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
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(Abstract)

# SOVIET PERCEPTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES

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The main objectives of this study have been to explore systematically the nature and sources of current Soviet perceptions of the United States, the extent and character of changes in Soviet beliefs as have occurred as a result of the research activities of Georgi Arbatov and his associates at the USA Institute in Moscow and the significance of these views for Soviet-American relations. More specifically, the analysis concentrates on Soviet perceptions in four main areas: 1) the American socio-economic system, its strengths and weaknesses and its influence on the goals and conduct of US foreign policy; 2) the political system of the United States, the Presidency, the State and Defense Departments, the Congress and other sources of influence on the formation of policy (special interest groups, the media and public opinion); 3) the characteristics and behavior of US policy makers; and 4) expectations regarding future American policy. These findings are also examined in the context of Soviet domestic political arrangements and in terms of possible policy implications for the United States.

The socio-economic system. It is the view of Soviet Americanists that, though currently facing a serious crisis, the economy remains basically sound and, more importantly, is still a very important source of American power. Recent economic difficulties, however, are seen to have had a major political impact. As a result of their considerable travails--inflation, declining production, falling profits, rising taxes--the product of "overheating" caused by the Vietnam War, a significant segment of the American "ruling circles" have become sharply critical of US foreign policy, especially on such issues as Vietnam and sustained high levels of military spending. Despite traditional ideological beliefs, the American corporate interests are losing their vested interest in the arms race and, increasingly, becoming supporters of detente, especially expanded trade.

The multiple crises of the late 1960s--racial violence, political assassinations, the anti-war protest movement--are seen to have precipitated a re-examination of American national priorities, leading to government policy changes in favor of increased allocations to social welfare programs (and, proportionately, away from military appropriations) and, as well, caused some degree of spiritual demoralization. The Nixon Administration's concern to stabilize the American home front, it is believed, was one of the main factors leading to the foreign policy changes of the early 1970s. There was little expectation among Soviet analysts that the crisis, though sharp, would be very serious. Given their growing concern about the danger of fascism in the West, this fact was greeted with silent relief.

The political system. American politics is recognized as being dominated by the President who, though restrained at times by a recalcitrant bureaucracy, is the central source of political power. The President can, "in the interests of the long-term general welfare of the capitalist system as a whole," pursue

policies which conflict with individual capitalist groups. The United States, especially when led by strong Presidents--like Roosevelt, Kennedy or Nixon--can undertake imaginative new initiatives in foreign policy despite the opposition of strongly-entrenched conservative elements. The role of the President, therefore, is crucial.

The Congress is less-well understood although, recently, it has been receiving more attention. Congressional authority over governmental appropriations (especially its increasingly critical posture toward the Pentagon and responsibility for foreign economic policy is of growing interest. (In their discussions of the Congress, it might be noted, Soviet analysts seem to be only faintly aware of the nature of American constitutional processes. Watergate genuinely mystifies them.)

The State and Defense Departments are viewed in largely negative terms. Both agencies are believed to be staffed by officials who made their professional careers in the cold war and who have, therefore, a vested interest in its continuation. The revitalization of the National Security Council system in the late 1960s was designed, precisely, to overcome the largely immobile bureaucracy at the State Department, a major obstacle to the diplomatic initiatives of the Administration, and the powerful influence of the strongly anti-Soviet Department of Defense. While not monolithic in their opposition, both agencies are ranked among the enemies of improved Soviet-American relations. The power and influence of Henry Kissinger, especially in his role as Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, is seen to be an effective counterweight. His "realistic" policy initiatives, however, are not without their inconsistencies.

Among the special interest groups, American business is currently seen to play a positive role supportive of detente. The "Arms Control Community" is recognized to be an influential source of criticism of Pentagon requests for new weapons systems. "Think tanks" specializing in strategic analysis (especially SRI and IDA) are described as having considerable influence at the Pentagon (and therefore worth cultivating) while "Sovietologists," regarded as professionally hostile to the Soviet Union, are waning in influence.

Public opinion is identified as a very potent political force in American public life. The anti-war movement, it is believed, forced President Johnson to quit the White House and pressured the Republican Administration of Richard Nixon to terminate the Vietnam War. Its ultimate weapon is seen to be the threat of withdrawal of electoral support, a factor which, given the unusual concentration of Jewish voters in five major states, has had a direct bearing on American policy in the Middle East. The media, in general, is seen to be the mouthpiece of vested economic interests serving little independent political purpose save, on occasion, as a foil for some conniving bureaucrat. (The role of the media, like that of the Congress, having no counterpart in Soviet political experience, is dimly understood).

US policy makers. Given the primacy of the Presidency, the personal qualities of specific leaders are carefully weighed by Soviet analysts. Recent administration attitudes towards the use of force has received particular attention. In the judgement of Soviet Americanists, this picture remains essentially unchanged. The policies of the Nixon Administration, as reflected in the American invasion of Cambodia and its threat to intervene during the civil war in Jordan in 1970, its policies during the Indo-Pakistani war of 1971, the bombing of Hanoi in 1972, its Middle Eastern policy in 1973 (the



military alert during the Yom Kippur War) are seen to be consistent with those of its predecessors. The willingness to resort to military force remains a major characteristic of US foreign policy.

Despite this negative assessment, the current Administration is recognized as far more "realistic," and restrained in its foreign policy than have been previous ones. The "realism" of recent US policy-makers can best be seen in their commitment to détente rather than confrontation (testified to by the summit agreements), the abandonment of the "positions of strength" policy of insisting on American military supremacy and sensitivity toward the issues of nuclear deterrence and the need to prevent nuclear war. The Administration's moderation of America's long-standing anti-communist posture and its willingness to negotiate with the USSR as a political equal are additional indication of the moderate character of the present leadership.

Policy expectations. The political dominance of "realistic" elements in US policy-making circles ensures, at least in the short run, the continued American commitment to détente. While the enemies of this policy, especially the "military-industrial complex," remain active, their power and influence have declined. Leadership concern to restore the health and trade position of the economy, to avoid "more Vietnams," to take stock of the domestic implications of foreign policy commitments (including the levels of military spending required to support them), to control the strategic arms competition, all are well-established attitudes which will continue to press the United States along its current détente line.

The 1976 elections open up the possibility of significant change. It is believed, however, that even were Senator Jackson to become President, he could not escape the pressures confronting the present Administration. If Richard Nixon, himself a former militant anti-communist, could modify his position, so might a Henry Jackson shift toward the center.

Though committed to détente, the United States, it is believed, remains faithful to its traditional defense posture. The budget requests of Secretary Schlesinger are seen to be not simply his own concoctions but an expression of the Administration's overall foreign policy. However, annual Pentagon alarms regarding threats to national security now must compete with the growing concern over domestic issues--urban problems, social welfare, public transportation.

Conclusions. In contrast to previously published analyses, the writings of current Soviet Americanists present an increasingly realistic picture of the United States, often at the expense of doctrinal beliefs. The textbook versions of "state-monopoly capitalism" have given way to more sophisticated assessments in which the policies of the United States government are seen to be the result of a medley of influences--political, bureaucratic, historical, even psychological--as well as the once dominant "class interests" of the "ruling circles." "Predatory imperialism" has, in Arbatov's phrase, become an "acceptable partner." Despite the political need to explain their findings in terms consistent with Marxist-Leninist ideology, a fact which gives a rather hard cast to their judgements, the views of Arbatov and the USA Institute represent a distinctively moderate trend in the spectrum of Soviet opinion. The current détente relationship with the Soviet Union should be conceived of as, among other things, offering an opportunity to strengthen the political position of such "realistic" elements in the Soviet leadership.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION	1
PART I: ECONOMY AND SOCIETY	9
The American Economy	10
The Crisis of Bourgeois Society	26
PART II: THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM	36
"State-Monopoly Capitalism"	37
The American President	43
The U.S. Congress	49
The Foreign Policy Mechanism: Departments of State and Defense	57
The National Security Council	58
The State Department	58
The Defense Department	65
Other Influences	71
Special Interest Groups	71
a) Economic	71
b) Academic	72
1) The Arms Control Community	73
2) "Think Tanks"	75
3) Soviet Specialists	75
Public Opinion and the Media	77
Public Opinion	78
The Media	83
PART III: U.S. POLICY MAKERS	87
The Use of Force	88
The New Realism	100
Attitudes Toward the Soviet Union	112
PART IV: POLICY EXPECTATIONS	119
Two Tendencies	121
The Opponents of Détente	124
The Forces of Moderation	127
PART V: CONCLUSIONS	140
NOTES	154

## SOVIET PERCEPTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES

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### INTRODUCTION

Among the problems confronting American policy makers, few are more vexing than that of assessing the images other, especially adversaries, have of the United States. While there clearly are limits to American power and influence, much of what transpires in the world arena hinges on the actual and anticipated behavior of the United States. This is especially true in the case of the world's other superpower, the USSR. A great deal of what the Kremlin rulers attempt to do, or not to do, rests on their estimation of how we will behave in various circumstances. While their choices are undoubtedly influenced by other factors--external circumstances, dangers, opportunities, resources--the Soviet "image of America" has an important, often critical, bearing on the formulation of policy.

The connection between Soviet perceptions and behavior is, in principle, well understood. The facts, however, have been a source of puzzlement. How, indeed, do the makers of Soviet policy view the United States? This issue is vastly complicated by the central role played by Marxism-Leninism in the Soviet scheme of things. Given their adherence to these doctrines as the official ideology of the Soviet Communist Party, the leaders of the USSR are compelled to see the United States in a



particular light. After all, as the most advanced nation, economically and militarily, in the non-Communist world, this country is regarded as the "citadel" of world capitalism, its "mightiest bulwark." As such, it is by definition presumed to be dominated by a "bourgeois" socio-economic and political system, i.e., one which is basically exploitative, oppressive, decadent, and crisis-ridden, and to pursue an "imperialist"--hence aggressive, predatory, anti-socialist (and anti-Soviet)--foreign policy.

And, indeed, the United States has been described precisely in such terms for much of recent Soviet history. The political leadership during Stalin's last years in the late 1940's and early 1950's gave voice to a particularly crude version of the Marxist-Leninist formulation. The United States, according to their expressed views, was ruled by a small clique of Wall Street finance capitalists dedicated to the pursuit and protection of their immediate class interests. All else in American life--the political process, the press, domestic social and economic arrangements, the <sup>politics</sup> culture, foreign policy--was said to be ruthlessly subordinated to the defense of these interests. In the strange realm of Stalinist political mythology, as Frederick Barghoorn wrote twenty-five years ago, "America resembles more closely the horrid fantasy of Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four than the country we know."

The America in Soviet propaganda is ruled by force and fraud. Its handful of rulers pull the strings to which their subjects dance like puppets. Its domestic policy is one of exploitation and oppression and its foreign policy is characterized by deception and aggression.<sup>1</sup>

As an integral part of his cold war campaign--waged with equal vigor both at home and abroad--Stalin insisted that all materials pertaining

to the United States had to be presented in these sinister terms. The official Party attitude which then prevailed was reflected in the Pravda (September 2, 1950) statement: "Every Marxist work on the economics of capitalist countries must be a bill of indictment." And given the fact that responsible Soviet officials were, as a matter of policy, isolated from contact with the United States and denied access to independent sources of information, there is little reason to assume that their political outlook differed significantly from the official Party orthodoxy.

In the two decades or so since Stalin's death in 1953, the situation has significantly changed. Seeking to break with the obscurantist practices of the Stalin period, top Party leaders in the mid-1950's instructed Soviet scholars to abandon the "dogmatic and oversimplifying" attitudes of the past. They were urged, in particular, to provide a more objective assessment of the outside world. And, as numerous writers have indicated, Soviet writings started taking on an increasingly less-dogmatic tone in the Khrushchev years and slowly but steadily improved.<sup>2</sup> However, it was only after the creation of the Institut Soyedinennykh Shtatov Ameriki (Institute of the United States of America), or Institut SSHA (USA Institute) in 1967 and the major research efforts of its director, Georgi A. Arbatov, and his fellow Americanists, that, relatively speaking, more realistic accounts of America began to appear. Although they clearly are not free from the normal requirements of Soviet scholarship and must hew closely to the political leadership's ideological and policy line, the analyses of Moscow's Americanists, especially in the past few



years, have been significantly better informed and more sophisticated than any previously published in the USSR.

While there is general agreement on these basic facts, there is little consensus on their implications. Some have argued that greater familiarity with the United States resulting from their research activities and frequent visits to this country, has led to a considerably greater objectivity. Issues of American politics, writes Hannes Adomeit, tend to be discussed "on their merits." Thus, it is suggested, the weight of doctrinal preconceptions has been reduced, a development which, at least potentially, could lead to a more pragmatic and realistic approach to political reality and to the making of Soviet policy.<sup>3</sup>

Others take an even more optimistic view. As a result of their greater competence and sophistication, it is suggested, Soviet experts today tend to regard American foreign policy as more benign and less threatening than did the more dogmatic political analysts of the past. This evolution in Soviet thinking has been especially important and helps explain recent achievements in Soviet-American relations. After all, the willingness of the Kremlin leaders to negotiate agreements with the United States on, say, strategic arms limitation, rests on their belief that Washington is pursuing a policy course which poses no immediate threat to basic Soviet security interests.<sup>4</sup>

There are still some who view Soviet research as primitive and devoid of understanding. Robert Byrnes, for example, argues that Soviet analysts lack any feel for "what makes us tick."

The work they do is not only propagandistic but also shows an inability to understand our culture. Some of the writing is not even malicious--it simply displays a total lack of comprehension. . . . Even those Russians who have spent a year in America work on a mental frequency that will just not pick up American signals.

The level of Soviet scholarship, in Byrnes' view, "is incredibly low."<sup>5</sup>

More respectful but much more pessimistic is the position of Uri Ra'anan who suggests that the current Soviet effort to gain a better understanding of America may have a disturbing, perhaps even destabilizing, influence on Soviet-American relations. What troubles Ra'anan is the fact that the Kremlin is pursuing this effort precisely at a time in our history when we seem overcome by internal disarray and malaise. Domestic problems are mounting--unemployment, inflation, racial tension, urban violence--and political processes are working uncertainly--two Presidents have been forced to retire, the Congress, the press and the American public are increasingly mistrustful of the executive branch. All these facts are carefully studied and duly noted in Moscow. The Soviet leaders, it is feared, are thus being led to the conclusion that the United States is gradually being turned into a "paper tiger."<sup>6</sup>

This clash of views, it should be noted, is no mere academic squabble. As is true for possible shifts in the Soviet views themselves these various assessments of Soviet beliefs about the United States have important--and very different--policy implications. Putting it somewhat crudely, to the extent that Soviet scholarship is seen to reflect relatively moderate views (and that important elements in the Soviet

political leadership are judged to share similar beliefs), the makers of American policy might want to consider adopting a "strategy of reassurance." That is to say, the American government should strive to avoid actions which will discredit this view; it should, where feasible, actively seek to encourage the belief that American purposes vis-à-vis the USSR are friendly, that its interests are indeed being taken into account by Washington and that the United States and the USSR share numerous interests in common. To the extent that dogmatic anti-American views have in fact declined in Moscow, this "strategy of reassurance" should help reinforce this development, help build mutual trust and, hopefully, stimulate further improvement in Soviet-American relations.

If, on the other hand, one assumes that the Soviet rulers see the United States as beset by serious social, economic and political crises, the adoption of a much more forceful policy may be in order. To help discourage the USSR from assuming that, because of incessant domestic turmoil, American power on the world scene is becoming increasingly irrelevant, Ra'anan suggests the American government pursue a policy of "intentional unpredictability." Only by occasional and somewhat unpredictable demonstrations of U.S. determination and strength, he argues, will the Soviet leadership be dissuaded from pursuing a more assertive and more dangerous foreign policy course.<sup>7</sup>

The present study addresses itself to the questions raised above, viz., it seeks to examine the Soviet conception of what they would identify as the "internal springs" of American foreign policy. Its main purpose



is to explore current Soviet perceptions of the United States, the extent and character of changes in Soviet beliefs as seem to have occurred in recent years, and the significance of these views for Soviet-American relations. More specifically, the study will analyze Soviet perceptions regarding four main areas: 1) the American socio-economic system, its strengths and weaknesses, and its influence on the goals and conduct of US policy; 2) the political system of the United States, <sup>the Presidency,</sup> the executive agencies formally responsible for foreign policy, the Congress, and the role of non-government agencies; 3) the characteristics and behavior of American policy makers; and 4) expectations regarding future American behavior. These findings will be examined in the context of domestic Soviet political arrangements. Their policy implications for the United States will also be explored.

\* \* \* \* \*

A word about methodology. The analysis which follows is based essentially on the writings of Soviet academic specialists on the United States as they have appeared in a number of books published by the USA Institute and in the pages of SShA: ekonomika, politika, ideologiya (USA: Economics, Politics, Ideology), the journal of the Institute published since January 1970 (hereinafter cited as SShA).<sup>8</sup> Its focus, therefore, is not on the expressed views of the top Party leadership nor those of the Soviet government agencies responsible for foreign policy--the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the Ministry of Defense.

Thus, in some measure, the materials used are not representative in the sense that they often differ considerably from the accounts on the same subject appearing in the Soviet media. The writings of the Soviet Amerikanisty are, at one and the same time, richer in detail and more sophisticated in analysis.<sup>9</sup> And, to the extent that we are searching for evidence of innovation, the analytic focus of the paper will tend to be distorted in favor of the most imaginative aspects of Soviet writings on the United States. Also, by the very nature of the enterprise, there is a tendency to give these findings a coherence and, thereby, a collective weight which, in fact, they rarely have.

To control for over evaluation and excessive enthusiasm, the reader should try to keep in mind that the materials cited are, often only isolated nuggets buried in a vast field of orthodox Party formulations. They are, most typically, unevenly distributed and, in many cases, hard to find. We should also be aware that we are dealing with mere words which should not always be taken at face value. As the Soviet political analyst, Alexander Bovin, has recently reminded us: "The verbal expression of policy can play a dual role: It either reflects real political interests and intentions or, conversely, is called upon to conceal these interests and intentions."<sup>10</sup> Nevertheless, the importance of innovation in Soviet public discourse should not be minimized. Given the rigorous demands of a Party leadership highly intolerant of unorthodox formulations and views, even occasional hints that Soviet perceptions of the United States may be changing must be considered as politically significant and,

perhaps, carry with them important policy implications. We shall return to this last point in our final section.

## PART I

### ECONOMY AND SOCIETY

Soviet attitudes toward the American socio-economic system reveal an odd mixture of respect and contempt. The Soviet leaders strive at once to "catch up" with the United States and to "bury it". As Paul Hollander has noted, this country is seen both as model and adversary.<sup>1</sup> The slogan "catching up with America" reflects the Kremlin's long-standing admiration for the productivity, organizational efficiency and technological sophistication of American industry and agriculture.<sup>2</sup> While urging Soviet workers to "overtake and surpass" the United States, the Soviet leaders refer to American culture and society with a deep and profound contempt. Soviet revulsion is founded on the conviction that a society built on the institution of private property must, inevitably, give rise to an unjust socio-economic system, one which generates ruthless exploitation, enormous inequalities of wealth, fierce competitiveness, commercialization of relationships, and general moral decadence. Thus, for Khrushchev, "capitalism is not simply an unjust economic system. It is a way of life that leads to a corruption of important values."<sup>3</sup> And he remained convinced that, for all of its economic strength, capitalism in the United States is fated by history to decline. Hence his belief that a socialist USSR will "bury" or outlive "capitalist America."



Such pronouncements, while revealing much about Soviet self-images,<sup>4</sup> tell us rather little regarding the forces and factors which, in their estimation, shape American foreign policy. Much more useful, in this regard, are the recent discussions of major trends in the American economy.

#### The American Economy

Orthodox Marxist theorists make two judgments about the character and future of the American economic system which have a direct bearing on foreign policy. First, it is a verity of orthodox Marxist doctrine that, when "mature," the capitalist economy--as a result of its "internal contradictions"--will just shrink and then collapse, a fact which would of course have ruinous implications for both internal stability and America's world role. Second, even before its historically-determined collapse, the "social nature" of the American socio-economic system is said to engender pressure to resolve both domestic and foreign policy problems by imperialist, i.e., aggressive, military means. Although both formulations are frequently referred to in the popular press, Soviet Americanists have offered strikingly unconventional interpretations of these basic dogmas.

Soviet officials have long held American technological achievements in high regard. Stalin himself was an admirer of American economic efficiency--which he hoped to combine with "Russian revolutionary sweep." Despite his respect for its accomplishments, he believed that growth rates in American industry were, save for abnormal wartime situations, on

the decline. Under Khrushchev, Stalin's stagnation theory was repudiated. Quoting Lenin, he said at the 20th Party Congress: "It would be a mistake to believe that the tendency to decay precludes the rapid growth of capitalism."<sup>5</sup> Traditional predictions regarding the increasing severity of capitalist economic cycles were quietly abandoned. As one official recently noted, "Soviet economists have long cast aside former ideas of an automatic collapse or shrinkage of capitalism. On the contrary, they appreciate its ability to develop productive forces and to control, to some extent, its cyclical movements. . . ."<sup>6</sup>

The measure of respect accorded the American economy is reflected in the highly complimentary--though sharply critical--article by Nikolai N. Inozemtsev, director of the Institute for World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), in the first issue of SShA. The United States, writes Inozemtsev, possesses "the mightiest and most highly-organized production mechanism" in the capitalist world. In 1968, he notes, it was the source of 44.2% of the industrial production of the capitalist economies, with second-ranked Germany producing only 8.8%. The United States, he goes on, was capitalism's largest exporter, especially strong in power equipment, nuclear reactors, aircraft, wheat, corn and foreign investment capital. "No capitalist country," in Inozemtsev's judgment, "can count on reaching a par with the U.S.A. in economic indices in the near future."<sup>7</sup> This enormous economic power is of particular concern, of course, because of its implications for American military power. "In this respect too," notes Inozemtsev, "the USA holds a special place. . . ." Which leads him to



conclude that "Thanks to its economic and military might, the position of the U.S.A. . . . is that of a kind of 'superpower' . . . ."<sup>8</sup>

Although Inozemtsev is quick to point out periodic slumps in US industrial production, "deformations" such as unemployment, enormous wasting of resources, and "very acute" social and political problems--the anti-war movement, the civil rights struggle, and "various manifestations of social protest,"--there is little expectation of serious economic problems ahead. In fact, he regards numerous features of American industrial processes--such as the use of computers in supply and marketing systems and <sup>the</sup> modernization of management systems on the basis of programming and production forecasting--as of "considerable interest" to the USSR. An economy this mighty and this advanced is, surely, hardly about to expire.

Despite the deterioration in American economic conditions which has occurred since this article was written, Soviet analysts have remained essentially "optimistic." They do, as one would expect, pay considerable attention to rising inflation, unemployment, declines in industrial production, the energy crisis, monetary and financial instability,

These are all condemned as the economic symptoms of the illness of contemporary capitalism, further indication of its "deepening contradictions." Yet, despite the fact that this has been the most severe economic turndown in postwar American history, one which has confused and frightened some of our own analysts, Soviet experts are still quite confident of the long-term stability and vitality of the U.S. economy.

In mid-1971, for example, in an article devoted to the "acute" domestic, especially economic, problems confronting the United States, Valentin Zorin concluded rather grimly that the 1970's will see a further exacerbation of America's difficulties. However, he goes on:

In speaking about the prospects of the next decade, it would, of course, be incorrect to assume that the American bourgeoisie has exhausted all of its potentialities and reserves and that, therefore, there is nothing left for it but to sag under the weight of its vices and sicknesses. The United States is the most powerful and richest capitalist country which still possesses considerable economic and political reserves. . . .<sup>9</sup>

The serious worsening of economic circumstances in the United States in the following years raised doubt.<sup>9</sup> Yet the worst indictment a recent symposium at the USA Institute could come up with was that "the serious aggravation" of 1973-1974 demonstrates the "instability" of the American economy and its "susceptibility to severe fluctuations." The assessment of the Soviet economists present, it was reported, did not completely coincide. Some predicted "a further decline of industrial production and of GNP." However, according to economist A. V. Anikin, head of IMEMO's Department on the U.S. Economy, "in the opinion of other participants. . . , the slump of 1973-1974 represents merely a temporary interruption of upward trend" of the US economy. In their view, "the second half of 1974 will see a resumption of the upward swing which may last another one or two years, or even longer."<sup>10</sup>

The sources of this abiding confidence in the vitality of the American economy are two. First, Soviet analysts consider American scientific and technological capabilities to be a source of enormous

economic strength. For example, in an article on the "scientific and technical revolution," Georgi Arbatov, USA Institute Director, notes that the United States has long played a major role in this arena.

The United States unquestionably has very strong positions in this sphere, primarily by virtue of its great economic possibilities which are so important for creating a mighty scientific and technical potential.<sup>11</sup>

This is a matter of considerable significance, notes Arbatov, for today science has become "a direct productive force." It is, in his view, "the source of the continuously accelerating and widening stream of innovations in all spheres."<sup>12</sup>

While insisting that American pre-eminence is only transitory,<sup>13</sup> Arbatov underscores the fact that "competition with the United States is an extremely complex matter." He ends on a somewhat ominous note:

States which cannot create a sufficiently powerful scientific and technical potential of their own are faced with a difficult dilemma under such conditions. They have a choice: Either they fall seriously behind. . .or they tie themselves firmly to a country which possesses such a potential. . . .<sup>14</sup>

Though Arbatov was specifically referring to the "other capitalist countries," he clearly had his own country's interests at heart as well.

Thus, while the advantage may be only "fleeting," as Arbatov suggests, "he who is in front can derive certain--sometimes substantial--economic, military or political benefit" from his technological mastery.<sup>15</sup> As numerous Soviet economists have observed, it has been precisely this phenomenon, the so-called "technological gap" which has aided the American penetration of European markets and allowed the United States to maintain



its economic primacy. As a result of its technological superiority, the United States is recognized as having achieved a dominant position in the "latest fields," viz., semiconductors, digital control systems, electronic computers, production of automation equipment, information systems, turbo-jet engines, and numerous others. Thus, although in quantitative terms the economic power of the European countries and Japan--and the Soviet Union--have been increasing rapidly, "The 'technological gap' between the United States and its competitors is growing wider."<sup>16</sup>

American technological capabilities, therefore, are an enormous reserve of economic strength. Thus, the problem of "raw material shortages" which looms so large in the thinking of Western economists is, in the Soviet view, not a terribly serious one. First of all, according to a resource analyst for Ekonomicheskaya gazeta, "the United States has colossal natural reserves of the majority of raw materials which are quite suitable for industrial development. . . ."<sup>17</sup> In addition, Inozemtsev suggests that, *и* "scientific and technical progress itself is constantly creating new potential. . . for developing power generation, for replacing a number of natural types of raw materials by artificial and synthetic materials. . . ."<sup>18</sup> Given the store placed in the "scientific-technical revolution," Soviet analysts clearly believe that problems which would strain the economies of lesser nations are, for the United States, soluble.

A second major source of American economic strength, in the Soviet view, has been the introduction of the Keynesian practices--what Soviet

economists like to refer to as "state-monopoly regulation of the economy." The Johnson administration's "new economics," note Soviet observers, led to "the active utilization. . . of the state mechanism for insuring steady and higher rates of growth." Thus, in the view of Y. I. Bobrakov, leading economist at the U.S.A. Institute,

The significant increase in the American economy during the period 1961-68, when the adjusted GNP increased almost 1.5 times, was due not only to favorable economic conditions but, in many respects, also to the purposeful utilization of state resources to support and stimulate the national economy.<sup>19</sup>

By the late 1960's, however, the combined problems of recession and inflation were said to "show plainly" that there were "serious flaws" in this system.<sup>20</sup> According to IMEMO economist V. M. Shamberg, the economic crisis of the early months of the Nixon Administration "struck a heavy blow at the views and concepts guiding American economists in suggesting measures to stimulate and control the economy."

The crisis and the continued inflation most clearly proved that uncontrolled forces operate in the U.S. economy, largely unaffected by the influence of state-monopoly capitalism.<sup>21</sup>

Thus, he concludes, the hopes of those who relied on government regulation to insure "long term balanced economic growth at optimal rates and stable prices were not justified." The "uncontrolled factors," in his view, are now taking their "revenge."<sup>22</sup>

Others, however, retain the faith. They argue that, as economic difficulties have mounted, new methods of controlling the economy are being employed--including planning. American economists, writes Anikin,

are now "actively debating" a "capitalist state plan." "Plan or perish. . . or, in any case, at least 'plan or fall behind'" has become the slogan.<sup>23</sup>

This shift to a more "systematic approach," to "long term projections and prognostications" is seen as promising. ". . . Naturally," writes Bobrakov, "no amount of programming can eliminate the inherent contradictions of capitalism. . . ." "However," he goes on,

it would be erroneous to discount the ability of modern state monopoly capitalism in the United States to exert a rational effect upon the production process, stimulate economic growth and accelerate its tempo.<sup>24</sup>

Thus, to ensure continued economic growth, US "state-monopoly capitalism" is resorting to "unaccustomed methods of regulation." "For the sake of maintaining the position of capitalism as a whole," writes Anikin, "The state is forced to inject itself to a heretofore unthinkable extent" into the private sector of the economy. We shall have occasion to meet this formulation--introduction of "unaccustomed methods" for the sake of "the system as a whole"--again.

In the judgment of Soviet analysts, then, the United States still has not exhausted its economic potential. Though carefully watching for economic "difficulties," "fluctuations," and "contradictions," they are wary of overstating them. "Be careful," Arbatov warned an Italian Communist newspaperman in May 1974, "the U.S. economy remains very strong: It is still 40% of the entire world capitalist economy."<sup>26</sup> Soviet respect for this country's "possibilities" has been such that, in contrast to the Stalin period--when there was "wide acceptance of the thesis that the volume of production in capitalist countries would decline"--Inozemtsev now



feels obliged to warn his colleagues that "imperialism's strength and possibilities should not be exaggerated."<sup>27</sup> A major economic collapse does not, in the view of Soviet analysts, appear imminent--or likely. And those--like the American Black Panther Party--who base their political strategy on such an unlikely turn of events--are chided for their "underestimation of the capabilities of state-monopoly regulation."<sup>28</sup>

While the economy of American capitalism is viewed as essentially sound, what of its "aggressive" character? Here, even more dramatically, orthodox stereotypes have been significantly modified.

Party doctrine, as noted earlier, has traditionally held the view that the capitalist socio-economic system is, by nature, predatory. Domestic conflict and contradictions, are said to "force the ruling circles of the imperialist countries to search for an outlet in foreign adventures and in the aggravation of international tension."<sup>29</sup> The rulers of "monopoly capitalism" deliberately encourage "military gambles" in order to secure overseas markets and investments and, at the same time, to promote militarization of the economy--both of which generate enormous super-profits.<sup>30</sup>

The child and prime beneficiary of this system is the infamous "military-industrial complex," the "monopoly weapons manufacturers, . . . top military brass, . . . and the bureaucrats and scientists specializing in weapons design." This "reactionary alliance," writes G. A. Trofimenko, head of USA Institute's Department of <sup>U.S. Foreign Policy,</sup> ~~International Affairs~~, is "the most bellicose grouping" in the capitalist system whose "vested interest

in the arms race. . . has sharply intensified" the bourgeoisie's "general class aspirations toward militarism." Thus, the "military-industrial complex" is seen to play the role of "a constant catalyst of militarist processes and military adventures."<sup>31</sup> The main objectives of this unwholesome group are "an increase in the share of the national budget earmarked for military purposes--the creation and retention on a permanent basis of a wartime economy and wartime business condition." Given these purposes, "tension and world conflicts play into the hands of the military-state monopoly grouping."<sup>32</sup>

It is not, however, the "military-industrial complex" alone which profits from an aggressive foreign policy. As a Soviet textbook notes:

An increase in state military orders sometimes acts as a lever for increasing overall production, including goods for civilian use. It can also temporarily promote a certain increase in wages, particularly of those employed in war industry.<sup>33</sup> (*Italics in the original.*)

High levels of military spending, therefore, bring benefits to all sectors, not just those corporations with defense contracts. The capitalist economy as a whole is thus believed to have a vested interest in international tension and the arms race.

The orthodox position may be put thus: "Imperialism gives rise to militarism and militarism under contemporary state-monopoly capitalist conditions inevitably leads to the creation of a military-state-monopoly grouping" which, in turn, "further urges on and intensifies the process of militarization and militarism." This "sinister spiral,"



according to Tsagolov, is "one of the most dangerous and vicious, although perfectly natural manifestations" of American capitalism.<sup>34</sup>

As an illustration of this "perfectly natural" connection between "state-monopoly capitalism" and the arms race, Anatoly Gromyko points to the first military budget of the Kennedy administration. In the early 1960's, Gromyko writes, "economic indicators increasingly demonstrated that the United States was entering a period of critical decline in production. . . . As in earlier situations of this nature, great hopes were placed in the arms race and military expenditures as measures to combat the crisis. . . . The new President did not break with tradition. . . ."<sup>35</sup> In the view of Gromyko and other militants, therefore, it is the "predatory nature of capitalist society" which "forms the basis of the foreign policy and diplomacy" of the United States. "No smoothing over or prettifying up of imperialist diplomacy is capable of changing its entirely negative essence."<sup>36</sup>

In the more recent scholarly literature, this view has been distinctively modified. The arms race, militarism and even an aggressive foreign policy are no longer seen as, automatically, working to the advantage of the American socio-economic system. In fact, as analysts have been arguing at great length in the pages of SShA and elsewhere, significant segments of the American business and political leadership of the United States have come to regard high levels of military spending as economically--and politically--dangerous.

The most articulate spokesman for this position is Institute Director Georgi Arbatov. "Until recently," Arbatov noted in a lecture

at the University of Michigan, "considerable numbers of Americans saw the arms race as an instrument for preventing economic slumps and depressions in their country. . . ." Now, he goes on, ". . . the situation has started to change. . . . It has. . . started to become increasingly obvious that colossal military expenditure in no way stimulates prosperity. . . but, on the contrary, has a destructive effect on the U.S. economy." Soviet analysts have long held such views. What is critical is that, "this fact is finding ever wider acceptance in the United States."<sup>37</sup>

What explains this dramatic turnabout? According to Arbatov, the main factor has been "the enormous costs of the modern arms race," the result of "the accelerating obsolescence of weapons" (the "logic" of unchecked scientific and technical progress "forcing one again and again to replace improved type weapons by yesterday's standards with ever more modern ones"). <sup>Furthermore,</sup> with each new generation of weapons, costs rise in "truly geometric progression." The impact of these developments on the economy has been striking.

The military economy has grown from a relatively small sector, which the ruling class even regarded as a useful "balance wheel"--enabling the state to regulate economic fluctuations by softening the impact of cyclical crises--into an enormous unproductive part of the economy, disturbing the normal operation of the economic mechanism.<sup>38</sup>

In view of these spiraling weapons costs, Arbatov writes the economic consequences of huge military expenditures have been very severe. US military expenditures of \$1.2 trillions in the postwar period resulted in "inflation, rising taxes, a shrinking domestic market, the undermining

of the USA's competitive position and the exacerbation of domestic problems."<sup>39</sup> In light of these conditions, ever larger numbers of Americans are now aware that even "such a rich country as the United States" cannot "provide both 'guns and butter' at the same time."<sup>40</sup>

The "bankruptcy of <sup>policy</sup> traditional American<sub>A</sub> became apparent during the war in Vietnam when "the interests of the military-industrial monopolies came into definite conflict with the interests of other more numerous and also highly influential groupings of monopoly capital." Underlying this "conflict of interests," according to Arbatov, was the fact that "of the 500 largest corporations from which the Dow-Jones average is compiled, only approximately 50 are connected with military matters."<sup>41</sup> The latter, clearly, benefitted from the Vietnam war. As Trofimenko noted: "The lion's share of the funds allotted for military purchases is to be found lying in the safes of aerospace and electronics industry monopolies and firms producing conventional arms and ammunition."<sup>42</sup> The great majority of firms, <sup>however,</sup> clearly suffered as corporate profits fell sharply as did the value of stocks, while taxes doubled. Thus, as Geyevsky wrote, "the war in Vietnam and the militarization of the economy had a negative effect upon the incomes of a considerable part of the American bourgeoisie."<sup>43</sup>

The impact of the Vietnam war, therefore, was unevenly felt. For the 50 corporations directly participating in military contracts--the "nucleus of the military-industrial complex"--it was enormously profitable and, to the bitter end, they urged its continuation. For the



remainder, Vietnam was a great burden which they grew to loath and to oppose. As Yuri A. Shvedkov, a leading foreign policy analyst at the USA Institute, has noted, the "global strategy" of American foreign policy "no longer suited U.S. monopoly circles. For just this reason representatives of certain very large banks and industrial monopolies in the USA began to come out in criticism of Washington's foreign policy and with demands for getting out of the war in Vietnam. . . ." To help achieve this end, they organized themselves into "Businessmen Against the War in Vietnam."<sup>44</sup>

Thus, according to Arbatov, "The economic interests of a considerable part of the ruling bourgeoisie began to collide with the old political line."<sup>45</sup> And the American government was compelled to modify its policies. "The discontent of business circles," he writes, was "one of the chief factors forcing President Johnson in 1968 to abandon plans for escalating the war (after the Tet Offensive) and to abandon the Presidency."<sup>46</sup> And to help deal with increasingly severe economic and social problems, the size of the military budget had to be brought down. As Soviet analysts have reported, the proportion of the US Federal budget devoted to military expenditures has declined from 44.6% in FY 1970 to 33% in FY 1974 and by 1978 should amount to 30%. While they stress that "the absolute amounts of military expenditures. . . are continuing to grow,"<sup>47</sup> the trend towards greater spending on social welfare and economic programs has been duly noted. And as part of a much larger anti-war movement--of which more shortly--US business interests pressured the Nixon administration to withdraw from Vietnam.

The above analysis suggests a clear departure from the traditional interpretation. While the orthodox Leninist view assumes a direct causal link between "monopoly capital" on the one hand, and an aggressive, militaristic foreign policy on the other, contemporary analysts now recognize that the two do not always necessarily go together. The American business community is now seen as internally divided between a relatively small group of major corporations--about 10% of the total, according to Arbatov's figures--who have an immediate stake in international tension and a stepping up of the arms race--and a large number from the non-military sector of the economy who regard high levels of defense spending with considerable misgivings. Thus, whereas earlier writers identified the whole of the business community with the "military-industrial complex"--on the ground that defense orders <sup>bring</sup> direct or indirect benefit to virtually all branches of the economy--economist A. G. Mileikovsky now argues that this view is "a mistake" since "not all of the big corporations gain access to this privileged market." Moreover, "militarization and its fellow traveller, inflation, represents a clear blow to the interests of a significant part of the corporations."<sup>48</sup> Given the fact that "the positions of various capitalist groups are determined by their real interests,"<sup>49</sup> it is not surprising that, on matters on foreign and defense policy, their views sharply differ.

However, the point is not merely that U.S. business corporations do not share equally in <sup>defense</sup> contracts. Previous writers have noted this.<sup>50</sup> What is significant is the fact that now, for the first time, "influential groups of monopoly capitalists" have come to understand that militarization

and war are no longer a reliable stimulus for economic development. While the "military-industrial complex" is believed to retain a political influence "much greater than its economic share,"<sup>51</sup> other segments of the American business community--especially the vastly larger multinational corporations<sup>52</sup>--are increasingly challenging both their policies and their political influence.

Traditional views regarding the "predatory nature" of capitalist society, therefore, have been revised. Soviet Americanists have concluded that the majority of American corporations do not have a stake in continued international tension and a prolonged arms race. From the orthodox view that the U.S. economy rests on its arms expenditures, it is now held that continued economic health depends on a curtailment of military spending. Thus, once regarded as the motive force behind the aggressive policies of the United States, the class interests of American big business are now seen to be the source behind Washington's more moderate stance.

One final point. In the view of Soviet Americanists, US policy makers no longer rely, as they are believed to have traditionally done, on military expenditures to control business cycles. Defense spending, as was noted by Arbatov, has been transformed from a "balance wheel" to a "disturber" of economic activity. Furthermore, as is now recognized, decisions regarding military spending often take place independently of business conditions. A major reason why intervention in Vietnam produced such serious consequences for the American economy, according to one writer, was its poor timing. Unlike World War II and the Korean war, when military production began during periods of economic recession--and, therefore,



had a stimulating effect on the economy as a whole--U.S. industrial production levels in the mid-1960's were already high. In these conditions, the extensive development of military spending resulted, inevitably, in an "overheated" economy.<sup>53</sup>

In the case of Vietnam, then, increased military budgets were adopted independent of business-cycle calculations. Decisions relating to defense spending, therefore, are not exclusively economic. This point is recognized by Arbatov who notes that "poor relations between states always spur on the arms race, serving as a justification for very large military appropriations, even under conditions of various economic difficulties."<sup>54</sup> While American policy-makers cannot shape policy in total disregard of economic factors--the "arrogant" assumption that this was possible has, in the Soviet view, created many of the economic difficulties currently facing this country--basic decisions regarding defense spending are considered to be essentially political.

#### The Crisis of Bourgeois Society

Soviet accounts of recent developments in American society take a predictable turn. The tumultuous events of this last decade--racial violence, student unrest, assassination of major political figures, Presidential instability--along with the more traditional symptoms of "social pathology"--unemployment, poverty, crime, drug abuse, pornography--were seen as further testimony of the crisis-ridden nature of capitalist society. When, in the latter 1960's the anti-Vietnam war protest movement turned from sit-ins to massive demonstrations, American society was seen

to be in serious disarray. Increasingly acute socio-economic crises were turning into a political and even spiritual crisis.

The importance attributed to the "increasing aggravation of domestic contradictions" in American society reflects, in some measure, the enthusiasm with which the newly-formed USA Institute approached its task. Many of its leading analysts, never having been in the United States before (Arbatov himself, as he told me in California in February 1969, was then on his first visit), could not but be fascinated by the "conflicts" and "tensions" of capitalist society, many of which were played out before their very eyes. Their analyses, in some cases, were smug and self-satisfied. For example, in his account of the "constantly growing difficulties which have befallen the citadel of capitalism," veteran Americanist Valentin Zorin writes:

For a time the leaders of the American bourgeoisie, self-satisfied and haughty, believed that they had succeeded in controlling the historical process and in finding a panacea for the troubles and evils of capitalist society. [They were] blinded by the rapid growth of the American economy, [and] lulled by the songs of the troubadors of bourgeois science who asserted that the means had been found of ensuring the continuous and crisis-free development of American society. . . .<sup>55</sup>

For Zorin, the disturbances and social unrest of the late 1960's were clear and gratifying evidence that capitalism's "general crisis" had not bypassed the United States.

While many may have shared Zorin's sense of pleasure, the social and political turmoil of the late 60's and early 70's were approached with the utmost seriousness. Some gave voice to the view--one also held by American commentators--that the mounting demonstrations and,



especially, the increasing levels of violence, were "tearing our society apart." The problems were seen as "extremely serious." The key question confronting the United States, according to one analyst was: "will it succeed in guiding the protests along the harmless channels of parliamentarianism or will it take forms which are more resolute and formidable for the social system. . . ."56 The threat of major social upheaval--even revolution--was not beyond mention.

Critically important, in the Soviet view, was the reaction of the American "ruling circles" to these deeply disturbing events. This was a "very critical period," writes Arbatov in mid-1971. Spreading "negro riots," the "very acute" problem of youth alienation (often referred to as the "disillusionment of the most sensitive elements in American bourgeois society"), the "rapid increase" in crime, drug addiction, immorality and pornography, the problems of the "sick" American economy, (declining growth rates, inflation, growing unemployment) were mounting in intensity. Even more significant he writes, was the "increasingly organic interlacing of those difficulties" with the opposition to the continued war in Vietnam, a war which many considered "immoral and criminal. . . ." Americans are losing faith, notes Arbatov--"not only the broad public but also the ruling circles."

Growing uneasiness, doubt with respect to the correctness of the policy that is being pursued and anxiety concerning the fact that the U.S.A. in entering a period of profound and dangerous internal convulsions became characteristic of a significant number of them during these years.<sup>57</sup>

The situation was seen as serious; worsening socio-economic crises were believed by Geyevsky to be "dangerously undermining the stability and shaking the foundations of bourgeois society."<sup>58</sup>

The "organic interlacing" of domestic problems and the anti-war movement produced what some analysts regarded as "a political crisis of unparalleled intensity," one which threatened the political stability of the United States. The American leadership was losing its self-confidence, writes Zorin (1971). Citing a speech given at Colorado Springs in September 1969, President Nixon is quoted: "we are encountering a collapse of confidence in the very government of the United States, a growing lack of confidence in all authority. . . ." "A great deal had to happen," writes Zorin, "for the President of the United States to make such a statement publicly." In his view, we were then facing "what may perhaps be called a crisis at the summit."<sup>59</sup> Others saw the situation similarly. Increasingly concerned about declining corporate profits, the American "ruling circles," according to Arbatov and Vitaly Zhurkin (1972), were also deeply worried about

the more indirect threats to their omnipotence which result from the aggravation of economic and social problems. . . and the increase in oppositional attitudes engendered by these difficulties.<sup>60</sup>

In response to this growing political crisis, Washington policy-makers began a review of America's "national priorities." To help find a way out of their increasingly acute crises, writes Geevsky, "real searches are taking place in the [American] ruling camp for a new and more effective social strategy. . . ."<sup>61</sup> This high-level policy review was seen to have had two major consequences: it was decided, first of all, "to put our own house in order," by giving greater attention, and resources, to domestic needs. This decision, and the increasingly obvious failure of

the war in Vietnam, led, second, to an over-all re-appraisal of the course of US foreign policy.

As a result of the "deepening crisis" of American capitalism, notes Geevsky, the decision was taken by the Nixon administration to give "priority to domestic needs in the distribution of budgetary appropriations. . . . This is witnessed, in particular, by the increase--absolute and relative--in federal expenditures for social needs." Though the amounts "look impressive," he comments, they are of course only "modest palliatives," the "most minimal concessions" designed to "reduce the acuteness of the most explosive problems and push back the wave of mass demonstrations." Nevertheless, this new policy decision is significant, especially since it "of course, results in great pressure on the federal budget, including on those items which were regarded as inviolable, military items. . . ." While the decline in expenditures for military purposes is "not in itself" an indication of a basic change in defense U.S. policy--especially since the absolute level of military spending remains the same--Geevsky quotes President Nixon's 1972 budget message statement that "for the first time in 20 years we have spent more to satisfy the needs of man than we have for defense needs." "Statements of this kind," he comments, "were entirely inconceivable several years ago. . . ."62

Thus, extremely tense social and political crises, compounded by serious economic difficulties, compelled the "ruling circles" of the United States to divert increasing funds to domestic social programs and, proportionally, away from the military budget. Equally important, in Soviet



eyes, was the impact of our domestic travails on the American spiritual climate. The events of the 1960's, writes Arbatov, have "thoroughly shaken" the faith of many in the United States in "the superiority of 'the American way of life'." The effect of social turmoil and violence was shattering, raising serious doubts not only about "the superiority of American economic, social and political institutions" but also about what he labelled as America's self-proclaimed "right to implant its 'ideals' throughout the world." Quoting from Andrew Hacker's The End of the American Era, Arbatov writes: "a growing number [of Americans] are convinced that the quality of life [they] have in this country can hardly serve as a pattern for export."<sup>63</sup>

The traumas of the 1960's, therefore, weakened the ideological underpinnings of US foreign policy. With the loss of confidence in the infallibility of American society, the "myth of the 'American era'" was discredited. The "nobility" of Washington's "mission. . . to 'defend' freedom and democracy" around the world, according to Arbatov, was called into doubt. Faith in traditional policies was further damaged by the futile war in Vietnam. "Millions of Americans," he writes, including "a significant segment of the ruling circles," are now asking: "Should and, most important, can their country continue to spend vast sums of money and manpower on the arms race and foreign-policy problems. . . ?"<sup>64</sup>

Thus, under the combined impact of domestic socio-economic crises and the war in Vietnam, "definite changes" began to occur in the foreign policy views of the American leadership. They began to "understand and admit the need for change," to raise questions

about the bankruptcy of old political precepts, about the need to take a new approach to many traditional policy concepts such as national security and national power and to recognize that the strength and international influence of the USA requires first of all concern for the stability of its own rear. . . .

And it is precisely this change of views which <sup>is identified as</sup> ~~was~~ the basis of the Nixon administration's decision to move from an "era of confrontation to an era of negotiations" in its relations with the Soviet Union.<sup>65</sup>

The implications of this analysis for the Soviet image of the American political system is most striking. Rather than assert, as many doctrinal Party spokesmen still do, that the "ruling circles of the monopoly bourgeoisie" seek a way out of internal crises in foreign policy adventures--to divert attention from domestic social ills--Soviet authors are now suggesting that anxiety regarding their "unreliable home front" (Zorin) has led American policy makers toward a more moderate foreign policy position. As in the case of the economy, the "vested interests" of the "ruling circles" are now considered to be poorly served by a policy of expansion and international tension.

This argument is spelled out by Zhurkin. Only quite recently, he suggests, "international conflicts and the chauvinist feelings they gave rise to were regarded in the United States [and in the Soviet Union<sup>3</sup>] as an important means of mobilizing public opinion. . . ." However, as the crises which occurred in France during the early 1960's (over the wars in Algeria and Indochina) indicate, international conflicts are increasingly "becoming a stimulus for the development of domestic political and social crisis in the country which has instigated the aggressive

actions. . . . The genuine split of American society over the issue of the Indochina war may serve as the most vivid illustration of this." Thus, rather than serve as a means to encourage "social peace," wars are now considered "one of the chief causes of domestic conflict."<sup>66</sup>

The current Soviet view is set forth by V. M. Berezhev, editor of SShA, when he writes that at

. . . the beginning of the seventies, past experience made the U.S. ruling circles abandon their unsuccessful attempts to resolve urgent domestic problems by all kinds of international adventures and an unrestrained arms race. In recent years, the understanding has grown that one cannot embark on the practical resolution of domestic problems without a favorable atmosphere in the world arena.<sup>67</sup>

In a stunning reversal of form, the social stability of "monopoly capitalism" in the United States--as well as its economic well-being--is now believed to require a tranquil international environment.

Two additional points. Although USA Institute clearly regarded the tumultuous developments of the 1960's as highly important--at least in terms of their impact on foreign policy--at no point were they regarded as seriously threatening the political stability of the United States.

For two reasons: First, in the view of most Soviet analysts, such potential for oppositional activity as may then have existed was weakened by internal divisions within the ranks of the system's adversaries.

According to Geyevsky, for example, "the black liberation movement" was torn by "certain ideological and political differences, different points of view on practical action, on ultimate goals, and on the ways and means of achieving these goals."<sup>68</sup> Similarly, Shvedkov observes that while "preconditions arose" for uniting the many democratic movements which



had developed. . . on a common anti-imperialist, anti-war platform," these were "only partially realized." The "organizational weakness" of these forces, "their lack of communication, a certain weakness in the progressive forces resulting from many years of persecution and repression," all stood in the way of their effective mobilization.<sup>69</sup> Little, clearly, was to be expected from the CPUSA.

Soviet authors take an equally dim view of the revolutionary potential of the American people. The traditional benchmarks of a revolutionary consciousness—class hatred of the oppressor, burning social resentment, intense passions about the intolerability of the present—are hardly to be found among the broad masses of Americans. Even the American working class is devoid of proletarian militancy. Betrayed by the "reactionary" trade union "bosses" of the AFL-CIO, the worker has apparently also been seduced by the "consumer society," (capitalism's strategy of ensuring social peace by means of overt bribery of the working class.) The American worker, notes Mileikovsky, has received "a marked increase in wages," improved housing, cars and other consumer durables, all of which has meant a real improvement in living standards. As he recognizes, fear of impoverishment no longer spurs the American worker to militant action. All Mileikovsky can find comfort in is the recent concern for the "quality of life" and the growing consumer movement, which he sees as evidence of a new militant spirit aimed against the ideals of the "consumer society."<sup>70</sup> For all its "profound spiritual crisis," the American working class is still a long way from the barricades.

Thus, Soviet judgments continue to be influenced by their high regard for American social and economic capabilities. As in the case of the economy, Soviet Americanists were confident of the "system's" ability to ride out the social convulsions of the late '60's and early '70's. In a symposium at the USA Institute in October 1972, for example, in the context of a discussion of the "very severe crisis" then confronting the United States, one commentator observed that "During its almost two centuries-old history, the American federal system has more than once demonstrated its ability to adapt to changing conditions."<sup>71</sup> Noting, for the record, that "this capacity for adaptation. . . is not unlimited"--especially in "a socio-economic system which has historically outlived its time"--nothing said by this speaker or any other symposium participant indicated that they expected to celebrate the collapse of the American system in the foreseeable future.

And, perhaps, just as well, for they seem far from certain that a severe capitalist crisis would work to Soviet advantage. As Arbatov told Giuseppe Boffa of L'Unita, "we are well aware that every crisis in bourgeois society may have various results. The crisis of the 'thirties' produced Roosevelt and his 'New Deal' in the United States and Hitler, fascism, and war in Germany."<sup>72</sup> Eminent Soviet commentators--Arbatov, Inozemtsev, Zorin, and many others--have repeatedly warned that harsh economic and socio-political crises lead to the activization of "rightist" and "the most reactionary groups." Thus writes Zorin, "the deepening crisis of American society" has given rise to a marked increase in the

danger from the right. The experience of history indicates that movements of a fascist type arise when there is an exacerbation of social and political contradictions.<sup>73</sup> The risk of fascism, however small, is not to be treated lightly. As Soviet Party Secretary Boris Ponomarev has recently written, "in the nuclear age, the strengthening of fascist forces and, even more, a fascist seizure of state power, would be even more dangerous. . . than on the eve of World War II."<sup>74</sup> Thus, the fact that the United States emerged essentially unscathed from its recent travails is undoubtedly a greater source of comfort than Soviet spokesmen would openly admit. The ultimate horror--a new "Hitler" with access to the American nuclear arsenal--is not, thankfully, a very likely prospect.

## PART II

### THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM

In their attempt to understand the American political system, Soviet analysts suffer from a variety of disabilities. They are burdened, as we have seen, by limited personal contact and the constraints of rigid ideological preconceptions. They also lack the benefit of useful historical guidance; Tsarist Russia never produced a Tocqueville or a Bryce. There is another, even more serious obstacle, however. They are attempting to comprehend a democratic political system, one whose institutions and processes neither they nor their countrymen have ever had any experience with. (The feeble efforts of the last Tsars and the Provisional Government hardly qualify.) Thus, while there are at least folk memories and socio-economic histories available concerning life in the emergent capitalism



of pre-1914 Russia--for whatever value they may hold--there is virtually nothing to guide their efforts to make sense out of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the Washington Post, Senator Jackson, Walter Cronkite and Judge Sirica.

The USA Institute has, as one of its major tasks, the responsibility of filling this intellectual and informational void. And its researchers have spent long hours pouring through the American press and magazines, professional journals and transcripts of Congressional hearings, reading American history and biography, interviewing government officials and political leaders. Given the handicaps with which they began--and the constraints which domestic political considerations still impose--the results have been surprisingly good. There are, to be sure, blind spots and rigidities, as we shall explain. It must be recognized, however, that Soviet perceptions of the American political system have notably improved.

Both to indicate the degree to which Soviet thinking has changed and as groundwork for a later discussion of American political dynamics, a brief sortie into political-economic doctrine seems useful.

#### "State-Monopoly Capitalism"

The basic character of the U.S. political system, according to orthodox Party doctrine, is shaped by the special relationship between the major American corporate interests and the Federal government. According to this view, the power of large "monopolies" is united with that of

the state, hence the title "state-monopoly capitalism." Thus, in a recent text,

The essence of state-monopoly capitalism. . . is the direct union of the power of the capitalist monopolies with the enormous power of the state. In this union the state occupies not an independent but a subordinate position.<sup>1</sup>

This last point is crucial; the function of the political mechanism is to promote the interests of major corporations--to help them enrich themselves (via government contracts, tax privileges, credits), to safeguard them from economic crises and foreign competition and to protect their political dominance from adversaries, domestic and foreign.

The state, in this view, is the tool and the servant of the dominant economic interests, to whose purposes the machinery and processes of government--and society as a whole--are bent. Following Lenin's notion of a "personal union" between the banks, industry and the state, it is argued that

To utilize state power more effectively, the tycoons of finance capital had themselves appointed as ministers, heads of important departments, ambassadors and prominent officials. The state machinery and the monopolies are so intertwined that it is often difficult to determine the boundary between them.<sup>2</sup>

All agencies and processes of the democratic state --government office, parties, the press, the legislature--are at best trappings serving to obscure the dominance of big business. In the United States, Lenin wrote, "The stock exchange is everything, while parliament and elections are marionettes."<sup>3</sup>

Lenin, as we shall see, did speak of divisions and disagreement within the ruling circles of capitalism, a condition which gave rise on

occasion to serious debate over questions of foreign policy. This observation admitted<sup>7</sup> at least the possibility of some meaningful political life under capitalism. It was the prevailing wisdom of the Stalin period, however, that capitalist governments were dominated by an essentially united oligarchy of finance capitalists--Wall Street. Stalin thus denied the possibility of autonomy to the sphere of politics or to the state itself. In his view, the capitalist state was in the hands of the corporate interests and not vice versa.

The orthodox view, therefore, is based on crude economic determinism according to which the economic base (dominated by big business) determines the political superstructure whose prime purpose it is to strengthen the base. Thus, the agencies of the Federal government, the Congress, the courts as well as the political parties, elections, the media are all seen to be mere pawns serving the interests of their masters. There is, in this view, no politically significant differences or conflicts either among the major corporations or within the state apparatus subordinated to them.

Since the death of Stalin, such primitive formulations have been significantly modified. As earlier studies have indicated,<sup>4</sup> Soviet analysts have in the past two decades moved considerably beyond these crude interpretations. It must be noted, however, that such views are not completely absent. They are frequently found in the popular press and even in the writings of eminent Soviet Americanists. Thus, for example, Anatoly Gromyko has written that



. . . the interests of the large monopolies are the very compass by which the United States government is guided in its activities. The President of the United States, the venerable senators, the smartest members of the House of Representatives and the entire bureaucratic apparatus are, in fact, in the service of the monopolists. Monopoly capital is the main and decisive force which controls American foreign policy. . . .<sup>5</sup>

Gromyko goes on, It is perfectly natural that leading American diplomats "are close in their views to those of their bosses, the American monopolists. Frequently they are offended when they are called 'servants of capital'. . . . they even get indignant. . . . Facts, however, are stubborn things."<sup>6</sup> In support of this assertion, another Soviet analyst asserts that "all eight postwar Secretaries of State have been appointed mainly on the basis of their ties with the business world." They are all, he insists, either directly or through their law firms, "proteges of the most influential financial groups on Wall Street."<sup>7</sup> Given Secretary Kissinger's earlier association with the Rockefeller Brothers' Fund, the number now is undoubtedly "all nine."

In his major study, USA: The Foreign-Policy Mechanism, Shvedkov states the case in sweeping terms: He writes that

American monopolies exert a constant influence on the government apparatus that is intertwined with them along an infinite number of channels at various levels.... Many government departments operating in the field of economic policy have become so intertwined with private organizations of monopolies that it is quite impossible to establish where the line between them runs.<sup>8</sup>

Corporate influence on government policy, he writes, is also transmitted directly. By means of connections at the very top--through participation in special Presidential commissions and task-forces or, less formally,

by their presence at unofficial dinners and meetings at the White House-- corporate executives "convey the main pulses from the principal groupings of monopoly capital that affect government policy as a whole."

The persistence of such notions in the writings of Soviet Americanists have led some to conclude that, for all the specific knowledge of fact and detail, this is nothing more than old wine in new bottles. Such is not the case at all. Though the language often remains unchanged, the specific manner in which "state-monopoly capitalism" is now understood indicates a far better appreciation of contemporary American politics than such language would seem to allow. While analysts still remain close to basic doctrinal formulations, which they must, they have managed to cast them in a new, far less inhibiting light. Let me illustrate.

A revealing description of the working model of "state-monopoly capitalism" currently held at the USA Institute was given by N. D. Turkatenko, deputy editor of SShA. In a June 1974 article on "U.S. Corporations in Conditions of Detente," Turkatenko writes:

The state itself performs the functions of coordinator of "streams of influence" originating from the corporations, and carries out legislative, economic, diplomatic, or military measures proceeding from the prevailing--either immediate or long-run--general interests of state monopoly capital as a whole.<sup>9</sup>

Turkatenko's formulation focuses attention on the political sphere. Admitting the possibility of internal conflicts, as he does, naturally raises questions about the various interests involved, alternative approaches and leaderships, the factors influencing choices, i.e., political questions. As Soviet analyses frequently note, while all (or

virtually all) of the major political actors in the United States are committed to the existing socio-economic system, this unity does not eliminate differences--sometimes very significant ones--as to the ways and means whereby individual groups seek to achieve their purposes. And the focus, increasingly, is on these "very significant" differences.

This model also recognizes the role of government leadership as an autonomous political force. If the function of the state is to protect the "long-term", "general" interests of the system "as a whole," the political leadership can embark on a course which conflicts with the "short-term," "narrow" interests of specific corporate groups. Soviet writers cite numerous instances of such conflicts. In 1961, for example, President Kennedy forced a rollback in steel prices--despite bitter opposition from the heads of the steel industry--out of concern for the impact of the price rise on the rest of the American economy. For actions such as this, it is noted, Kennedy was in fact considered to be an "anti-business President," very much like President Roosevelt who in his time was regarded as a "traitor to his class."<sup>10</sup> According to a Soviet historian, President Kennedy was "a flexible figure who sometimes spoke out against certain groups of monopoly capital in order to defend the interests of the ruling class as a whole."<sup>11</sup>

Similar views are expressed concerning several other recent Presidents--Woodrow Wilson, FDR and Richard Nixon (who, as we have seen, substantially modified the course of American defense and foreign policy, despite opposition from the "military-industrial complex.") In the words of N. N. Yakovlev, such leaders "imposed strict discipline and sacrifice



that was sometimes considerable for the sake of the higher interests of the capitalist class."<sup>12</sup>

The role of political leadership is clearly of prime importance. Though President<sup>s</sup> Wilson, Roosevelt, Kennedy and Nixon were all "guided by the interests of their class," they held distinctive views as to how these interests could best be served. And they were in a position to act on their beliefs. The particular policy orientations of individual political leaders, therefore, can be decisive.

Soviet analysts, in short, are now aware that, in Arbatov's phrase, "The superstructure can have a relatively independent role"<sup>13</sup> and they study its operations with considerable care. It is to their understanding of this "superstructure," the institutions and processes of the U.S. political system, that we now turn.

#### The American President

In contrast to earlier notions, when government policy was viewed as having been worked out in the board rooms of Wall Street financial houses and the executive offices of the National Association of Manufacturers, current Soviet conceptions explicitly reject a crudely conspiratorial model of American politics. It would be naive to assume, writes Arbatov, that there exists "as in the military sphere. . . a kind of political General Staff which draws up a common plan and issues orders in accordance with which various campaigns are launched. . . ."<sup>14</sup> The analytic focus, especially in the sphere of foreign policy, is on the office of the

President. In the formation of American foreign policy, writes Inozemtsev, a "big role" is played by "individual statesmen at the highest levels of the official hierarchy (this applies especially to the President, who. . . is vested with very important powers.)"<sup>15</sup> Or, in the words of Foreign Minister Gromyko, "responsibility for policy is borne by people--primarily those who are invested with authority and stand at the helm of state rule."<sup>16</sup>

While the constitutional authority of the President is recognized, it is not seen to be without constraints. And, in the judgement of Yuri Shvedkov, these are considerable. The problem, in his view, is essentially bureaucratic, i.e., the management of the gigantic apparatus of government. This problem, he writes, has made the job of implementing foreign policy "increasingly difficult." The President, he notes, has "become a captive of the cumbersome bureaucratic machine. . . . Frequently, implementation of decisions taken becomes bogged down in interdepartmental labyrinths." More specifically, Presidential decisions are the victim of bureaucratic inertia and, at times, the open defiance of some governmental departments which, because of alliances with powerful forces on Capital Hill--and elsewhere--have been able to attain "a certain antonomy." Quoting Roger Hiltsman (at some length), Shvedkov concludes that because of "uninterrupted internal struggles within the government apparatus and outside it. . . 'the President is hardly able to govern in a sphere which is supposedly almost entirely within his authority. . . .'"<sup>17</sup>

In his analysis of the Kennedy administration, Anatoly Gromyko cites numerous instances of bureaucratic opposition and resistance to Presidential authority. The Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the State Department were all seen as having attempted to force a hard line on the administration on a host of issues--military doctrine (the strategy of "flexible response"), the Bay of Pigs, the Cuban missile crisis, Berlin. Nevertheless, throughout his analysis, Gromyko stresses that ultimate authority to make decisions was in the hands of the President, that nothing happened without his approval and that he always had to be persuaded and was never dictated to. (That there was intense pressure brought to bear on him by "militaristic" groups only reinforces this point.) Thus, though Kennedy's decision not to allow American forces directly to participate in the Bay of Pigs' invasion "aroused strong resentment within the CIA and the Pentagon," his orders were carried out.<sup>18</sup> Again, "despite the military who wanted to force a confrontation" during the missile crisis, Kennedy remained determined to avoid one. When an American U-2 plane was shot down, "the supporters for war again demanded the implementation of an air attack on Cuba followed by an invasion. Kennedy again rejected their demands."<sup>19</sup>

The President, in Gromyko's view, is in control. Once Kennedy had firmly decided that a certain course was the correct one, regardless of the pressure to the contrary, he stood fast and, more importantly, his decision was implemented. (Shvedkov points out that Kennedy's decision to withdraw medium-range American missiles from Turkey "was not implemented



for several months because of delays by the State Department and the Department of Defense."<sup>20</sup> Gromyko does not mention the Turkish bases.) Despite considerable opposition and counterpressure, Kennedy decided to meet with "the head of the Soviet government" in Vienna, to accept a coalition government in Laos, to sign the Partial Test-Ban agreement. The President, in Gromyko's judgement has overwhelming independent power.

The generally accepted view of the scope of Presidential authority is set forth in an earlier work by Gromyko, Diplomacy of Contemporary Imperialism. Here he writes that, as chief of state and head of government, the President must "unconditionally be given first place" as an influence on foreign policy. He "possesses such great powers" that he "frequently. . . operates practically on his own initiative. . . in the making of individual decisions. . . ." However, he goes on, the situation "is rather different when developing the overall strategic. . . policy." "In this process dozens, if not hundreds, of people and numerous state institutions take part." Basic policy lines are set as a result of "hundreds of decisions arising from deep within the political and state machinery. . . ." <sup>21</sup>

The President, it would seem, can exercise considerable initiatives only in particular instances. He has especially great authority in periods of great crises. According to Zhurkin, "the last word in taking decisions in international crisis situations rests with the President. The old rule that 'crisis is the President's show' still holds."<sup>22</sup> However, in terms of day-to-day operations and the shaping of the basic directions of

U.S. foreign policy, the President has "behind him hundreds of people and forces"<sup>23</sup>--bureaucratic, political, economic.

Having asserted this as a general rule, Soviet writers again and again come back to the exceptional cases--FDR, Kennedy and Nixon-- Presidents who were able to surmount bureaucratic and economic pressures and take independent, i.e. favorable, policy decisions. Kennedy was mistrusted by many, writes Gromyko, because they feared that he "might become a new Roosevelt. . . ." "The 'ghost of Roosevelt' has always frightened" those on the "right" both for his domestic policies and because he normalized relations with the Soviet Union. They feared Kennedy would seek to do the same.<sup>24</sup> Kennedy did move in a "realistic" direction, as we have seen, and he acted with caution. Furthermore, unlike Presidents "Truman, Eisenhower and Johnson [who] preferred in general not to go against the current. . . ," Kennedy proposed numerous measures which "were to a considerable degree at variance with the ideas prevailing in the State Department, the Pentagon and the CIA."<sup>25</sup>

Reactions to the foreign policies of the Nixon administration have been even more positive. Though initially apprehensive--and, at times, deeply troubled (as we shall see), Soviet analysts became increasingly enthusiastic after the 1972 Moscow summit. Since then President Nixon has been described (quoting an American source) as "the first President since Franklin Roosevelt to have recognized the legitimate interests of the USSR. . . ,"<sup>26</sup> as having understood that, quoting President Nixon, "every confrontation means coming into contact with the potential

nuclear destruction of all civilized countries"<sup>27</sup> and, in general, for helping break the ice of the cold war, opening up broad prospects for Soviet-American relations and contributing to an improvement of the whole international atmosphere.<sup>28</sup> Though somewhat muted and indirect--out of deference to American sensibilities regarding Watergate--the Americanists high regard for the policies of the 1972-74 period is unmistakable.

What this literature suggests is that Soviet analysts clearly place a great deal of weight on the personal qualities of individual Presidents. They point out, to be sure, that other elements--such as the conservative segment of the governmental apparatus (of which more in a moment) and pressure from "right wing" forces in and outside the government seek by various means, fair and foul, to resist sober, realistic, moderate policies of such thoughtful Presidents. In 1947, for example, "reactionary circles," attempted to restrict the authority of future Presidents to make policy decisions at their own discretion. Fearful of another FDR, Shvedkov writes, they sought to tie the hands of all Presidents. Thus:

The idea of setting up the National Security Council had something in common with the law limiting the President of the United States to an 8 year term of office adopted by the Congress at the same time. All of this reflected the desire of reactionary circles to prevent a man of independent views and broad capability. . . from occupying the chief political post in the government.<sup>29</sup>

The fact remains, however, that despite the efforts of such unenlightened elements, "sober," "realistic" political figures do manage somehow to emerge at the helm of the U.S. government, a fact which may lead to



significant changes in U.S. foreign policy. While the resistance and counterpressures they face are often considerable, Soviet observers continue to search for--and to find--American Presidents who, by personal inclination and character, "exceed the bounds."<sup>30</sup>

#### The United States Congress

While responsive, even sympathetic to individual Presidents, Soviet analysts are, as a whole, less understanding of the role of the Congress. Such knowledge as they have acquired reflects more an awareness of the specific ways various parts of the Congressional machinery can effect particular policies than an appreciation of the legislative process itself. Congress as a whole is thought of primarily in terms of whether or not it supports--or opposes--"detente," with little mind to its place in the American political system.

Soviet writers are familiar, as one would expect, with the mechanics of Congressional operations--the committee structure of both houses, areas of competence, hearings, voting procedures, vetoes and overrides and, recently, the impeachment procedure. There is on occasion evidence of some degree of understanding of its functions. Thus, for example, commenting on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, V. A. Shvetsov stresses the important role of Congressional hearings. He writes: "Exercising the right to hold hearings and conduct inquiries, the Committee has broad opportunities for a comprehensive discussion of foreign policy problems." The Committee, it is noted, has in recent years

held hearings on a variety of important issues--the Partial Test-Ban Treaty, relations with Western Europe, China, Vietnam, etc. "Because of the critical attitude towards the administration's line taken by many of those who appears," writes Shvetsov, "these hearings have aroused considerable interest on the part of the American public."<sup>31</sup>

A similarly thoughtful position was taken concerning recent Senate hearings (February-March, 1974) on the Pentagon's proposal to enlarge its facilities at Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, with fairly good coverage given to the presentation of the Defense Department. Attention, however, was focused on the testimony of those opposed, including, incidentally, CIA Director William Colby. "During the hearings," writes A. D. Portnyagan, Colby

declared that ". . . despite the Pentagon's uneasiness, the Soviet Union will hardly build up its fleet in the Indian Ocean substantially if the United States does not just begin building its own fleet there." Thus, even the chief of U.S. intelligence cast doubt on the Pentagon's assertions.

The author concludes on a positive note: As a result of the "stormy debates" in Congress in 1974, advocates of the construction of an enlarged base on Diego Garcia "were defeated." However, he warned, "The Pentagon had not abandoned its plans. . . ."<sup>32</sup>

Other Soviet commentary on Congressional hearings, however, have been less enthusiastic. V. S. Anichkina, for example, points out that as part of his campaign against normalizing relations with the USSR, Senator Jackson's Subcommittee on Investigations held hearings in the spring and summer of 1973 to which "violent opponents of the

Soviet Union and well-known "'cold war' ideologues British 'Sovietologists' W. Laqueur and L. Labedz" were invited. Similarly ill-intentioned hearings were held by the House Internal Security Committee that November in which "notorious opponents of improved relations. . . appeared as 'witnesses'."<sup>33</sup>

Regard for Congressional hearings, quite obviously, depends on their thrust. When testimony and committee questioning runs parallel to Soviet policy positions, e.g., on Vietnam, ABM deployment, Diego Garcia, they are considered significant. When they take a contrary view, they are condemned as a tool of reaction. At best, however, even when supportive of "realistic" policies, Congressional hearings have been viewed as nothing more than a lightning rod, a device to distract an angered public. Critical Congressional hearings and even debates within Congress itself, writes Shvetsov, are used "to steer deep public dissatisfaction in a definite channel, to open valves so as to alleviate pressure from the dissatisfaction seizing the masses."<sup>34</sup> Legislative debate, therefore, is a ruse, a mechanism to beguile and deceive.

Soviet disdain for constitutional process is clearly demonstrated in SShA discussion of the issue of Presidential war powers. Soviet analysts have, of course, endorsed Congressional efforts "to restrict the uncontrolled activity of the President and to return to the Congress the role it has lost in matters concerning the use of armed forces abroad."<sup>35</sup> The passage in 1971 of the Cooper-Church Amendment (which banned Congressional financing of combat operations by U.S. ground forces in Cambodia) and, in



late 1973, of the War Powers Bill, a more blanket restriction on Presidential authority, were both hailed. The latter, in particular, was seen as having "significantly reduced the capacity of the executive to conduct undeclared wars or conflicts not sanctioned by Congress. . . ."36

Given their political heritage (and the absence of any tradition of shared power), the basic constitutional issues underlying this legislation, i.e., the challenge by the Congress to what is viewed as an executive abuse of authority, is at best dimly perceived. For Soviet Americanists, the only point of interest is the "reduced capacity"--for whatever technical reason--of the power of the President to employ military force. The question, in their mind, is political--what are its policy implications for the USSR--not constitutional.

The essence of the Soviet position is reflected in the following comment:

The U.S. Congress, decisively supporting the shift from "cold war" to détente by voting approval of the strategic arms limitations agreements and by the passage of bills putting an end to the financing of U.S. military operations in Cambodia and limiting the power of the President to wage "undeclared wars," became bogged down in the nets of the "cold war" on the question of the abrogation of discriminatory trade restrictions against the Soviet Union. . . .37

The issue here is hardly one of "Presidential usurpation" but, more importantly--"is it good for the Soviet Union?"

The insensitivity of Soviet analysts to this fundamental constitutional principal helps explain their confusion regarding Watergate. Most insist, even in private conversations, that the resignation of President Nixon was forced by a political cabal of disgruntled Democrats,

ultra-right anti-Soviet elements, newspaper publishers and other inveterate Nixon-haters. Senator Erwin--and the U.S. Constitution--remains a total mystery.

The USA Institute approaches Congressional "bipartisanship" in foreign policy much the same way. Previously condemned as the attempt by "reactionary Democratic and Republican leaders" to promote continuity in policy during changes of administrations, an approach which led to Congressional "passivity," and a willingness "to follow the decisions of the President obediently,"<sup>38</sup> "bipartisanship" is today very much in favor. When Congress failed to close ranks and unite, in the best bipartisan tradition, in support of the Administration's trade bill, it was denounced for having become "bogged down in the nets of the cold war." More recently, when Senator Church predicted "strong bipartisan support in Congress" for the Vladivostok agreement signed last November, his remarks were quoted approvingly.<sup>39</sup> Clearly, on "bipartisanship," as on "Presidential usurpation," as on all other American political traditions and practices, the sole concern is whether it helps the cause.

Seen in these terms, what is the overall balance of forces in the Congress? The record, in the view of the USA Institute, is a mixed one. There are numerous "liberal-minded" Senators--Fulbright, Mansfield, McGovern, Hatfield, Church--who take consistently "positive" positions. Even such "conservatives" as Senators Richard Russell and John Stennis were recognized as having supported the War Powers Bill--"carefully and in a subdued way."<sup>40</sup> Others, however, led by Senators Jackson and

Goldwater, reflecting the "very considerable" influence of "the most reactionary forces"<sup>41</sup> are "still captive to the dogmas and postulates of the 'cold war'. . . ." The majority of members of Congress, especially in the House of Representatives, "as a rule act too indecisively and vaguely. . . ." Though they claim to favor detente, they assumed "a passive-conservative position" on the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the Administration's 1974 trade bill; despite their proclaimed opposition to the arms race, they continue to "avoid specific action" to reduce the size of the U.S. military budget.<sup>42</sup> According to a more recent study, the Senate "liberals" tried, during 1973 and 1974, to cut back defense spending--on the TRIDENT program, "counterforce" weapons, and military procurement. Their efforts failed, largely because of an unstable and vacillating group of "centrist" Senators.<sup>42A</sup>

The Congress, clearly is an uncertain force. Though the size of the "liberal" bloc in the Senate has been growing, it too is unstable and may--as Popova reported it did in 1974--lose strength.<sup>43</sup> It is this very lack of focus, this amorphousness and unpredictability that, in the Soviet view, explains the weakness of Congress. It simply cannot compete with the better-organized executive departments. As Shvetsov points out:

The apparatus of the executive branch has a better developed bureaucratic organization compared to the diffuseness. . . of responsibility and lack of proper coordination in the activities of Congressional bodies.<sup>44</sup>

As a result of its many weaknesses, its "direct influence on the foreign strategy of the Administration is, of course, limited."<sup>45</sup>



While rather disdainful of Congress as a major power, Soviet analysts clearly do not contemptuously dismiss it. Congress has come to be taken seriously. For example, the "struggle" of "liberal" Senators to repeal the Tonkin Gulf resolution and to set a date for the termination of American military activity in Southeast Asia, it is reported, "undoubtedly influenced the administration's decision to remove American forces from Vietnam."<sup>46</sup> Furthermore, in the view of two leading experts on military strategy and arms control at the USA Institute, M. A. Mil'shteyn and G. A. Trofimenko, Congressional participation in the "strategic debates" of the late 1960's and early 1970's made significant contributions to the SALT agreements thus far achieved and have been promoting a useful discussion of the "extremely complex problem" involved in the SALT-II negotiations.<sup>47</sup>

Congress, therefore, is still considered to be "an important political mechanism." This is true for three reasons. First, as has recently been noted, "one should not. . . underestimate the ability of the Capitol to delay or even prevent a specific treaty from taking effect if that document unfailingly must be approved by the legislative branch."<sup>48</sup> Moscow has apparently learned, through its recent unhappy experience, that Congress does indeed have a clearly defined role in a variety of spheres, including that of foreign economic policy. Presidential assent to a trade accord, or even arms control agreement, though vitally important, is not necessarily the end of the matter. Congressional approval, as was discovered last December, is far from automatic.

A second factor relates to Congressional control of the purse strings. As we have seen, Congress vetoed Defense Department plans regarding Diego Garcia and the Senate has come very close to defeating plans to develop new weapons systems. Though largely underutilized, from the Soviet point of view, Congressional control over government budgetary appropriations can, in specific instances, be quite important.

A third reason for keeping a close eye on Capitol Hill is that "it is the Congress where future politicians and statesmen are made. After all," writes Shvetsov, "it is the rare President who has not gone through the school of the Congress."<sup>49</sup> The fact that five of the last six chief executives have served on Capitol Hill is certainly not lost on the USA Institute. Mr. Arbatov's hospitality, especially towards visiting Senators, is partly motivated by a desire to talk with an American President--before he takes the oath of office.

The Congress, though clearly not at the center of the foreign policy process, is viewed with increased respect. And, it is worth noting, Soviet writers have become considerably more discerning in their analyses of its activities. Recent articles are not simply better informed--which they clearly are--but strikingly free of ideological preconceptions. For example, Soviet coverage of the political downfall of Senator Fulbright, Congressional hearings on Diego Garcia and Senate debates on the military budget, while clearly partisan in their concerns, are largely accurate, temperate, based on a fair-minded reading of American sources (Congressional testimony, public opinion data, roll call analysis), thoughtful, and,

mercifully, devoid of the stereotypes and polemics characteristic of the popular press.<sup>50</sup> Soviet treatment of the Congress, a sphere which initially was so problematic, has become considerably more balanced.

The Foreign-Policy Mechanism: Departments of State and Defense

Whether from a more acute interest in the executive branch--the heart of the foreign-policy making system--or more broadly, greater familiarity with organizational processes, Soviet Americanists are much more comfortable in their treatment of the State and Defense Departments. Away from the wild terrain of legislative politics, where behavior is often unpredictable and surprises frequent, they are much more self-confident when dealing with the bureaucracy. This, clearly, is the heart of politics, in the Soviet view. In fact, it is only the belated recognition of the importance of "bureaucratic politics," (Halperin, Allison, et al.) writes Shvedkov, that has brought American analysts to a more realistic appreciation of their own political system.<sup>51</sup>

The "foreign policy-mechanism," in the Soviet view, is critically important. Whatever new policies the President may undertake, whatever treaties and accords the Secretary of State may initial, all may be for naught unless they are properly implemented. As Chetverikov has written:

However thoroughly high-level decisions are thought out and substantiated, it is ultimately precisely the departmental apparatus which translates them into daily practice.<sup>52</sup>



Thus, fulfillment of new international agreements depends not only on "resolve to cooperate," but also concerns "the good will, frames of mind and the traditions of the administrative apparatus called upon to implement [their] specific provisions."<sup>53</sup> The government apparatus itself is thus seen to exercise an independent influence on foreign policy.

#### The National Security Council (NSC)

Soviet views of the NSC system are so closely meshed with their accounts of Secretary Kissinger that they will not be treated separately. Comments on the NSC are to be found throughout this section.

#### The State Department

In its responsibility for the implementation of policy, the State Department performs a critical task upon whose fulfillment may rest the success or failure of high level policy decisions. "Its role," writes Chetverikov "may be on the one hand, positive and constructive, or on the other, retrograde and inhibiting."<sup>54</sup> In the view of Soviet analysts, the State Department's role has generally been a negative one. That is to say, the "frames of mind" and "traditions" which have prevailed in the Department are seen as having been hostile to the Soviet Union. This view<sup>is</sup> expressed most sharply by Anatoly Gromyko, "When John Kennedy assumed office," he writes, ". . . American foreign policy was trapped in the ice of the 'cold war'. The refrigerating plant of the 'State Department-Pentagon-CIA' corporation was generating at full capacity."<sup>55</sup> The majority of people at the State Department, he goes on, like those in the Defense

Department and the CIA, regards the Soviet Union as the enemy of the United States, "increasingly pressuring us." Thus they believe "all means are justified."<sup>56</sup> The State Department, writes Gromyko, "never made any recommendations to the White House that might have aided the relaxation of tension." Moreover, many in the Department "regarded the President's actions with apprehension. All this displeased Kennedy."<sup>57</sup>

In the current view, the situation has remained essentially unchanged. In an article in Pravda, Arbatov seeks to explain the persistence of anti-Soviet attitudes among State Department officials in terms of "vested interest" in the Cold War. Among the "influential forces. . . stubbornly resisting. . . any shift towards détente," he writes, is

a rather substantial stratum of people from among bureaucrats, scientific personnel [i.e., academics] and journalists who, nurtured by the cold war and interested in its perpetuation, do not want to, and perhaps are unable to, think otherwise than in flagrantly anti-communist categories.<sup>58</sup>

Chetverikov explains what he sees as "the obsolete traditions which had formed in the foreign policy departments" in much the same way. He writes: "Among the career bureaucrats there is a grouping composed of people who were brought up on the cold war and who are interested in perpetuating it. They, naturally, actively oppose changes which do not correspond to their views and interests."<sup>59</sup> Having thrived in the Cold War, Department officials have acquired a stake--professional and psychological--in its continuation. This would, presumably, be especially true for the Bureau of Intelligence and Research and the Bureau of Politico-Military

Affairs, those divisions within the Department whose size and function were "swollen" during the period of the Cold War.<sup>60</sup>

The strength of such anti-communist, Cold War sentiments is bolstered considerably, it is argued, by the bureaucratic inertia which pervades the Department. Quoting from an essay by Secretary Kissinger (published in 1969), Chetverikov observes that "the very nature of government structure introduces an element of inertia. . . ." He goes on to suggest that "many links of the bureaucratic mechanism which had mastered the old process of making and implementing policy" are reluctant to abandon them.<sup>61</sup> Clinging to the familiar--as much from inertia as from conviction--Department officials are slow to change their old Cold War views.

In the view of Soviet Americanists, then, the State Department is the captive of its cumbersome, sluggish, inflexible bureaucracy whose career impulses encourage stereotyped anti-communist Cold War habits and traditions. Such a situation, writes Shvedkov, "materially hindered. . . negotiations with countries having a different socio-political system."<sup>62</sup> Thus, when the new Nixon Administration decided to "normalize" relations with the Soviet Union--and China--it had, somehow, to overcome the resistance of the State Department bureaucracy. To strengthen the hand of the President and protect his new policy course from being frustrated, the National Security Council system was revitalized.

This reform, argues Chetverikov, was of the utmost importance. It represents the "organizational registration and consolidation," the



"institutionalization" of détente. Steps have been taken, he writes, which "take into account the key position of the executive apparatus," i.e., the White House, and which are "aimed. . . at improving the system of coordination and control primarily of the departmental apparatus." This new system of foreign policy management attests "to the fact that the desire for détente has become deeply rooted in all the most important and decisive spheres of American political life."<sup>63</sup>

The NSC system, therefore, is viewed as a means of overcoming the influence of a rigid immobile bureaucracy. Though "initially left by the wayside" by their resistance to the new foreign policy course, the State Department "began gradually to accept the changes."<sup>64</sup> With one of its chief architects in the Secretary's office, it had little alternative. Nevertheless, "obsolete traditions" and bureaucratic inertia have not been notably dissipated. Both "frames of mind" still persist and tend to place the Department officials largely in the camp of the cold war traditionalists.

The main determinants of the State Department's policy orientation, it would seem, are largely political (high-level policy decisions) and organizational (bureaucratic interests, traditions and habits of mind)--not economic. One still finds references to economic interests, of course. Chetverikov notes, for example, that "the apparatus of the state is linked by thousands of threads to the monopolies."<sup>65</sup> However, it is only rather specific instances that such assertions seem to be anything more than ritualistic. Even in the field of foreign economic policy, the significance of the "economic interests of the ruling classes

is not very clear. As we saw earlier, "contradictions have arisen between the monopolies oriented towards foreign and domestic markets"<sup>66</sup> as well as to military industry. Thus, as Shvedkov observes, "even the influence of the leading businessman's organizations. . . is not unambiguous. . . . In the face of domestic problems and competition on foreign markets many of them are beginning to show a perceptible interest in expanding trade with the USSR. . . and in relieving world tension."<sup>67</sup> The best argument that the authors of "The Economic Levers" (in Shvedkov's volume, USA: The Foreign-Policy Mechanism) can make is that "all units in the U.S. government mechanism" responsible for financial, trade, investment and aid policy "are bound up with one another because in the economic sphere they serve the single course. . . aimed at strengthening the dominant position of the United States. . . ."<sup>68</sup> Not a clear cut policy guide, to say the least.

Within the Department, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research is believed to be in a highly important position. The Bureau is "the only Departmental unit which processes information for all its other subdivisions. It receives the entire mass of information coming in from foreign points, it systematizes, analyzes and interprets it. . . ." The functions of analysis and interpretation have an especially important bearing on policy since they are, "as a rule. . . accompanied by a list of alternative political courses which inevitably predetermine the thinking of people making the decisions." The Bureau, therefore, has unique access (within the Department) to the information upon which policy is

based and is responsible for presenting policy recommendations, functions which gives it--along with CIA--a very important role in the formulation of policy.<sup>69</sup>

In the view of Soviet analysts, the State Department, is far from monolithic. Its "internal structure," writes Bessmenykh, is "contradictory, unstable, complex and muddled." In addition to incessant conflicts between "career diplomats" and "political appointees" over key diplomatic assignments, the "broadly-trained" career officials are said to resent the recent influx of "specialists" (planners, economists, programmers, psychologists, propagandists, etc.) into the Department. The "hostile reception given the newcomers" is due to a) the "professional conservatism of the career diplomats" who have argued that foreign policy decisions can and should be "based almost exclusively on knowledge obtained from experience, on an intuitive understanding of the processes taking place" rather than on "timely planning and forecasting," and b) the fact that the new specialists "destroyed the 'elite' position which the diplomats previously enjoyed as 'members of a 'closed professional club'',"<sup>70</sup>

In addition to "professional incompatibility" and "social dissociation," there are even cases of what are described as "disagreements on specific tactical matters." Thus, not only does Arbatov note "serious disagreements" within the "power apparatus itself" at the time of the invasion of Cambodia, which provoked a protest from "250 State Department employees"<sup>71</sup> but he also has commented on the fact that in the 1940's there



was a policy disagreement between Secretary Acheson and Soviet experts in the Department.<sup>72</sup>

As troubled as they may be by the internal strife within their own ranks, far more significant for the Department's leadership is the sharp political struggle which pervades the whole executive branch. The entire foreign policy apparatus, writes Bessmenykh, is torn by "intense, internecine conflict." The State Department is in continual conflict with the USIA, ACDA, the Departments of the Treasury, Commerce, and Agriculture not to speak of "the still more difficult relations" with the Defense Department and the CIA.<sup>73</sup> The "augmented role of the military and intelligence departments" have been a particular source of difficulty.

Though these "external factors" were seen to be "qualifying the role" of the State Department,<sup>74</sup> in the early 1970's the situation began to change. The creation of the new NSC system and, Kissinger's role in the State Department and, especially, his retention in the White House are seen to reflect the administration's "desire to consolidate the system of levers of influence on the Pentagon."<sup>75</sup>

This bureaucratic competition is seen to be the heart of the policy process by Shvedkov. He writes: "policy is usually the result of various pressures on the government mechanism from outside, the complicated maneuvering of the agencies that comprise it, and the compromises concluded between them."<sup>76</sup> While corporate interests are seen to exert pressure "from outside," the focus of attention is on the mechanism itself.

And though other agencies, especially the Defense Department, may well have some advantages, the State Department's position remains a central one.

#### The Defense Department (DOD)

The first and perhaps most important point made by Soviet analysts is that the Defense Department is "the largest and most expensive part of the government apparatus" dealing with the implementation of foreign policy. Not only is its yearly budget almost 10% of the annual American GNP, but it owns property worth more than \$200 billion (three times greater than the combined properties of U.S. Steel, General Motors, Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., AT&T and Standard Oil of New Jersey), it is the country's largest single largest purchaser (signing more than 200,000 contracts a year and with more than 100,000 permanent suppliers). DOD is thus seen to be an enormous concentration of power, wealth and influence. "This position in the national structure makes it possible for the military complex to play a special role in U.S. domestic and foreign policy."<sup>77</sup>

The great size and wealth of DOD has enabled it to acquire great political influence. Given its enormous budget, it has been able to acquire "more up-to-date equipment for communications, data processing and organization of management than the other government departments." This fact alone has magnified its power. While the "capabilities and intentions of men working in an organization" may affect its political role, "frequently the organization, particularly such a giant mechanism as the Pentagon, overpowers people and dictates their actions as if it

had itself become an independent force."<sup>78</sup> Given the Pentagon's vast material resources, it has "a number of important advantages. . . in its constant rivalry with the State Department for influence over foreign policy. . . ."<sup>79</sup> Furthermore, writes Chetverikov, "Since not one significant presidential decision is adopted without military factors being taken into account, the President is virtually constantly dependent on the Pentagon's information and recommendations. . . even when he has a certain mistrust of military people."<sup>80</sup>

Given DOD's central role in the formulation of foreign policy, the influence of the Secretary of Defense has since the end of World War II been very considerable. Under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, writes Kulagin, "it was the Secretary of Defense rather than the Secretary of State, who had the greatest influence. . . ." The military, along with the CIA, "played the most important role in planning and carrying out" the invasion at the Bay of Pigs. The policies of Secretary McNamara also "predetermined escalation" of the U.S. military involvement in Vietnam.<sup>81</sup> The role of his successor was believed to be somewhat less. Defense Secretary Laird was seen to fall "far short of a man like McNamara in both energy and erudition. . . ." The influence of the Defense Secretary in the Nixon Administration is believed to have "declined somewhat."<sup>82</sup>

Another factor which has helped bolster the influence of the Pentagon over that of the State Department, according to Kulagin, is the relative advantages of military over political planning. "Military



planning," he writes, "is based on a completely fixed material base: the size, structure and deployment of armed forces, characteristics of weapons systems, the military capabilities of potential adversaries and allies, and so on." In contrast, the planning units of the State Department face an altogether different situation. "They have at their disposal only foggy projections, subjective guesses and proposals, facts and tendencies that are difficult to put in precise quantitative terms." The military, therefore, can engage in "concrete planning," the State Department cannot. Its greater precision and concreteness, it is said, increases the influence of military over diplomatic planning estimates.<sup>83</sup>

The power of the Pentagon is increased still further by its vast political influence. Not only does it enjoy a symbiotic relationship with large military corporations, its powerful and wealthy allies in the "military-industrial complex," but DOD also has the firm support of a number of highly influential Congressmen, viz., Senators Russell, Goldwater, Jackson, Thurmond, and Stennis.<sup>84</sup> Further, in order to ensure its continued influence on Capitol Hill, DOD employs the largest number of lobbyists of any department in the executive branch. "In 1969, it had 339 officials for relations with Congress, i.e., there were two Pentagon lobbyists for every three members of Congress."<sup>85</sup>

The policy implications of this vast accumulation of power and influence by the Defense Department is entirely negative. As we noted earlier, "the military-industrial complex" thrives in conditions of tension and world conflict. Thus, in order to protect its privileged

bureaucratic position and enormous arms appropriations, the Pentagon strives to maintain constant nervous tension in the highest government circles. This inevitably places DOD in the anti-Soviet camp. As Oleshuk has recently written, the "military-industrial complex," "based on its own strictly selfish interests," seeks to prevent improved relations with the Soviet Union.

It is now a familiar story which is repeated from year to year: when the time comes to "push" new appropriations for military expenditures through the Congress, the Pentagon and the monopolies filling military orders inspire a routine noisy campaign on the subject of the "military threat" from the USSR. This helps force through Congress large appropriations for the armed forces. . . .<sup>86</sup>

Such campaigns about "sinister Soviet intentions," writes Arbatov, "are whipped <sup>up</sup> with the inevitability of other seasonal phenomena (like the blossoming of the cherry trees in Washington). . . ."<sup>87</sup>

Thus, to extort large appropriations, the Pentagon presents overstated appraisals of potential enemies. The influence of such practices are highly pernicious and serve to further aggravate Soviet-American relations. They lead, inevitably, to what Kulagin refers to as "the fabrications and myths that have intensified the atmosphere of cold war hysteria. . . ."<sup>88</sup> With its privileged power and status--and budget--depending on the continuation of concern for national defense, the Pentagon has a definite stake in the cold war. In the case of the professional military men in the Pentagon, however, they tend towards aggressive behavior not merely because it is in their self-interest to do so; their political views and their professional narrowness naturally bend them in

this direction. Most American military officers, notes Kulagin, hold conservative or ultra-right wing views. Furthermore, they tend to see only military answers to complex political issues. Thus, "in most cases the influence of professional military men on foreign policy is oriented toward the use of military means."<sup>89</sup> (General Gavin's criticism of US Vietnam policy and Admiral La Rocque's opposition to the current level of military budgeting are among the exceptions noted.)

Though the Pentagon is enormously powerful, Soviet analysts do not view its position to be uniformly evil. For example, even though he was severely condemned for U.S. policies in Vietnam, Secretary McNamara's reputation in Moscow is not wholly negative. Kulagin, as noted, regards him as a man of "energy and erudition." Trofimenko also views him with respect. He writes:

One of the first U.S. leaders to be more or less realistically aware of the hopelessness of the "senseless inertia" of the arms race. . . was Robert McNamara. . . . He put forward the thesis of the 'diminishing return' of capital investment in strategic arms systems under modern conditions. . . . 'The country can reach a point,' McNamara concluded in 1966, "when, in buying more military hardware, it is no longer buying more security for itself, and we have reached such a point."<sup>90</sup>

The current Defense Secretary, James Schlesinger, however, does not seem prone to accept "sensible arguments." In the view of two prominent military analysts at the USA Institute, Mil'shteyn and Semeyko, Secretary Schlesinger's endorsement of the doctrine of "limited strategic war" is highly "dangerous," "runs counter to the trend towards detente. . . and gives ground for suspicion and distrust."<sup>91</sup>



*militaristic*

Such views, however, do not go unchallenged. As we saw previously, "the sharp expansion" of the powers of the President's Special Assistant on National Security Affairs was, as Chetverikov writes, "a measure aimed at creating a balancing force to counter the military's influence in the NSC machinery. . . ."92 These new arrangements, in the Soviet view, have worked. Mr. Kissinger is "'the President's man,' that is, the one who does not represent narrow departmental interests." He has become, in effect, "deputy president on foreign policy matters."93 Thus, though the Defense Secretary is one of the "influential forces among the enemies of detente," he is seen to be constrained by the more powerful--and more moderate--forces in the White House.

In addition, there is growing uncertainty within the business community regarding the wisdom of continued high levels of military spending, a view shared increasingly on Capitol Hill. There are in the Congress, writes Tsagolov, many who actively oppose an increase in military spending expenditures and the continuation of the arms race, and their ranks have recently swelled. . . ."94 "The desire for constraint in the arms sphere. . .," writes Konovalov, ". . . has been characteristic of both chambers. . . in recent years." For example, in the fall of 1974, Congress "made a cut of almost \$5 billion" in the military budget requested by the Defense Department. He notes further that American "statesmen and military figures have themselves frequently stressed. . . the sober thesis. . . [that] the true security of the United States cannot be ensured by means of the endless spiralling of the arms race."95

The Defense Department, in sum, is seen to be a major force in American political life with a vital stake in the continuation of the arms build-up. This fact has critical implications. Should the White House decide that the best interests of the United States would be served by negotiating arms control agreements with the USSR, such a decision would, of necessity, jeopardize the power, influence, and economic interests of the Pentagon and, therefore, be resisted. This hostility to détente on the part of the Pentagon gives rise to what Soviet analysts see as "a certain inconsistency and dangerous zig-zags" in U.S. policy which, as a result, "contradict the positions which have already been asserted. . . " by the American political leadership.<sup>96</sup> The Pentagon-- and its allies--remain a "complex" of enormous power and influence "which did not emerge yesterday and which will not depart the scene tomorrow. . . ."97

#### Other Influences

Of the various other forces in U.S. political life which bear on foreign policy, Soviet analysts make particular note of three: special interest groups, public opinion, and the communications media.

#### Special Interest Groups

a) Economic. As discussed in detail previously, Soviet analysts regard the American business community as internally divided in terms of their economic interests and, accordingly, having different foreign policy orientations. The weapons suppliers and their subcontractors, seeking an ever larger slice of the military pie, support an aggressive

foreign policy line. The far larger non-military sector, concerned about inflation and economic stability, do not.

The one additional point worth further note is the interest shown recently in those segments of the American business community seeking improved relations with the Soviet Union. This, of course, is not a totally novel development. In the early 1920's, the newly-established Soviet regime hoped that "far-sighted [American] business leaders would see the advantage of commercial and diplomatic relations with Russia" and encourage<sup>d</sup> the Republican Administration of President Warren Harding to pursue a friendly policy.<sup>98</sup> Soviet analysts today place a similar faith in David Kendall, Armand Hammer, David Rockefeller, et al. to help promote trade--and political--relations between the U.S. and the USSR. (We shall return to this at a later point.)

b) Academic. Soviet analysts are showing a growing interest in the American academic community. Once condemned as mere intellectual apologists, paid to rationalize and justify the official government line, scholars in the United States today are regarded as an independent source of influence on policy. Government agencies, writes Gromyko, "have in recent years. . . been increasingly using the services of the academic community, turning for advice either to scholars who are experts on general problems of international relations, or to specialists on some particular country. . . ."99

To facilitate this relationship, a "fairly-well organized system for exchanging ideas, understandings and mutual assistance" has been



established between the U.S. government and the academic world. Although, as Gromyko writes, "of course, primacy in the making of decisions belongs to the government and the last word remains with the President,"<sup>100</sup> academic influence is seen to be significant. For example,

scholarly research is regarded as an important instrument in the NSC staff which makes it possible to outline more thoroughly possible alternatives of the US position on the most important and complicated international problems before they are presented to the President.<sup>101</sup>

This "approach" was used, Berezin notes, in putting together the American position in the SALT negotiations. After the conclusion of the first round of talks in November 1969 in Helsinki, a special task force (headed by NSC weapons system specialist Lawrence Lynn) including specialists from outside the government, prepared twelve studies for the American side.<sup>102</sup> Thus, while not decisive, academic influence can well be important.

Soviet analysts have made particular comment on three different segments of American academia--the "Arms Control Community," "think tanks" specializing on military and strategic problems, and Soviet specialists.

1.) The "Arms Control Community". The USA Institute has for some while been alert to the activity of those specialists working on questions of arms control, the so-called "Arms Control Community." During the "great strategic debates" in the United States on the adoption of an ABM system, notes Trofimenko, "eminent scholars and specialists. . . joined vigorously. . . ." Their role, he suggests, was positive. They opposed the ABM system as enormously expensive and basically ineffective.

As a result, in part, of their writings and testimony before Congress, "a realistic line emerged victorious" when the President signed the 1972 SALT accords in Moscow which limited ABM development.<sup>103</sup>

The critical role of the Arms Control Community is explained, in part by the credentials of its members. The "eminent scholars and specialists" usually referred to--York, Kistiakowsky, Wiesner, Scoville, Rathjens, Chayes, Ruina, Panofsky--have all been high-level officials in previous administrations or served as government advisors. Their judgements, in the Soviet view, are authoritative; their criticism of Defense Department policy, therefore, is especially telling.<sup>104</sup>

USA Institute military analyst M. A. Mil'shteyn has, recently, observed a similar discussion regarding SALT-II. He writes: "There were continuous broad discussions at the most diverse levels in the United States around the questions which had to be solved at the second phase" of SALT--"in Congress, in government departments, at symposia and seminars. . . and particularly among the circles of people engaged in arms control questions (The Arms Control Community) [given in English]. . . ." <sup>105</sup>

In this instance, Mil'shteyn found the American discussion to be "unjustifiably pessimistic." Nonetheless, he and Trofimenko clearly consider the "Arms Control Community" an influential group of "realistic" scholar-advocates who frequently--though not always--can be counted on to raise serious objections to the Pentagon's latest programs, contribute to the public and congressional discussions of arms control issues and, at times, influence policy decisions.

2.) The "think tanks." Aware that, as Gromyko has written, the American position at SALT-II depends "upon the entire complex of forces. . . which take part in work on military-political problems. . . ,"<sup>106</sup> Soviet interest extends beyond the "Arms Control Community" to the research centers specializing in strategic analysis. Previously denounced for their "right wing," militaristic attitudes, the Institute for Defense Analysis and the Center for Strategic Studies of the Stanford Research Institute are now openly courted--precisely because of their association with the Department of Defense. Such institutions, notes Gromyko, with unusual candor,

can significantly affect the process of government decision making, if only because they are in a position "to shoot upward their analytical and military-technical documentation and expertise, which may exert a very significant influence on responsible government officials."<sup>106A</sup>

Thus, even though "the interests of the military-industrial complex are deeply-embedded in these institutes," and "many on their staff take positions which coincide with the views of Senator Jackson," Mr. Gromyko managed to spend sometime visiting with SRI's "energetic Richard Foster" (whose office, he notes, is "a ten minute drive from the White House and right next to the Pentagon.")<sup>107</sup>

3.) Soviet specialists. A special place in the Soviet pantheon of the enemies of detente is reserved for American scholars specializing on the Soviet Union. At best, according to USA Institute Director Arbatov, the "well-known vices of Sovietology" include the following:

empty thoughts, the deliberate complication of the most simple things, and persistent attempts to make great



conclusions from facts of little significance (the method of "splitting hairs" or, as we say in Russia, attempts to "make an elephant out of a fly and then trade in ivory"). . . .<sup>108</sup>

Put less politely, academic specialists on the Soviet Union, like many of their bretheren in the State Department, are <sup>considered to be a</sup> product--and a major beneficiary--of the Cold War. Gromyko refers to American Sovietology as "that product of the Cold War which, in turn, it did everything to stimulate. . . ."<sup>109</sup> Having made their career in anti-Communism during the Cold War, they seek to prolong its existence. Thus, charges Arbatov, they disseminate false notions--regarding an alleged "expansionist drive" in Soviet policy--"calculated to discourage any desire in the West to seek alternatives to the Cold War."<sup>110</sup>

Purveyors of ossified anti-Communist dogmas, many of the professional anti-Soviets made a sizeable contribution to the Cold War. In their time, Zbigniew Brzezinski, the current favorite bête noire, and numerous other lesser lights served in the State Department sowing the seeds of distrust and suspicion towards the USSR. They appeal, in their writings, to liberal intellectuals and students, "an impressionable and occasionally fickle and fashion-conscious milieu."<sup>111</sup> (Soviet scorn for Western liberalism is well captured in Arbatov's characterization of "liberal circles": "Like frivolous young girls," he writes, "(although many of them are gray-haired), they swing from one fashionable political trend to another. . . .)"<sup>112</sup>

While numerous others--such as Herbert Dinerstein, Walter Laqueur Richard Pipes, Leopold Labedz--are also regarded as overt enemies of

détente, the picture is not all bleak. In a recent issue of SShA, "political scientist"--a less ominous profession--Marshall Shulman was mentioned without any abusive references and Zbigniew Brzezinski was seen to have begun to recognize reality.<sup>113</sup>

Whatever influence they may have had in the past, "the prestige and authority of the so-called Sovietologists has declined sharply. . . ." The "new realities" of Soviet-American relations, writes Gromyko, ran counter to their "dire predictions." As a result, "the authority of these experts has now been shaken and their advice is listened to with an increasing amount of skepticism." According to Richard Barnett, reports Gromyko, "their analysis of the dynamics of the processes of development of Soviet foreign policy is now rejected by the government itself."<sup>114</sup> Just as détente enhances the authority of "far-sighted businessmen," it apparently "washes away" the positions of the "adherents of the Cold War," America's Sovietologists.

#### Public Opinion and the Media

Soviet accounts of the role of public opinion in U.S. political life are strikingly generous. SShA authors have observed that public sentiment has become so potent a force in recent years as to have compelled critically important changes--in both policy and personnel--on the U.S. government. In recognition of this vast power, official circles are striving to "manage" public opinion, i.e., to manipulate it and, hopefully, render it harmless. It is to the accomplishment of this

purpose, it is argued, that the activities of the communications media are directed. American newspapers, magazines and television, therefore, have no function save to serve the interests of the official leadership.

#### Public Opinion

In an article in the August, 1974, issue of SShA, Eduard Ivanyan, chief of Sector on U.S. Public Opinion at the USA Institute wrote the following:

. . . there is every reason to assert that public pressure is objectively in a position to force a bourgeois government to take actions in foreign and domestic policy which might not have been considered in other times or under other circumstances.

While stressing that public opinion is "only one and not the only factor" influencing its behavior, he underscores the fact that "the position taken by broad circles of the American public was one of the factors along with a number of political economic and military factors, that influenced the decision of the U.S. government to withdraw its armed forces from Vietnam."<sup>115</sup>

A similar position is taken by numerous others at the Institute. Writing in early 1972, G. A. Trofimenko said that "the powerful popular protest against the war. . . with its nation-wide 'Vietnam moratoria' of 1964-71 and with its long and stormy anti-war campaign of 1971 is the main factor forcing the Republican government toward the gradual withdrawal of American troop units from Vietnam. . . ." Furthermore, writes Trofimenko, it was this "grass roots" movement which "forced President Johnson, who was responsible for the escalation of aggression in Vietnam, to leave the White House in 1968."<sup>116</sup> Still more recently, Geyevsky took the position



that the anti-war movement was "one of the main factors which impelled Washington to sign the [Paris] peace agreements" ending the Vietnam war." (Geyevsky, in fact, berates former student members of the anti-war movement for their political apathy. In his view they are "unable to understand the complex system of interrelationships between domestic and foreign policy. . . ." and unnecessarily "devalue the methods of mass struggle. . . ."117)

What explains this extraordinary turn of events? The classical interpretation argues that public opinion in bourgeois societies plays a negligible role, especially where foreign policy issues are involved. As Lenin wrote, "the most important questions--war, peace, diplomatic questions--are decided by a small handful of capitalists, who deceive not only the masses but very often parliament as well."118 How is it conceivable, then, in the view of Soviet Americanists, for a popular protest movement to cost the political career of one American President and force his successor to abandon a major foreign policy commitment?

Ivanyan attempts to explain, but his answer is rather vague. "In formulating and implementing their domestic and foreign policies," he writes, "bourgeois governments are forced to recall that unless they ensure support for their chosen course from the country's public opinion, it is difficult to count on its successful realization."119 What, precisely the source of the difficulty is, Ivanyan leaves unclear. Trofimenko provides a more discerning explanation. His reasoning is as follows: Whatever its public rhetoric, the United States government, does not always heed public opinion when formulating its foreign policy. On the contrary, its "optimum policy" is either to ignore public

opinion completely or, by manipulating public sentiment, to create an artificial climate of support for official policy. "However," he goes on, "the possibilities for such manipulation are not infinite."

Moments arise when the split between the sentiments and feelings of broad public circles and official policy proves so deep that a bourgeois government, wishing to remain in power, has either to correct official policy or to resign from power. . . .<sup>120</sup>

Fearful that public wrath will result in their defeat at the polls, American politicians must mend their ways, or leave the scene. "This, strictly speaking," writes Trofimenko, "happened in the United States in 1968, when public opposition. . . forced President Johnson to quit the White House." Similarly, the "present Republican administration must take account of the opinion of the overwhelming majority of voters. . . ."<sup>121</sup>

What Trofimenko refers to as "political reality," therefore, demands that the U.S. government give some heed to the sentiments of "the broad mass of voters." Citing General Westmoreland, he refers to public opinion as the "Achilles heel" of official policy.<sup>122</sup> Others take much the same view. At a November 1970 Symposium at the USA Institute, Shvedkov noted that it "is not by accident" that the Nixon Administration pays a great deal of attention to public moods.

. . . the President must take into consideration the fact twice during the postwar years, in 1952 and 1968, the American public's dissatisfaction with U.S. foreign policy has cost the ruling party dearly.<sup>123</sup>

And, later, Shvedkov notes that "the dramatic and unprecedented refusal" of President Johnson to run in 1968 and the failure of Senator Humphrey to win the election "showed clearly the dimensions of the American voter's rage."<sup>124</sup>

American electoral practices, therefore, traditionally denounced as exercises in political casuistry--as Khrushchev declared in 1964, "a 'flowery screen'. . . behind which capital is omnipotent and the workers are actually deprived of their rights"<sup>125</sup>--are seen to be an effective democratic political mechanism. An incumbent American administration must, in the current view, heed the changing popular mood, lest it lose public support at the polls. Such indeed happens at all levels of American political life--as demonstrated by the defeat of Senator Fulbright.<sup>126</sup> All elective bodies, therefore, including the Congress, are seen to be subject to some degree of public influence.

Electoral requirements have a direct effect on one specific area of U.S. foreign policy--the Middle East. The distinctive distribution of Jewish voters, who are largely concentrated in five major states (New York, California, Pennsylvania, Illinois and Ohio) "which account for 165 electoral votes out of the 270 needed to elect a President," writes V. A. Kremenjuk, is "a fact capable of influencing the policy of the Washington Administration." The views expressed by candidates of both parties on the Middle East during the 1972 campaign was influenced in considerable measure by this factor, that is to say, by their desire "to attract to their own side the greatest number of Jewish voters. . . ." Thus, "all prominent Democrats" and the Republican administration favored "decisive" and "active" support of Israel.<sup>127</sup>

While electoral considerations are not the only factors involved--the economic, military and political interests of the United States also



play their part--American policy toward the Middle East is influenced by the fact that in any election campaign, both parties must at least avoid offending the strategically placed Jewish vote. Their strategy, Kremen'yuk writes, is to speak in "generalities in their pre-election discussions" on this important question. This helps explain why "American diplomacy is presumed to be frozen when an election campaign is on. . . ."128 When the elections are over, such politically sensitive issues are open to more "realistic" diplomatic consideration.

Clearly, in the view of Soviet Americanists, public opinion has a highly important, in some instances even decisive, influence on American political life. Curiously, one Soviet commentator was recently moved to criticize Walter Lippmann for having denigrated this fact. (In the Illusory Society, she writes, Lippmann "reproached American public opinion for inertia and indifference to political issues.") "Without disputing Lippmann's thesis in principle," she comments,

it must be noted that under certain circumstances public opinion can be regarded as one of the factors which influences the social-political life of society--a factor which not only should be taken into account but in reality is considered when the political course of the contemporary bourgeois state is formed and implemented.<sup>129</sup>

Such is the sorry state of the "dictatorship of the bourgeoisie."

#### The Media.

The communications media is the most poorly understood feature of American political life. Paul Hollander has remarked on the striking tendency of Soviet judgements on American society "to project upon it

characteristics of the Soviet social-political environment. . . . Time and again Soviet spokesmen credit American society with political conditions which actually exist. . . in the Soviet Union."<sup>130</sup> Nowhere is this more clearly the case than the Soviet treatment of the American newspapers.

The starting point in the Soviet interpretation stems from their analysis of the role of public opinion. Ivanyan puts it simply. He writes: "Bourgeois states would violate their nature if they were not to at least try to halt or retard the. . . awakening of class consciousness and the political activity of the popular masses."<sup>131</sup> Thus, if public opinion cannot simply be ignored, then it can be transformed. It is to this end, that is to say, the management of public opinion, that the media are directed.

The role of the media is described simply as a tool of the ruling classes to ensure continued public support. The "powerful mass media," make it possible for the ruling classes "who exercise control over them, to constantly and vigorously exert an effect" on American public opinion "and thereby to artificially implant ways of thinking that are necessary to their circles."<sup>132</sup> Competition between various segments of the media--newspapers, magazines, radio and television--can be found. It reflects, however, not freedom of the press but a struggle between the owners of different media for the advertising dollar. And "even though commercial competition does exist, it does not prevent all mass media from working as a united front when it is a case of brainwashing the public. . . .

In such a case, there is complete unity between them notwithstanding tactical differences stemming from the political sympathies and convictions of the individual owners."<sup>133</sup>

The picture is one of endless manipulation and pervasive government control. For example: "There is a rather clearly defined distribution of duties and demarcation of spheres of penetration between the mass media. Each has its target." "In the overwhelming majority of cases, newspaper owners permit official Washington. . . to use newspapers and journals to implement its domestic and foreign policies and to influence public opinion. . . ." "Government power and the capital press corps" are "linked. . . by transmission belt<sup>3/4</sup>" (press conferences, briefings), that make the latter a 'quasi-official branch of the government'."<sup>134</sup> "Very strict censorship has for a long time prevailed over the speeches. . . made by any employee of the Federal Government on matters of foreign policy"--"rigid control. . . exercised over the news media. . . is constant."<sup>135</sup>

The USA Institute's handling of the publication of the Pentagon Papers by the New York Times, Washington Post and other leading newspapers in June 1971 reflects the basic Soviet attitudes towards the press. In an unsigned lead article appearing in its September issue, SShA reported the following:

Newspaper corporations in the USA are a great force closely linked to the banks and industrial monopolies. If the most powerful and influential newspapers in the country publish documents of the military establishment



against the will of the government and most of the members of the Supreme Court support them for doing so, this means that someone's patience has reached its limit on the American Mount Olympus.<sup>136</sup>

Trofimenko argues similarly. The "close connections" between American "business circles" and the media, he writes, explain such "seemingly paradoxical actions as the publication by bourgeois press organs of exposés" like the Pentagon Papers "despite government opposition."

It can be said that a certain section of the U.S. ruling classes has grown tired of the war. Having suffered commercially from the war, they. . . are therefore prepared to resort to powerful "shocking" eruptions within the "establishment" itself to achieve a speedier end to the protracted and fruitless adventure.<sup>137</sup>

In deciding to publish the Pentagon Papers, therefore, Katharine Graham, Arthur Ochs Sulzberger and the other publishers involved were responding not to any journalistic notions of public service; their main concern, like that of the non-military sector of the "ruling class," was the interests of "coffers and commerce" (Trofimenko).

The only other explanation offered for the "paradoxical actions" of the media i.e., the publication or broadcast of material hostile to the interests of government policy, is a bureaucratic one. Such "scandalous exposures of Washington's policies" as the publication of the Pentagon Papers or the release by Columnist Jack Anderson of the minutes of the NSC's Washington Special Action Group meetings during December 1971 at the height of the Indo-Pakistani crisis, writes Shvedkov, "are by no means random initiatives by individual persons." These "'bureaucratic scandals' are above all the result of the keen rivalry in the ruling

clique in Washington, a result of the struggle for power and influence." The "real reason" behind these "leaks," he writes, was the effort by Defense Secretary Laird to discredit Henry Kissinger and the NSC system. Resentful of the White House's "administrative innovations," Laird, with the support of allies at the State Department, sought to sabotage his chief rival.<sup>138</sup>

The media, therefore, have no independent role; they are, at once, the tool the business world and the foil of Washington bureaucrats. While occasional kindly remarks are made about individual "realistic" journalists (e.g., Walter Lippmann), and "authoritative" newspaper columnists (e.g., James Reston) are quoted, Soviet Americanists view their publishers in the grimmest light. SShA coverage of the Watergate affair, such as it has been, differed little from that given in the daily Soviet press. According to one source, the "hullabaloo in the press" concerning Watergate "fully corresponds to the traditions of the American two-party system. . . [of] using passing scandals to distract the public's attention from the really fundamental social problems of society."<sup>139</sup> So much for the efforts of Woodward and Bernstein, and their colleagues at the Washington Post.

## PART III

## U.S. POLICY-MAKERS

The personal qualities of specific leaders occupying the White House are, as we have seen, of considerable interest to Soviet analysts. The particular personality standing at the helm of state--be he a Roosevelt or a Truman, a Kennedy or a Johnson--can be of critical importance. Thus, though they continue to insist on "the primacy of objective factors" (the "correlation of forces," levels of economic development, scientific-military factors, the "laws of historical development" and the like), these are seen to be "mere objective preconditions." Essential to the formation of U.S. foreign policy strategy is the American leadership's "comprehension" of these factors, i.e., "how world realities are perceived--or how they may be perceived."<sup>1</sup>

The picture of the American political leadership presented in SShA is most striking. While not without its darker sides, the intellectual--and moral--qualities attributed to U.S. policy-makers in the past five years seem to have dramatically improved. From an anti-communist, expansionist, belligerent, at times even unstable band of essentially malevolent men, the key American decision-makers are now considered to be generally cautious, flexible, perspicacious and realistic. Soviet views regarding the American leadership will be reviewed in terms of three issues: 1) policy regarding the use of force, 2) Washington's "new realism," and 3) attitude toward the Soviet Union.



### The Use of Force

"As is well known," write two major military analysts at the  
USA Institute

military force has traditionally been regarded in the United States as the main instrument of foreign policy. This was reflected most vividly in the "positions of strength" policy whose pivot was based on the calculation that the solution of almost any foreign policy problem can be achieved with the aid of military force--by means of the threat of its use and when necessary by its direct use.<sup>2</sup>

The adoption of this militaristic stance, we are told, is a result of the "transient omnipotence" which the United States enjoyed after World War II. America was "the only world power which came out of the upheavals of war not only without having experienced disaster and destruction," writes Shvedkov, "but significantly enriched. . . ."<sup>3</sup> Furthermore, with "the appearance in their hands of the 'absolute weapon'--the atom bomb,"--U.S. political leaders were intoxicated with their own power. "Euphoric" regarding their own "omnipotence," they felt "anything goes" and sought to achieve, by a policy of military diktat, U.S. world hegemony.<sup>4</sup>

As a result, U.S. postwar diplomacy "took on a hypertrophied and monstrous form." Gromyko argues that "in the manner of an inveterate gambler," the political leadership "undertook the risky game of inciting international tension. . . ." Thus, for the purpose "of instilling fear," President Truman "used nuclear weapons on Japanese civilians so that everyone would understand the military capabilities of the United States."

"Under the conditions of the temporary possession of the atomic monopoly. . . , " the policy "of acting 'from a position of strength' became more and more fashionable on the banks of the Potomac."<sup>5</sup>

In the application of the "policy of strength," the United States is said to have engaged in three basic types of actions. V. V. Zhurkin, who specializes in U.S. "crisis behavior," notes the following:

The first form was the demonstration of force to frighten, deter, blackmail, and sometimes also to bluff. In these cases, the use of armed force was either not envisioned at all or viewed as extremely undesirable. Clear examples of such demonstrations were U.S. actions during the Berlin crises, the actions centering on Laos during 1961-1963 while Kennedy was President, and many others.

The second form was comparatively short actions, more or less limited in time, carried on with the active employment of armed forces. That is how it was during the U.S. intervention in Lebanon in 1958, in the Dominican Republic in 1965, and in a number of other cases.

Finally there is the third form, extended combat actions which are in fact what American military-political theoreticians call limited wars. This was the case in Vietnam.<sup>6</sup>

The point, clearly, is that U.S. political leaders are willing to resort to force to achieve their purposes. They employ the threat of force to "frighten, deter, blackmail and bluff" and, actually use American power to engage in "military adventures"--in Lebanon, Dominican Republic, Korea and Vietnam. President Kennedy, as noted previously, was regarded as somewhat exceptional in this regard. Kennedy recognized, notes Trofimenko, that, as he stated in November 1961, ". . . the United States is not omnipotent and not omniscient. . . ."<sup>7</sup> The United States was becoming aware that its "chief potential adversary" possessed a

weapons arsenal "sufficient to inflict an annihilating responsive nuclear missile strike against an aggressor. Such a situation, Kennedy stressed, called for caution, perspicacity, great realism and flexibility. . . ." Thus, during the Cuban Missile Crisis, he was able "to curb the 'hawks' straining for a fight and expressed readiness for a political, rather than a military solution. . . ." After the crisis, he expressed readiness for negotiations with the Soviet Union, which led to the Partial Test-Ban Treaty and made "a fundamental decision to curtail American participation in the civil war in Vietnam. . . ." <sup>8</sup>

Kennedy, therefore, was seen to have dissociated himself from the use of military force, understanding that in the case of Vietnam, "the tactic of military escalation. . . was not promising." In Zhurkin's view, Kennedy's "realism" was combined "in an eccentric manner with the basic one--the use of force." In any event, Kennedy's successor was not so constrained and "the world was again witness to repetitions of the traditional policy of aggression"--in the Dominican Republic and, especially in Vietnam. <sup>9</sup>

The experience of Vietnam, however--the lack of political and military success and the enormous cost (economic, social as well as human)--raised doubts about the wisdom of traditional policies. "The failure in Vietnam," writes Zhurkin, "gave rise to a sharp debate" in the United States in which some

even began to talk about a "post-Vietnam non-intervention syndrome" predicting that Washington would now show greater restraint in new international crises and conflicts, would strive to avoid involvement in such situations, and would soften its traditional principle of using force as the main instrument in conducting U.S. policy. <sup>10</sup>



The "fiasco in Vietnam," therefore, served as a powerful catalyst for Washington's reassessment of its basic policies. It did so, in particular, in that "it fostered the coming to power. . . of a different party, the Republicans, and the logic of interparty struggle was obligated to a certain 'change of landmarks'. . . ."11 As Arbatov writes, "it is typical of the American political tradition for new leaders to attempt to formulate some kind of new foreign policy line. . . ."12 The "new people" in Washington were forced to reassess their politico-military strategy. What lessons would they draw from Vietnam?

The USA Institute was not especially optimistic regarding the outcome of this reassessment. Their pessimism was based on two factors. First, as Zhurkin has written, the "lessons" of Vietnam are more "complex and contradictory" than the unambiguous predictions about a "non-interventionist syndrome" believed. There is always the "danger," he writes, of "attempts by an aggressor to take revenge for his failures by increasing the dimensions of a conflict. . . ." Such, in fact was considered in Vietnam in the second half of the 1960's. Actions of this kind, he somberly warns, could lead into "a descent into world nuclear missile conflict."<sup>13</sup> Yet another reaction to Vietnam, writes Zhurkin, could be the policy of "faits accomplis." Fearful of becoming tied down in "new Vietnams," the United States might seek to achieve its goals by "rapid aggressive actions," i.e., to deliver quick strikes and withdraw, thus presenting US and world opinion with "accomplished facts." Such a policy would be designed "to lessen the numerous negative consequences, domestic and foreign, which follow upon extended wars like that in Vietnam."<sup>14</sup>

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
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While the threat of a vengeful U.S. nuclear weapons strike was felt to be small--Zhurkin notes that military circles facing defeat had "frequently called for the use of nuclear weapons" (General McArthur in Korea, 1950 and 1951, Admiral Radford at Dienbienphu, 1954, and General Lemnitzer in Laos, 1961),<sup>15</sup> none of whose requests were implemented--the policy of quick strikes could not be foreclosed. Much depended on the character of the U.S. political leadership.

Here, too, there was little in which to take comfort. The new President's political record was very well-known in Moscow. While his "persistent declarations about an aspiration to switch 'from an era of confrontation to an era of negotiation'. . . inspired hopes that Washington's policy would promote a general relaxation of international tension,"<sup>16</sup> Nixon's previous anti-communist, anti-Soviet positions cast doubt as to their credibility. There is the question, wrote Arbatov, "whether his positions have really evolved from the right towards the center," that is, whether "the claims about a 'new Nixon' which were persistently advanced during the 1968 election campaign" were true. Noting Nixon's reputation as a "clever politician," Arbatov was dubious. He was also uncertain whether the President will "be able to display in his new position the qualities of a statesman which are essential, not so much for election to the position, as for running such a complex machine as the American ship of state."<sup>17</sup>

Doubts regarding the political style of the Nixon Administration were not long lasting. By late 1970, at a symposium at the USA Institute,

Arbatov concluded that though "declaring various new principles of policy in relatively calm periods, in crisis situations the Nixon administration acts as before in the old 'classical' style."<sup>18</sup> What led to this judgment was Washington's policies toward Cambodia in the spring of 1970 and its response to the Jordanian Civil War that September.

The new administration's decision to invade Cambodia in April 1970 was interesting to Soviet analysts on several grounds. This was the first major test of the operations of the new emergency decision-making machinery of the National Security Council, the Washington Special Actions Group (WASAG). The creation of WASAG, it should be noted, was seen to be a positive step. Fascinated with "bureaucratic rationality" and "orderly processes," the establishment of a "permanent organ. . . for preparing decisions at the highest possible levels during crises situations" was deemed to be a "very radical restructuring of the. . . decision-making process." Since the "decision-making process during crises is of exceptionally great significance"--Zhurkin notes that in such periods, "the U.S. President must make decisions in a matter of days (and sometimes hours). . . on actions which may threaten the fate of entire countries, and possibly even the whole world"--<sup>the creation of WASAG</sup> was thought to be a step in the right direction.<sup>19</sup>

While enamoured of Washington's administrative innovations, Zhurkin was less than pleased with the results. The discussions in WASAG lasted ten days, from April 20-30, 1970, during which a variety of alternatives were considered. "It is not possible to say," he writes, "that factors opposing the use of force were discounted completely."

He notes, in fact, that "on April 24, Kissinger organized a political game with five of his staff assistants who had opposed new measures for broadening military actions in Indochina, giving them an opportunity to formulate their basic arguments. . . . However all of these factors were in considerable measure analyzed one-sidedly, seeking to find ways of neutralizing them."<sup>20</sup>

While "practically all the alternative variants proposed" by WASAG "suggested the use of force," in the end "the toughest of all the proposed alternatives was selected," i.e., invasion with U.S. forces. The "only non-military alternative--to call a meeting of the international conference on Cambodia--was, so to speak, turned down from the outset."<sup>21</sup>

What Zhurkin sees as the predisposition towards a military solution is explained in part by the fact that, quoting L'Express, WASAG was "composed of the administration's hardliners." (It then included Presidential Assistant Kissinger, <sup>Under</sup> Secretary of State Johnson, Deputy Defense Secretary Packard, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Moorer and CIA Director Helms.) "Such a composition. . . cannot but be reflected in the character of the decisions taken." (He also notes that "the Nixon Administration's political makeup is distinctly expressed in the selection" of the WASAG membership.<sup>22</sup> It also may reflect the fact that, precisely during crises, "the influence of military circles and supporters of an assertive, aggressive policy" has been "particularly strong."<sup>23</sup> The decision to choose the toughest alternative, according to Shvedkov and Lesnoy, was taken "under the influence of the conclusions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff."<sup>24</sup>



What this reflected about "the administration's style of action" was explained by Arbatov in the August 1970 issue of SShA. The decision to invade Cambodia, he writes, "produced an impression of unexpected and even convulsive action." Some, he claimed, suggested that "the administration even consciously sought to create such an impression in order, so to speak, to put the fear of God into the adversaries of the United States, to show them that it is ready for decisive, unexpected and risky actions." This "show of force" did not make "an impression" on the Soviet Union, says Arbatov. (He quotes a Brezhnev speech (June 13, 1970) which scolds "shortsighted politicians" who seek to "amuse themselves with hopes that it is possible to scare the Soviet Union by any kind of show of force.") It does, however, raise doubts whether Washington can, "under the pressure of circumstances, in a crisis situation, control its emotions and maintain its composure and the necessary discretion."<sup>25</sup>

What the Soviet Americanists seemed so disappointed in was the fact that the new decision-making machinery had produced such dismal results. The decision to invade, notes Zhurkin, "was comparatively carefully prepared under conditions when Washington had a certain freedom of action and sufficient time to analyze the situation. . . ."<sup>25A</sup> The resort to force was a calculated one, whose purpose, therefore, was considered especially sinister. Nonetheless, Arbatov was not unduly alarmed--even though he notes reports that the use of tactical nuclear weapons had been contemplated. "Of course, in politics, everything is always in motion." Therefore, he concludes, "one cannot consider the formulation of the Republican Administration's policy completed."<sup>26</sup>

The crisis in the Middle East developed rather differently. The clashes between the army of King Hussein and "Palestinian guerrillas" which began in Amman on September 16, 1970, presented Washington "with a rapidly changing situation." "The mechanism of leadership," writes Zhurkin, "worked in extreme haste" (WASAG "sat almost continuously between September 16 and 21) and, depressingly, "displayed a tendency to take spasmodic and extremely dangerous decisions in a critical and complex situation."<sup>27</sup> Zhurkin referred to the fact that at the time the crisis was unfolding, Washington moved "large units of the US Navy, including several aircraft carriers, to the region of the Mediterranean Sea," brought "American airborne units in the USA and West Germany to combat readiness," and so on. The purpose of this "massive demonstration of force," he writes, was "to use the situation which had come about in Jordan to weaken the front of the Arab countries, strengthen the position of Israel and generally change the situation in the Middle East in favor of imperialism."<sup>28</sup> No mention by Zhurkin of the Syrian intervention in Jordan on behalf of the Palestinians which the American show of force was designed to discourage.

US action in Jordan was even more ominous than that taken in Cambodia. Here, notes Zhurkin, "special efforts were made toward widely advertising Washington's 'resolution' to implement direct intervention. . . . Reports concerning the movement of ships and the quick mobilization of battalions and brigades to a state of combat readiness became the property of the mass information media." This was "an obvious and typical example of 'brinkmanship'. . . ."<sup>29</sup>

Zhurkin's assessment of American policy during the Jordanian civil war is both stark and ominous. The crisis, he notes, "developed spasmodically and from time to time got out of control. . . ." Furthermore, he notes,

a new and extremely dangerous tendency was exposed in the behavior of Washington officials--the ability at moments of special tension to lose their heads and to set out upon patent adventures.

(The reference here is to a decision, reportedly taken on September 21, that "in certain circumstances," i.e., if the "Palestinian partisans" begin to gain victory over the King's army in Jordan and under a threat to the authority of the King," the United States planned "to land American troops in Amman and for Israel to invade north Jordan.")

"Moreover," he goes on, "according to The New York Times,

it was in principle decided to use the US Sixth Fleet against the forces of the UAR or the Soviet Union (!) should they come to the aid of the victims of aggression.<sup>30</sup>

The United States, had reverted to Dulles-like "brinksmanship" against the Soviet Union itself.

The Nixon Administration, in Zhurkin's view, behaved recklessly. The American leaders took "extremely risky decisions" and, in critical moments, "lost the ability to appraise the consequences of their actions soberly. . . ." Furthermore, the belief is "now disseminated among the ruling circles in Washington that by playing with power, balancing on the edge of war, artificially heating up these and other acute crises situations Washington will be able to frighten its opponents. . . ." In fact, "some people are even considering the use of carefully-advertised



recklessness in order to make their opponents more cautious and more yielding." These are "absurd calculations," he concludes, which can only sharpen international crises situations and "heighten the threat of war."<sup>31</sup>

Arbatov's analysis was quite different. He interpreted US actions in Cambodia and the Middle East in terms less of aggressive adventurism than as a response to the domestic crisis confronting the Nixon administration. "On the one hand," he told his colleagues at the Institute,

the Administration well understands that within the country there is a growing dissatisfaction with the foreign policy adventures, the burdensome commitments, and the participation of the United States in aggressive wars. And the government cannot but take account of this dissatisfaction. It tries to show that it is responsible to public opinion.

On the other hand, the Administration is experiencing a noticeable nervousness that other powers, particularly those whom the United States confronts in the world arena, will notice the complicated domestic situation in America and recognize that this limits Washington's freedom of action. This nervousness, apparently, pushes some American leaders to adventuristic actions in order to prove that the United States Government as before has full freedom of action and in case of need is ready for any crisis and can, as the expression goes, "go all the way."<sup>32</sup>

Arbatov clearly feared that US "adventuristic" behavior in 1970, was a case of an over-reaction by the Nixon administration to a domestic political crisis. To prove that internal dissension has not paralyzed the United States, Washington resorted to a policy of "bluff" and "brinkmanship." (Though avoided by Arbatov himself, a similar interpretation was given to the US military alert during the Yom Kippur war in

October 1973. Alluding to the rising Watergate crisis then confronting President Nixon, the venerable French Communist, Jacques Duclos, writing in Pravda, observed that:

In capitalist circles, there are people, capable of launching themselves on dangerous maneuvers in the international arena, proceeding, in particular, from domestic policy considerations, as though they were prompted by an awareness of the end of the regime--an awareness which was expressed on the eve of the great French bourgeois revolution in the phrase: "après nous le deluge."<sup>33</sup>)

The "general conclusion" reached by Zhurkin was that U.S. policy still "basically counted on the traditional application of force."<sup>34</sup> This conclusion was further corroborated by U.S. policy during the December 1971 Indo-Pakistani War when, a "group of ships from the US Seventh Fleet, including the aircraft carrier Enterprise, the United State's most powerful warship, was brought into the Bay of Bengal. . . as a demonstration of force against India."<sup>35</sup> Zhurkin sees the pattern continuing. As he told an Italian journalist in February, 1975, "let us not forget that in 1972 the port of Haiphong was mined, . . . that not long prior to the Paris agreements on Vietnam there were massive American bombing raids on Hanoi and that the Yom Kippur War broke out not long after that." In the judgement of the Deputy Director of the USA Institute, "anyone who follows American policy. . . knows that the Washington rulers. . . precede every diplomatic or political action with a threat or, if you prefer, by strong pressure. That is as a general rule."<sup>36</sup>

"Reliance on force," therefore, in the view of leading Americanists, remains a major characteristic of U.S. policy-makers. Whether to

intimidate adversaries, blackmail others into accepting American initiatives or compensate for internal weakness, the Washington leadership is believed to place a premium on the "value of non-predictability" and to have easy resort to "unexpected," "convulsive," "risky," "adventuristic" actions. The Mayaguez affair undoubtedly was seen as vintage "military adventuresness." As Zhurkin recently remarked, ". . . we very well know with whom we have to deal. Détente is no picnic."<sup>37</sup>

### The New Realism

Side by side with this dark assessment, the American political leadership of the past few years has received especially high marks for what is viewed as its "realistic," "sober," "sensible," "constructive" approach to US foreign policy. While this policy outlook is seen more in terms of necessity than virtue, it is very clear that Soviet Americanists have had strikingly high personal regard for both President Nixon and Secretary Kissinger.

Despite the initial suspicion with which they viewed his election in 1968, Richard Nixon's anti-Soviet past was not without its bright side. Thus, in a November 1970 symposium, Arbatov told his colleagues at the USA Institute about the argument heard in the United States which suggests that

the fact that the people now in power enjoy a solid reputation as conservatives, figures of rigidly anti-Communist convictions, has its positive aspects since people of that sort do not fear criticism from the right. They are free of that "inferiority complex that has compelled some liberals to act in such a way as to demonstrate that they



are "more Catholic than the Pope." In that case, the present leaders can go much further in the policy of the relaxation and normalization of the international situation.

Such suggestions, in Arbatov's judgement, contained a "certain logic, especially considering the 'service record' of certain of the more liberal predecessors of the present leaders of the United States."<sup>38</sup> Thus, not only were "liberals" (presumably Democrats) seen to be frivolous and fainthearted, they were, paradoxically, always under suspicion of being "soft on communism." A Republican Administration, especially one with impeccable anti-Communist credentials, would be immune from charges of "selling out." His conservative flank protected, Nixon could, said Arbatov, "go much further" in negotiations with the Soviet Union.

Another factor attracting the attention of Soviet analysts was the new administration's interest in "new methods of foreign policy management." Given the political complexion of the Nixon leadership, this came as something of a surprise. While Henry Kissinger "has himself always shown considerable interest in new methods of analyzing international situations" and recruited Charles Hermann, a specialist on simulation from Princeton <sup>University,</sup> to serve on his staff, the interest of the President in such matters was unexpected. According to Vitaly Zhurkin, a "serious attempt" to create an efficiently functioning decision-making system was being made "paradoxically. . . precisely under Nixon, a figure of conservative persuasion from whom it would seem that one could not expect special

interest in scientific 'innovation,' in the sphere of administration, analysis and so forth."<sup>39</sup> While "liberals" are frivolous, conservatives are conservative.

In any event, the new NSC system, WASAG, political gaming (used during the Cambodian crisis) and other management reforms introduced by the new administration were seen to be efforts to systematize the process of decision making, i.e., to filter out irrelevant (bureaucratic) influences, and rationalize the method of presenting alternatives to the President for decision. Given the grave importance of the choices he must make (which are recognized, as we have seen), this well-ordered approach to the conduct of US foreign policy was, and remains, a valued characteristic of the current Washington leadership.<sup>40</sup>

The real source of interest, however, has been less the organizational changes introduced by the Nixon Administration than the modifications it is seen to have made in US foreign policy. Here, clearly, the American policy-makers receive very high marks indeed. As Trofimenko has noted, the adoption of the policy of détente by the United States "required a quite serious reexamination of the basic principles of its foreign policy and a very radical change in its foreign policy practices."<sup>41</sup> It is this "radical," even "drastic" change in US foreign policy which has won the administration such great respect.

The contributions of the Nixon Administration are said to be both practical and conceptual. Practically, the summit conferences--the personal meetings between the leaders of the Soviet Union and the United

States are considered to be of "exceptional importance." During the "Cold War" period, notes Trofimenko, the Soviet Union and the United States communicated with or "signalled" to each other "primarily by threats--direct or indirect." Despite the availability of extensive opportunities to do otherwise, "the two sides actually conducted their dialogue by means of various indirect 'signals'--ostentatious measures and counter-measures, actions and gestures in international forums--but in no way by direct contact." With the inauguration of the summit conferences, which began when President Nixon visited Moscow in May 1972, and especially as these meetings became yearly events, "the development of systematic contact at the highest diplomatic level" allowed for "frank and direct exchange of opinions." Such exchanges do not, of course, necessarily lead to elimination of differences. However, writes Trofimenko, they are a considerable improvement over the former system of "signalling." A frank discussion, he writes, is always useful

because it helps to get a better understanding of the intentions and interests of the other side and therefore provides an opportunity for. . . seeking solutions based on taking the interests of both sides into account. . . .<sup>42</sup>

For reasons to be explained shortly, the concern of the Nixon White House to learn about the intentions and interests of the Soviet Union and to take them into account in the solution of international questions is considered a marked improvement over the attitude of preceding administrations.

American willingness to negotiate regularly with the Soviet Union is based, in the view of Soviet analysts, on a prior modification of the



American self-image. In the 1940's, the American political leadership was inspired by a boundless faith in US military and economic, hence political supremacy, a cocky self-assurance which led it to pursue its cold war, "positions of strength policy." The "Acheson concept of talks from a position of strength," writes Trofimenko (quoting historian Norman Graebner) "meant in practice no talks at all. . . . Diplomatic confrontations, as the Secretary of State repeatedly said, should be used not for talks but to record Soviet diplomatic defeats. So long as Western superiority was not sufficient to ensure precisely such a result, Acheson preferred that the West avoid settlement."<sup>43</sup> Haughty with its own sense of omnipotence, the cold war "positions of strength" policy led to diplomatic bankruptcy.

The current American leadership takes a modest and restrained view of its own capabilities. Writing in 1972, one Soviet theorist suggests that Henry Kissinger is "among those American strategists to whom a sane view on certain problems is not alien." Evaluating the role and place of the United States in the contemporary world," he writes, Kissinger has noted its "limited capabilities. . . ."<sup>44</sup> In a speech to State Department employees, notes Chetverikov, Kissinger observed that "from the U.S. viewpoint, international relations are going through 'a critical transitional period'. This is expressed, above all, in the radical change in the world position of the United States. 'We no longer have,' he said, 'either an insuperable safety margin nor overwhelming predominance in resources'."<sup>45</sup>

This implied a considerable change in official government thinking.

The officially accepted slogan of "supremacy" in world affairs by means of achieving "superiority" in all of the means which make up the arsenal of foreign political and foreign economic coercion has been replaced by the expression "an important role in world affairs"; this has been a substantial departure from the view which was dominant during the first two postwar decades.<sup>46</sup>

It is only with the acceptance of this more modest role, it is argued, could the American leaders recognize, as it did at the May 1972 summit, that the security of both the United States and the Soviet Union must be based on the principle of equality.<sup>47</sup> Previous assumptions regarding "supremacy" would not have permitted Washington policy-makers to consider the interests of anyone save themselves.

Given a less-inflated "self-image, American policy-makers are no longer so disdainful of diplomatic negotiations with their major adversary. As important, however, has been their willingness to recognize the need for negotiations, particularly in the sphere of strategic weaponry. Here, especially, what has proved to be of such great importance is the intellectual competence of the U.S. leadership. As numerous Soviet analysts have indicated, the Republican Administration has had a sound conceptual grasp of the strategic relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States. Writing in 1972, for example, Trofimenko salutes the American understanding of deterrence. "It should be said," he writes, "that in conditions of nuclear-missile standoff between the two great powers, . . ." not only are the military arsenals and strategies of each side important but "ever-increasing significance" is attached to the

question of "what each side thinks of the capabilities and intentions of the other side. Thus," he continues,

H. Kissinger stressed that what a potential opponent believes about the intentions of the other side "is substantially more important than the objective truth. Deterrence takes place above all in people's minds."<sup>48</sup>

This understanding, suggests Trofimenko, is the only basis for preserving the strategic stability between the Soviet Union and the United States. Each side must be convinced "that the other side does not intend to carry out a preventative nuclear attack against it." He goes on:

This conviction will be strongest when it is based on a knowledge that the other side does not possess the physical capability of delivering a first (dismanting) strike. In a situation of "mutual deterrence," such knowledge becomes a real deterrent force only when your opponent holds the same views on this matter as you do, that is, when each of the sides believes that the other side will in all cases preserve its capability, will and readiness to deliver a crushing response in case a nuclear missile attack is undertaken against it.<sup>49</sup>

It is in terms of the essentially "psychological framework of deterrence," writes Trofimenko, that the concept of "sufficiency" introduced by the United States assumes significance. Thus, he notes, "President Nixon emphasized that one of the particular criteria of 'sufficiency' was the necessity of a deployment of U.S. strategic forces which the Soviet Union could not view as a provocation. 'Sufficiency', Nixon stated, 'also signifies that the number, specifications, deployment of our forces will not provide the Soviet Union with grounds for interpreting them as an intention to threaten the USSR with attack in order to disarm it'.<sup>50</sup> Washington, in his view, clearly knows what it is doing.



Furthermore, Trofimenko goes on, the United States understands that deterrence "is to some extent a closed circle. Any attempt unilaterally to change these established limits can only lead to a new turn in the spiral of the arms race. . . and create an atmosphere of increased nervousness in which the world is moved closer to the edge of global thermonuclear conflict." The White House, in the view of Soviet analysts, is aware of the destabilizing effects of a continuing escalation of the arms race. For this reason, Kissinger has opposed those in the United States demanding "preservation of American nuclear superiority." In responding to their arguments, writes Turkatenko, the Secretary of State takes the position that

the constant expansion of strategic weapons does not lead to an additional level of security. It only leads to a balance at higher levels of complexity and risk and, moreover, at the cost of colossal expenditures; this would engender an atmosphere of hostility and suspiciousness which would only make the emergence of political conflict more likely and would in time dispel the aspiration to create a calmer and more secure atmosphere in the world.<sup>51</sup>

The White House clearly recognizes, then, that efforts to implement qualitative weapons improvements "destabilizes the existing balance to a particularly dangerous degree by creating a lack of confidence in the intentions of the other." This awareness, writes Trofimenko, was the basis for the SALT agreements.

The American leadership's understanding of this circumstance was reflected in the fact that it moved to conclude agreements with the Soviet Union to limit offensive and defensive weapons systems. The establishment of certain limits on the corresponding systems is very important on the level of "removing" the fears, whether real or

illusory, of each side that the other side is nurturing the idea of a preventive "counterforce" strike.

Further testimony regarding the understanding by the ruling circles of the United States of the dangers involved in a nuclear "confrontation," including the psychological problem of incorrectly interpreting the intentions of ones opponent, is seen in the signing of the American-Soviet Agreement on measures to reduce the dangers of nuclear war.<sup>52</sup>

For Trofimenko, then, Washington's "understanding" of the psychological dynamics of the arms race and, more broadly, of the need to take concrete measures to control international conflicts, prevent nuclear war and to regularize and stabilize Soviet-American relations has been crucially important to the summit agreements signed since 1972.

Moreover, despite Zhurkin's pessimism, some of his colleagues at the Institute see American policy makers gradually abandoning its reliance on military force. In the view of Soviet analysts, the Vietnam war clearly demonstrated that even "the huge military power created by the United States has its limits. . . ." a conclusion shared by Washington. (As evidence of this, Arbatov quotes--frequently--an article written in 1968 in which Kissinger states: "The paradox of contemporary military strength is that a gargantuan increase in power has eroded its relationship to policy. . . . In other words power no longer automatically translates into influence.")<sup>53</sup> Furthermore, given Soviet nuclear parity with the United States, nuclear war has now become unthinkable. The "obvious realization of the hopelessness of a universal nuclear war," a war which "would inevitably lead to devastating consequences for the United States," write Mil'shteyn and Semeyko, ". . . contributed to a

reassessment of views on the use of military force as the main instrument of foreign policy." The "U.S. leading circle's recognition of the need to prevent a general nuclear catastrophe," is, in their view "one of the main preconditions of the contemporary international détente. . . ."54

The affixing of President Nixon's signature at the 1972 summit conference in Moscow to agreements on strategic arms limitation and acceptance of a "new code of conduct" for Soviet-American relations (formulated in the "Basic Principles of Mutual Relations") were seen to be practical evidence of Washington's "new realism." The United States was turning, as Nixon had promised, "from an era of confrontation to an era of negotiation."

Of particular importance, in this connection, was the June 1973 Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War which served not only to exclude the outbreak of nuclear war between the Soviet Union and the United States but sought to prevent local conflicts from escalating into nuclear wars. In signing this agreement, writes Trofimenko, the United States took another step in the direction of "military détente." Back in the 1960's, he writes, Washington realized the dangerous nature of nuclear weapons and sought to avoid conflicts which might result in a direct confrontation with the Soviet Union. But, at the same time, it was believed, that "mutual deterrence" on the nuclear level "allowed the United States to be 'bolder' and 'freer' to use conventional armed forces, which prompted it to unleash war against the Vietnam people."55



The understanding reached in the 1973 summit agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War, asserts Trofimenko, "testified to an extremely fundamental change of views [svidetel'stvovala o ves'ma sushchestvennom izmenenii vzglyadov] on the part of the American political and military leaders." This agreement, in which both sides pledged to refrain from the threat or use of force under any circumstances which might endanger international peace and security, "acknowledged the existence of a close tie between any conflict whatever and nuclear conflict." In so doing, the American leaders are seen to have retreated from their previous views. That is to say, they "acknowledge the untenability of the theory that some kind of visible 'watershed' exists between conflict in general and nuclear conflict." Trofimenko argues that US policy makers

have in fact come to recognize that the most effective means of preventing nuclear war is not the artificial construction and fixing of one or another set of 'thresholds' of military escalation, but the renunciation of the use and threats of force in any form. It was this change in attitude which made it possible to conclude the Soviet-American Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War. . . .<sup>56</sup>

There are, to be sure, inconsistencies and contradictions in the American position. Krivozhika, for example, questions the "commensurateness" of the means used by the United States during the Yom Kippur War--the military alert--with the actual threat to American interests. In one of the few oblique criticisms of US behavior during the October 1973 conflict to appear in SShA, the "leadership's estimate" of the situation was faulted.<sup>57</sup> Much more important, however, is the fact that, as Soviet Americanists often point out, the "new realism" emanating from the White

House has not gone unchallenged. As Mil'shteyn and Semeyko write, "the reassessment of views" by the American political leadership "has taken place and continues to take place under conditions of complex struggle and in the conflict of contradictory views."<sup>58</sup> While "sober-minded political circles. . ." in Washington "are aware of the danger of nuclear catastrophe and of the fruitlessness of an endless arms race," "Pentagon theoreticians" search for "ways and opportunities for broadening the spectrum of the 'usability' of nuclear weapons." Though the White House regards the arms race as economically wasteful and politically dangerous, the Pentagon proposes ever new weapons systems.<sup>59</sup> The influence of the Department of Defense and other elements of the "military-industrial complex" leads to a "certain inconsistency" in US government policy (such as the appropriation of vast funds for the supersonic B-1 strategic bomber and the "Trident" submarine, and Secretary Schlesinger's "dangerous retargeting doctrines."). Nonetheless, the main trend in the White House, the center of power in the American political system, is very much the "realistic" one.

The "growing awareness of new realities" among Washington policy-makers is clearly regarded as a very positive development. As one Soviet commentator wrote shortly before President Nixon resigned, "it is a noteworthy fact that even the loudest critics of the Nixon administration cannot find any weighty arguments against his policy of détente. And this is understandable since, for the first time in the past quarter-century, the official interpretation of the United States so-called national

interests ceases to conflict with the policy of easing of international tension. . . .<sup>60</sup> Watergate or no, Nixon is seen as having helped achieve "a positive turn" in the direction of Soviet-American relations.

#### Attitudes Toward the Soviet Union

Of the many indicators of Washington's "new realism," perhaps none is of greater psychological importance than the "sober" attitude of US policy-makers towards the Soviet Union. For a variety of historical and cultural reasons,<sup>61</sup> Soviet officials--ordinary citizens as well--are highly sensitive to outside criticism. They are, at the same time, extraordinarily responsive to those, especially from the West, who recognize their country's historical role and achievements. FDR is remembered as much for having granted the Soviet Union diplomatic recognition in 1933, which several preceding administrations had refused, as for his place as one of the wartime Big Three. The concern by the Nixon Administration to turn "from confrontation to negotiation," its "business-like" policy towards the USSR, explains why the former President is treated with greater regard at the USA Institute than he is in the United States itself.

One of the chief "motive forces" of the Cold War, it is argued in Moscow, is the profound animosity borne by the West toward the USSR. Many in the United States, Arbatov notes, have long regarded the socialist regime in the Soviet Union as "a kind of illegitimate child of history, . . . a 'historical misunderstanding' which has to be ended in one way or another



as quickly as possible." It was precisely this attitude which inspired the military intervention in Russia after World War I which sought to crush the Bolshevik Revolution, "or, in Winston Churchill's words, 'to strangle the baby in the cradle'." This also explains, he writes, why the United States delayed recognition of the Soviet Union for 16 years--hoping thereby "that it would disappear from the face of the earth or maintaining the illusion that we really did not exist."<sup>62</sup>

Despite the profound resentment of such hostile behavior, there is a curious understanding of the intense Western response (if it was that) to the new Soviet regime. As Ivanyan told his colleagues at an Institute symposium, the Bolshevik Revolution "shook the foundations of international capitalism. . . [and] caused anxiety and confusion in financial and monopoly circles. . . . The October Revolution 'has started a fire in all of Europe and America. . . . They (the capitalists) have one thought: to prevent the sparks from our fire from falling on their roofs,' wrote V. I. Lenin."<sup>63</sup> Would not the bourgeois leaders have "violated their nature" not to speak of their self-interests if they did not at least try to put out the fire?

The emotions and ideas born of this hostility, it is argued, lay at the heart of American postwar policy. Despite its great role during the Second World War, the USSR's right to exist was not accepted as legitimate and its policies were seen to menace the basic interests of the United States. As Davydov writes, American strategists in the 1940's "proceeded from the notion. . ."

that the presence of the socialist camp, to say nothing of its expansion, was a direct threat to the very existence of the United States. As a result, official Washington declared that the sphere of American "national security" stretched to the borders of the socialist countries, and sometimes even further.<sup>64</sup>

This was the rationale for the policy of "containment."

US irreconcilability towards the Soviet Union, justified by an increasingly venomous anti-communist ideology, led to the creation of NATO, SEATO and other military alliances. It thus gave impetus to the arms race which, as we have seen, further re-inforced the aggressive cold war impulses of the American leadership. To secure ever greater funds for the protection of American "security interests," the military constantly harped on the danger of an external Soviet threat. The anti-Communist animus was deep and abiding. Thus, writes Arbatov:

Practically right up until the end of the sixties, all American policies vis-à-vis the socialist countries were regarded primarily as policies intended to influence their internal affairs. Both "containment" and "liberation" and even "bridge-building" were in the final analysis intended either to crush these countries by force or to promote the "internal transformation" of the socialist countries, their "softening up" and "erosion," that is, they constituted a policy aimed at interfering in their internal affairs.<sup>65</sup>

Central to the American Cold War mentality, according to the Institute Director, was the "desire to assess any political step solely from the angle of how to harm the other side. . . ."<sup>66</sup> The American aspiration for nuclear supremacy in the 1950's is thus explained as due, in part, to the US "intention 'to economically exhaust' the Soviet Union in the course of a new round in the nuclear-missile arms race."<sup>67</sup>

The essence of the American foreign policy position during the Cold War is set forth by Trofimenko. US national interests at this time, he writes, were defined "by the 'obverse' method, that is, by counterposing them to the 'national interests' of the other side." This was the equivalent, he notes, of a "zero-sum" game. "On the basis of this kind of psychology, anything that was bad for ones opponent was always good for oneself, and vice versa."<sup>68</sup>

This approach, which by its very nature perpetrated confrontation and made even normal relations extremely difficult, began to fade in the late 1960's. The events of the past several years, writes Arbatov, increasingly revealed the "bankruptcy" of Washington's "primitive anti-Communist stereotypes." US policy-makers who had built their policy on the crude notion that every misfortune America encountered was rooted in communism found it increasingly difficult to attribute all changes in the world to a "Communist conspiracy." The various difficulties confronting the United States--decline in US influence in the Third World, including tension in relations with Western Europe and Japan, the growing bitterness of the competitive struggle on world markets--these and other problems could not be ascribed to the Soviet Union. "Even the most thick-witted representatives of U.S. imperialist circles could no longer see the 'hand of Moscow' in these dangers and threats or seek an answer to them in the build-up of armed forces and military adventures."<sup>69</sup>

Another factor undermining traditional anti-communist attitudes in Washington was the realization that the Cold War had a deleterious



effect on the United States itself. As noted earlier, large-scale military spending associated with modern strategic weaponry and, especially, the war in Vietnam, generated enormous pressure on the economy--causing serious inflation, declining productivity and profits--and exacerbated complex social and political problems within the United States. The profound internal crisis of the past several years, it was argued, shook the messianic conviction in the infallibility of the American way of life. Further, it "taught the U.S. ruling class to realize that, in basing its policy wholly on a platform of bellicose anti-communism, the American bourgeoisie not only does not protect itself. . . but also can do substantial damage to its own class interests."<sup>70</sup>

Under the pressure of "life itself," therefore, the doctrines and policies of the past began to lose meaning. With the decline of "rabid anticommunism" in the American worldview, the "main objective" of postwar US foreign policy--to oppose, at least to "contain," and ultimately to "crush" the Soviet Union once and for all--lost its former significance. Washington, therefore, has abandoned its "black-white" view of the world. The United States, writes Arbatov, "no longer can base its foreign policy assumptions on the premise that it has one and only one enemy in the shape of the USSR. . . and that any harm inflicted on that enemy automatically signifies an equivalent profit for the United States. . . ."<sup>71</sup> In brief, the American policy-makers no longer see the world in "zero-sum terms." "This type of thinking"--which sought to inflict the greatest possible damage on the Soviet Union--has, according to Trofimenko, been "finally overcome. . . ."<sup>72</sup>

The decline in American anti-communism--what amounts to, in the Soviet view, a secularization of U.S. foreign policy--was essential to the recent détente in US-USSR relations. Before serious negotiations could occur, before both sides could attempt to define spheres of cooperation in areas of mutual concern (especially in the prevention of nuclear conflict and controlling the strategic arms race), the United States had to acknowledge the legitimacy of Soviet diplomatic interests, a posture which it was believed previous administration's had refused to adopt. The summit agreements themselves demonstrated how far the US leaders had come. Thus, for example, in the 1972 accord on the "Basic Principles of Mutual Relations," both sides agreed that "in the nuclear age, there is no alternative to conducting their mutual relations on the basis of peaceful coexistence." The development of "normal relations," they concurred, were to be "based on the principles of sovereignty, equality, noninterference in internal affairs and mutual advantage." Little wonder that Arbatov considers this agreement as having "the highest degree of significance." The Soviet Union is clearly no longer the "illegitimate child of history," at least not as far as the United States is concerned. Quite a change, he notes, from the period two decades ago "when the United States proclaimed as its official foreign policy platform the doctrines of 'liberation' and the 'rollback' of communism which in point of fact were the direct antipodes of the principle of the peaceful coexistence of states. . . ."73

In this and subsequent summit agreements, the "special responsibility" of the Soviet Union (along with the United States) for preserving world peace, controlling international tension and, especially, for lessening the danger of nuclear conflict is emphasized. Arms limitation agreements, it is acknowledged, must be based on "the principle of equal security." Clearly, at least in principle, US policy-makers have recognized "once and for all, the viability, full-equality and invincibility of the socialist system. . . . This is a very great gain for socialism. . . ."74

The political leadership of the United States therefore, clearly has abandoned the "bellicose anti-communism" of the Acheson (containment) Dulles (liberation) era. Others, especially President Kennedy, were seen to be moving away from this tradition. In his third year in office, writes Anatoly Gromyko, Kennedy had come to recognize "the utter futility of his efforts to base American foreign policy exclusively upon 'cold war dogmas. . . . He had begun to understand more clearly the need for peaceful coexistence. . . . He thus attempted to introduce a positive element into American foreign policy. . . ." attempts reflected in his American University Speech and the US signature on the Partial-Test Ban Treaty of 1963.<sup>75</sup>

It was not, however, until the Presidency of Richard Nixon that the United States moved to a generally positive approach to relations with the Soviet Union. Despite his anti-Soviet, anti-Communist past, Nixon was a "realist" who proved ready to "adapt" to changing conditions, domestic and international. He was, further, assisted by Henry Kissinger



who, even in the 1950's, believed that bilateral talks between the two countries "should be conducted with regard to Soviet interests," that the solution of the problem of limiting the arms race "depends precisely" on the USSR and the United States, and that "these two countries have a common interest" in avoiding nuclear war.<sup>76</sup> Given the "realism" of its top leadership and this "constructive and business-like approach," the United States has become, in Arbatov's phrase, an "acceptable partner."<sup>77</sup>

#### PART IV

#### POLICY EXPECTATIONS

What do Georgi Arbatov and his colleagues at the Institute anticipate from the United States in the years ahead? President Ford's "constructive" role at the Vladivostok working-summit last November indicates that despite the resignation of Richard Nixon, "realism" still prevails in the White House. Will it survive the departure (as depart he eventually must) of Henry Kissinger, the man linked to "the concretization of the ideas on which the present U.S. foreign policy course is based. . .?"<sup>1</sup> Will it endure should President Ford lose the 1976 election and be replaced in the Oval Office by a Democrat? By Henry Jackson? What about the longer term? Will "caution" and "restraint" prove lasting if, as a result of the "scientific-technological revolution," the balance of military power were to shift significantly back in the direction of American superiority?

Soviet judgements on these and other questions bearing on the future of America hinge on an analysis of both internal and external factors. As we are repeatedly told, U.S. behavior in the world is directly influenced by the changing international situation. Thus, the "realism" to be found among current Washington policy-makers is explained largely in terms of their response to an increasingly unfavorable international environment, one in which their major adversary has achieved nuclear parity with the United States. American policy in Vietnam, to take a recent case, was directly affected by Soviet strategic power. The American leaders were fully aware, writes Trofimenko, that uncontrolled military escalation could lead to a general war which might even result in a nuclear confrontation. "It was precisely for this reason and not for any other that Washington exerted the harshest political control over the operations of the U.S. Armed Forces in Vietnam." Given their need to act "within the framework of what was 'permitted,'" he concludes, the American forces could not achieve military success.<sup>2</sup>

It is beyond the scope of this analysis to deal directly with the issue of external constraints. Our concern is with the implications of domestic factors--the "internal struggle" among various groupings in the "ruling elite" (economic, political, bureaucratic) and the influence of individual leaders at the highest levels<sup>of</sup> the official hierarchy--for the future of American policy. Though our focus is essentially domestic, we share Arbatov's view that "the intense political struggle in the

United States" is "developing under the influence of both internal and external factors."<sup>3</sup> We shall return to this point shortly.

### Two Tendencies

Soviet Americanists approach their analysis of this internal political struggle in terms of the Leninist "two-tendency" model. As they frequently point out, Lenin saw the political leadership of capitalist countries divided into essentially two groups. Writing in 1922, Lenin observed:

. . . It is by no means a matter of indifference to us whether we are dealing with those representatives of the bourgeois camp who gravitate toward a military solution of a problem or with those representatives of the bourgeois camp who gravitate toward pacificism, be it of the shoddiest kind and, from the standpoint of communism, unable to withstand the slightest criticism.

While in a purely theoretical sense, he wrote, the differences between these groups are "abstract" and insignificant, from the viewpoint of "practical action," they are "terribly, terribly important."<sup>4</sup>

What Lenin was saying, in effect, was that there were two trends in Western politics in terms of their attitude towards the USSR--one favorably inclined, one not. There were, after all, some in the United States--like Senators La Follette and Borah--who opposed the intervention against Soviet Russia. Should such a moderate group come to power, this might be, as Lenin said, "terribly, terribly important."

Since the mid-1950's, Soviet scholars and officials have made this perspective the core of their analysis of Western politics.



Departing from the Stalinist approach, which saw the men in power in the capitalist governments as a more or less homogeneously hostile group, the current view is that two opposite tendencies are to be found in the ruling circles of the capitalist countries: the first, a bellicose, aggressive one which pursues a policy of international crises and conflicts and strives to maintain high levels of international tension; the second, a moderately sober one which supports cautious policies, avoiding conflict and tension.

The "correlation of forces" between these bellicose-aggressive tendency and the moderately sober one--their relative power, resources, leadership--are of critical importance. Distinguishing among the various elements in American political life, declared Arbatov, is a matter of "immense political urgency." Though, from a communist point of view, differences between them may seem small, "they spell the difference between a thermonuclear war and a policy envisaging methods. . . that would not undermine the principle of peaceful coexistence. . . ."<sup>5</sup> Arbatov goes on to note that the distinction between these tendencies should not be considered as complete. There are, he writes, many intermediate forces, groups and trends which tend to make the political climate unstable and always subject to major reshuffles. As a result, "one can always find in the actual program of one or another politician elements of both. . . policies." Thus, though the two tendencies are clearly different, in any one political situation, "it is sooner a question of proportions."<sup>6</sup> The basic question remains, however, <sup>1.e.,</sup> ~~yes~~, which "tendency" dominates? Kto-kogo?

How, then, do Soviet analysts evaluate the "correlation of forces" in American political life? The overall picture has become strikingly positive. Though their language is guarded and their judgments set forth in the framework of protective ideological formulations, the articles published in SShA seem clearly to have concluded that the forces of "realism" and moderation have in recent years become increasingly the dominant ones. The change in tone has been most dramatic. In 1969, Gromyko could write only about "the outcroppings of a realistic policy"<sup>7</sup> while in 1970 Arbatov would warn that although moderate forces were becoming stronger, this did not settle anything for the "vanquished" die-hards may yet seek to take revenge. Further, the moderates cannot be trusted not to make concessions to the more extremist elements.<sup>8</sup> In 1972, Arbatov would warn that the views of the more moderate elements "are still far from having become predominant within the US ruling classes. The positions of the supporters of traditional policy. . . remain very strong."<sup>9</sup> In 1973, there was a distinct change in tone. Arbatov, writing in Kommunist argued that a more realistic "frame of mind is becoming characteristic of a significant segment" of the American leadership.<sup>10</sup> In 1974 he would observe that "the strength and influence" of the enemies of détente "are no longer what they were,"<sup>11</sup> while in early 1975, one veteran analyst noted that

Although the most reactionary circles of present day imperialism have in no way laid [!:] down their arms, their counter-attacks often resume [resemble?] rear-guard actions following a battle which they have lost.<sup>12</sup>

"As we sum up the results of the first half of the seventies," write the editors of SShA in their first issue for 1975, "we can say that on the whole positive trends have prevailed over negative ones."<sup>13</sup>

Such judgements are, of course, never stated unequivocally. They are always hedged with comments regarding "highly influential circles" who have "not given up" and who "seek to obstruct the process of international relaxation." Even--perhaps especially--Arbatov feels obliged to include such cautionary references. In fact, writing in Izvestiya in July 1974 he refers to a hoary Stalinist formula when he warned:

It is natural that with each new step along the path of improving Soviet-American relations their opposition [i.e., that of the "enemies" of détente] will become fiercer, particularly when matters start moving towards changes and decisions which not only do not please these circles but which also pose a direct threat to their profits, interests and influence.<sup>14</sup>

As Stalin said, in justification of his call for "vigilance," the greater the success, the more dangerous the enemy. Nonetheless, as reported in the writings of Soviet Amerikanisty, the strength of the pro-détente forces is considerable--and growing.

The opponents of détente. The "conscious and active enemies of détente" are generally classified in terms of three basic groups:

- a) Those whose economic interests are seen to be "incompatible" with a relaxation of tension--most notably the top Pentagon officials and the corporations dependent on military contracts united together in the "military-industrial complex;"



- b) special interest groups--"counter-revolutionary" emigré organizations, Zionist circles; and
- c) those whose professional careers have been associated with the Cold War--bureaucrats, social scientists (Sovietologists) and journalists.

(To allow for the errant troglodyte who does not fit easily into one of the above, mention is sometimes also made of "extreme right-wing elements" and "professional anti-communists and anti-Soviets of every stripe.")<sup>15</sup>

This is the core of the "bellicose aggressive tendency," forces which, according to Trofimenko, "in one way or another--from considerations of profit, career, the preservation of professional bureaucratic and institutional privileges, because of primitive anti-communism--have a 'deep-rooted interest' in the cold war and the arms race."<sup>16</sup> Frightened by detente, these groups resist its implementation. Added to this "open, outspoken opposition" however, "in the very thick of American political life, so to speak, there are still very noticeable vestiges and traditions of the cold war, which are still making themselves felt. . . ."<sup>17</sup> "Force of habit, harmful traditions and inertia stemming from the prolonged 'Cold War,'" writes Arbatov, "are on the side of such forces and groups."<sup>18</sup>

What Soviet analysts are suggesting is the importance of subjective factors, of states of mind which reflect not simply economic--or even organizational phenomena (such as concern for bureaucratic privileges)--but the impact of experience on the psychological outlook of political leaders. "Suspicion, guardedness, extreme caution, distrust of the other

side's sincerity and other such traditions engendered by the conditions of the Cold War," writes Trofimenko, "are very much alive and well-established."<sup>19</sup> The Cold War left traces in people's consciousness which influence their current political outlook and policies.

The "inertia of the Cold War" reinforces the vitality and tenacity of the conceptions of the past. "Old dogmas" regarding, for example, the need to achieve military supremacy and the "Red menace," are still quite vigorous. They at times generate ambiguities in official policy and other times influence the positions of groups--like Congress and the mass media--who exert an influence on policy.

"All taken together," writes Arbatov, "this is a serious force" which "will do everything possible to impede the process of détente. . . ."<sup>20</sup> Such elements continue to push through high levels of military appropriations, they blocked the trade bill and put forth provocative and dangerous strategic doctrines. At the same time, they are fighting a losing struggle. Their intrigues have not been able to stop the process of negotiation; all they can now hope to do is to "pervert the essence" of the agreements reached. "Having been unable to frustrate" the 1972 SALT agreement,"<sup>21</sup> these forces may try to emasculate its essence by influencing its practical implementation." While they no longer feel they are in a position to oppose these accords directly, they now "try to 'compensate' for the restrictions imposed by the accords by whipping up the arms race in other fields."<sup>21</sup> These "counter-attacks" may create obstacles--given the dialectical nature of the Soviet world view, such resistance was to

be expected--but, as Tomashevsky wrote, "they resemble rearguard actions following a battle they have lost."<sup>22</sup>

The forces of moderation: The individuals and groups generally identified with the policy of detente include the following:

- a) the White House;
- b) the Congress--especially the Senate;
- c) influential corporate interests;
- d) the Arms Control Community; and
- d) public opinion.

This "sober-moderate" tendency, long regarded as weak and diffuse--confined to individual personalities (who, with rare exception, were politically isolated) and "progressive" segments of public opinion--now has the support of the most powerful political and economic forces in the country with broad scale, and growing, public support.

The factors identified by Soviet analysts to explain the moderate views of the groups have been discussed previously in some detail. They include: the surprisingly damaging <sup>ECONOMIC</sup> consequences of a rapidly escalating military budget (the product of the war in Vietnam and the strategic arms competition), unprecedented social and political instability, declining self-confidence and faith in "the American era," waning American military superiority, the failure of "the Pentagon's military adventure" in Vietnam, growing concern regarding the stability of the strategic weapons competition, and the decline in "bellicose anticommunism." In the judgement of Soviet Americanists, then, "highly influential segments



of the ruling circles of the United States" are now persuaded that their class interests--that is to say, the interests of the American socio-economics and political system--are best served by a policy of "realism."

The consequences of recent experiences on the "frames of mind" of specific groups are seen to have been profound. The highest echelons of authority in the American political system--the office of the President--has shown special concern regarding the potential danger of a nuclear confrontation and has taken important steps to stabilize the strategic arms competition and "normalize" Soviet-American political and economic relations. Major corporate representatives--the traditional "ruling circles"--have asserted their belief that the limitation of the arms race is vital to restore the health and trade position of the American economy (Arbatov quotes Lundborg of Bank of America and Watson of IBM to this effect)<sup>23</sup> and that "peaceful coexistence is more in accord with their economic interests than the 'cold war'. . . ,"<sup>24</sup> (with frequent reference to Rockefeller, Kendall, Hammer, et al.)

Additionally, as a result of recent experiences, the American political leadership<sup>is</sup> judged to be considerably more cautious than in the past. The loss of military superiority and, especially, the failure of U.S. policy in Vietnam, have eroded their faith in the efficacy of military force as a major instrument of U.S. foreign policy. "No more Vietnams" has become a guiding principle in Washington. A heightened sensitivity to the domestic repercussions of prolonged military involvements is seen to have had much the same effect. American theorists and policy-makers, writes Petrovsky, have long held to a "voluntaristic

approach to the evaluation of foreign policy. . . . Distorting or clouding over the relationship between domestic and foreign policy. . . ,” he writes, they “attributed primary and decisive importance to the will of the creators. . . .” of policy in Washington. Convinced that they were masters of their own destiny, US policy-makers acted as they pleased. Thus, in practice, “voluntarism serves as a theoretical justification of the political adventurism inherent in many foreign policy actions of the American government.”<sup>25</sup>

In view of the experience of the last several years, this voluntaristic approach has been called in to question. The domestic consequences--rampant inflation, recession, the massive anti-war movement, etc.--of American policy in Vietnam were a crucial reminder that foreign and domestic policy are indeed intertwined. Davydov thus writes:

The domestic factor (state of the economy, level of social movements, and so on) which during the early postwar period hardly hindered the expansion of American activity in the international arena at all, has now increasingly begun to operate in the opposite direction. “The American people have tired of that international burden which they have had to bear now for 25 years,” admits President Nixon.<sup>26</sup>

Concern regarding the “domestic factor” as well as the “correlation of forces” now affect the judgement of U.S. policy-makers regarding “what is permitted.”

The influence of domestic constraints is not judged to be only of transient importance. While the powerful anti-war movement of the late 1960's and early 1970's began to fade abruptly in 1973 with the signing of the Paris accords, the mood of the American people remains hostile to

"militarism." This can be seen, most immediately, in the US Congress, especially in the Senate, where the size of the "liberal wing" which has opposed Pentagon requests for new weapons systems has grown to significant proportions. The close votes on a number of military appropriations bills demonstrated the existence of a "stable opposition to militarism and anti-Sovietism" in the Senate. Furthermore, writes Popova, on the issue of the Vladivostok agreement-in-principle on the limitation of strategic arms, the "inveterate militarists" were "opposed by a vast camp of agreement supporters."<sup>27</sup>

The growth of anti-militarist sentiment in the Senate, in the judgement of Soviet analysts, reflects something quite profound in American life. As Arbatov has argued, the anti-war movement has now become "a serious political force." The appearance of weapons of mass destruction, he suggests, has both broadened and intensified the anti-war movement. Given the great dangers which war now threaten, the desire to prevent a thermonuclear catastrophe has "grown into a movement against predatory wars and militarism in general." In fact, he argues, this movement is acquiring "considerable revolutionary potential." The dread of war has become so intense that it "poses serious problems for bourgeois politicians, forcing many of them to think seriously about the prospect of a political course which is not only doomed to failure. . . but also fraught with profound domestic consequences."<sup>28</sup>

Given the "progressive heritage and traditions" of the anti-war movement in American history, "the traditions of democratic isolation



and pacifism," which goes back to the Spanish-American War,<sup>29</sup> Soviet analysts seem to be optimistic about the durability of the anti-war mood. They are also aware that Senator William Borah, "the ideologist of the pacifist wing" of the Senate, led the struggle against American intervention in the Soviet Union and, subsequently, urged American recognition and trade. As Popova notes, the <sup>seemingly futile</sup> activities of Senator Borah, who headed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee from 1924 to 1933, "prepared the way" for recognition in 1933.<sup>30</sup> Following "Lenin's instructions regarding the need to study divergent opinions in the bourgeois camp on the question of war and peace" which she cites, she may be aware that the probable head of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1978 has a picture of Senator Borah hanging in his office.

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Given this reading of the American political scene, viz., the ascendancy of a "ruling elite" of largely moderate views whose "realistic" policies have transformed the "citadel of imperialism" into an "acceptable partner," expectations regarding US policy in the short run can best be summarized as, essentially "more of the same." Barring unforeseen domestic developments or serious international disruptions, Soviet Amerikanisty probably anticipate further progress in the direction of the relaxation of tensions, i.e., a continued commitment by the Ford Administration to negotiating a more comprehensive agreement on strategic arms limitations, endorsement of the final text of a European Security

Conference agreement, renewed efforts to secure passage of a Trade Bill unencumbered by the Jackson Amendment. US policy makers are expected to avoid undertaking new military commitments and, generally, remain attentive to Soviet Union's "special responsibilities," especially in the Middle East. As a Soviet analyst noted recently, Secretary Kissinger stressed at a press conference "that the United States 'has no intention of striving for the elimination of Soviet influence in the Near East. Indeed we are unable to do thus,' he added." This language, according to the author, was "extremely symptomatic" of the current American "realism."<sup>31</sup>

The process of "normalization," to quote numerous Soviet sources, is not expected "to develop smoothly and without hindrance." The "military-industrial complex" and its allies will persist in their efforts to prevent further progress in the SALT talks and, should agreement be achieved, to block Congressional approval. The Congress, however, particularly in the sphere of arms control, is expected to follow the administration's lead. Its attitude regarding a new Trade Bill, however, is less certain. The influence of "Zionist circles," especially in the media, and electoral considerations, make Congressional reaction difficult to predict. The votes may not be there, especially in 1976, an election year.

High levels of military spending will undoubtedly continue in the immediate future. Though Secretary Kissinger has reduced the American--and his own--prior stress on strategic superiority, military strength is still very much respected. Thus, the Defense Department budget requests

are recognized as <sup>being</sup> identified with the Administration as a whole, and not, simply with Secretary Schlesinger. Furthermore, should Washington come to the view that in some short term emergency situation--for either domestic or foreign policy reasons--it should be required, the use of US military force cannot be ruled out. Thus, the intimations earlier this year regarding possible American intervention in the Persian Gulf region and in South Korea were undoubtedly taken seriously (at the very least by Zhurkin).

Over the longer run, the picture becomes less certain. There is the watershed of the 1976 elections which opens the possibility of a major change in the White House. Though George Wallace's candidacy is not taken seriously--his 1968 poll of 10 million votes is, given current socio-economic conditions, probably considered his maximum (a major economic crisis would of course alter this assessment)--that of Senator Henry Jackson is. Jackson's long-standing suspicion of détente and hostility toward the Soviet Union is, of course, well-known. His election to the Presidency would, undoubtedly, be considered a serious blow to Soviet-American relations. It would not, however, necessarily be viewed as fatal. In the view of Valentin Zorin, all candidates for public office in the United States must "shift to the center." Even the most extreme candidates, he writes must "obey this law of American reality" in order to attract the greatest possible number of voters. (This, it is reported, is why in the 1972 election campaign Senator McGovern modified his radical project on tax reform.)<sup>32</sup> This same pressure to "shift to the center"



would also operate on Senator Jackson during the campaign. Further, should he be elected, the growing pro-détente sentiment in the Congress, in the business world and in public opinion would undoubtedly also press him in this same direction.

There is, in this regard, the splendid example of Richard Nixon who, as Arbatov pointed out, sought "popularity and electoral victory" in 1960 "along lines of stirring up anticommunism, a tough anti-Soviet policy and the arms race."<sup>33</sup> The same "objective factors" which pushed President Nixon towards a "realistic" policy would also operate, presumably, on a President Jackson. As Arbatov points out, "the tendency toward normalization of Soviet-American relations. . . has a solid objective foundation, and hence has a future."<sup>34</sup> With half the Senate, many in business, numerous influential scientists, and broad sectors of the American public opposed to the ABM and Trident programs, Diego Garcia and a new round in the arms race, even the former "Senator from Boeing" would have to "shift to the center."

Assuming economic and social conditions continue to stabilize-- a key issue on which there is continuing debate--judgements about the distant future are shaped by one basic consideration. Even assuming economic recovery, domestic concerns are now seen to have acquired a far greater significance in American political life than at any time since the 1930's. Thus, while the United States is undoubtedly expected to continue playing an active world role, demands to meet the needs of the cities, social welfare programs, public transportation, new sources of energy, environmental control will compete ever more vigorously against

the claims of the Defense Department. The annual warnings regarding the "Soviet menace" will lose force before Mayor Beame's anguished cries about the piles of garbage in the streets of New York. The reduction of the number of American troops in Western Europe may thus well be considered an idea whose time is about to come.

What policy implications do Soviet analysts draw from their assessment? They approach this important task, it should be stressed, with some caution. For all their efforts there are still some areas of uncertainty regarding American behavior. First, as Arbatov notes, even moderate political leaders have been known to pursue dangerous policies. He writes that "mankind was brought closest to a thermonuclear war during the 1962 Caribbean crisis," that is, during the administration of a "moderate" President. Moreover, he observes, "that crisis was not provoked by President Kennedy and his advisors deliberately steering towards a world war. . . ." Rather, it was the result of the "entire logic of imperialist policy. . . ." Thus, in his view, "even regardless of the subjective intentions of individual Western leaders," crises and tension may occur.<sup>35</sup>

To cite a more recent example, the endorsement by the Congress of the Jackson Amendment to the Administration's 1974 Trade Reform Act has been most confusing. The issue has not been addressed directly in SShA, but Soviet analysts are clearly in a quandry. Despite the fact that the Nixon Administration strongly supported enlarged trade relations between this country and the Soviet Union, a policy which was subsequently

endorsed by President Ford, and that "leading business circles" vigorously endorsed the government's policy, Senator Jackson managed to undercut their efforts. Vitaly Kobysh, Izvestia correspondent in the United States, revealed his confusion openly. Noting that Secretary Kissinger and President Ford have both endorsed "detente" as "state policy," he exclaims that it is

. . . strange if not wholly unnatural, that a political course supported. . . by powerful sectors of big business and the government can be opposed by forces of any significance. I would say that many people. . . do not understand what is happening. To many, this aspect of the present situation in the country appears to be a daub of surrealist colors.<sup>36</sup>

The explanation of newspaper editor Daniel Kraminov, in an interview with an Italian journalist, is simple. Noting that "as many as 240 big U.S. companies proved to be against the Jackson amendment," he concludes: "Unfortunately, in this instance the industrialists have the money but not the power or the opportunity to influence the masses and major decisions."<sup>37</sup> The Amerikanisty at the USA Institute are, apparently, too bewildered even to attempt to explain this failure of the "ruling circles" to rule.

Whether as a result of the "intrigues of the military-industrial complex," or the "inertia of the Cold War," the policy of the United States is not regarded as wholly predictable. As Lenin once wrote, "the fact that there are two opposite tendencies in the development of the imperialist system makes every alliance of the capitalist countries contradictory and unstable." And, as SShA editorial board member, A. Bovin



suggests, "the ambiguities of imperialist policy will not vanish today or tomorrow."<sup>38</sup>

Allowing for the possibility of unnatural or even surrealistic behavior by the United States, what policy implications, if any, do Soviet Amerikanisty derive from their assessments? One conclusion-- which both fits their basic analysis and serves to protect their political position (of which more in a moment)--relates to Soviet military posture. To the extent that the moderation which characterizes American policy-makers today is interpreted to be a function of the "objective fact" of Soviet nuclear capabilities, maintenance of strategic parity with the United States is an essential prerequisite for the continuation of détente. Writing in 1972, Arbatov noted that "the change in the correlation of forces is not some abstract formula, but a perceptible reality, which compels the imperialist powers to adjust." Preservation of this new balance of power is thus crucial. As he observes: "One cannot doubt that any change in the correlation of forces in favor of imperialism would have led not to a relaxation but an increase in tension, whipping up the aggressive aspirations of reactionary circles."<sup>39</sup> Given the essentially "predatory essence of capitalism"--which it is claimed has not changed--military strength remains essential.

Writing in 1973, the Institute Director carries his argument a step further. "Power in and of itself," he observes, "does not guarantee peace, let alone détente."

The growth of power at one pole can ultimately--and this has happened quite often in the past--lead to attempts to build up power at the other pole; in other words, it may lead to unrestrained military competition entailing armed clashes.

What is critically important, suggests Arbatov, is Soviet diplomatic policy, especially its "unprecedentedly intensive 'peace offensive'" which "undermines the basic foundation of anti-communism--the myth of a 'military' threat supposedly emanating from the Soviet Union. . . ."<sup>40</sup>

What Arbatov is saying is that the foreign policy posture adopted by the Soviet Union feeds back on the United States, affecting the psychological outlook of its leadership. In other words, Soviet policy can, in overt behavior and in style, influence the American political environment. This argument is broadened somewhat by Trofimenko who writes that:

The foreign policy of one side which is favorably disposed and friendly toward the other strengthens in this latter side an atmosphere of public support for a similar policy in return which creates an additional stimulus for them to move toward each other along the path of peace. . . .<sup>41</sup>

Thus, in the judgement of Soviet analysts, the policy of détente is, in itself, a political force. The active pursuit of "normalization" of relations and the relaxation of international tensions helps undermine the "Cold War myths" in the United States. It also weakens the position of the opponents of the Soviet Union. As we noted earlier, Gromyko reported the decline in the influence of academic Sovietologists in the United States as a result of the "normalization" of Soviet-American relations.<sup>42</sup> Further, N. A. Olenov suggests "it is natural to assume" that

detente "will entail a restriction of the subversive operations of the American intelligence agencies on the world scene."<sup>43</sup>

The pursuit of *détente*, furthermore, tends to strengthen those in the United States who support the policy of improved relations with the Soviet Union. One of the consequences of expanded East-West trade, notes Oleshuk,

is the strengthening of the immediate interests of influential U.S. business circles in the improvement of Soviet-American relations. . . . In turn, these representatives of the U.S. business world who, according to political scientist [?]/ Marshall Shulman, have become 'persistent adherents of peaceful coexistence,' are actively influencing sentiment in the United States in favor of deepening and expanding relations with the Soviet Union.<sup>44</sup>

Increased trade, therefore, strengthens the "immediate interests" of David Rockefeller, Armand Hammer, et al. in the political "normalization" of Soviet-American relations.

The active support for the policy of *détente*, therefore, in itself serves to reduce American hostility toward the Soviet Union by counter-acting the "inertia of the cold war," undermining the political position of its critics and helping to bolster support for the "realistic" forces in the United States. The Soviets have indeed, as Leites observes, "progressed in insight and proficiency on the matter of how to handle us."<sup>45</sup>



## PART V

## CONCLUSIONS

The conclusions one draws from reading the publications of the USA Institute reflect in considerable measure one's starting point.

Approaching these materials from the perspective of an American political and intellectual environment, some observers are appalled by the distortion and misunderstanding which they find. Professor Hans Morgenthau, the eminent political scientist, was "shocked" by Anatoly Gromyko's study of the Kennedy Administration, by the "quality of caricature" which, in his view, permeates the book.<sup>1</sup>

The analyses of the United States published in SShA are, indeed, often badly distorted. While Soviet Amerikanisty perform this task with varying degrees of skill, the need to fit all facts--from the nomination of Senator George McGovern by the Democratic Party to Watergate--into a rigid Marxist-Leninist framework, imposes a uniformity on U.S. public life which most Americans would regard as, at best, simple-minded. This judgement is reinforced by the general insensitivity, even of those quite well-informed, to democratic politics. Thus in a recent discussion of legislative politics on Capitol Hill, Congress was described as "a unique kind of feedback mechanism." Through its debates, we are told, "alternatives" to the policies of the Administration are charted, "corrections" and "recommendations" are made, all of which "reflect the progress which has occurred both in the international situation and in the country," Legislative representation is thus conceived of as a "mechanism of adaptation."<sup>2</sup> Such, alas, is the fate of parliamentary institutions.

This approach, though in substantial measure accurate, misses the point. While they read the Washington Post and the Congressional Quarterly and know that "American banking circles," charter members of the once nefarious "ruling circles," ". . . gave serious financial support to Senator Fulbright in his unsuccessful primary campaign last year,<sup>3</sup> the analysts at the USA Institute function in a Soviet political context. Unless this crucial fact is taken into account, the significance of their efforts cannot be understood or appreciated.

For reasons I have elaborated more fully elsewhere,<sup>4</sup> the internal dynamics of the Soviet political system place an extraordinarily high premium on doctrinal orthodoxy. Relying heavily on ideology as the justification of their political authority, the Soviet Party leadership insists that the canons of Marxism-Leninism be rigidly adhered to. They continue to stress such hallowed Leninist principles as "the leading role of the Party" in the conviction that tampering with these beliefs (or, as the Czechs and Slovaks did in 1968, revising them substantially) "would endanger the philosophical and psychological underpinnings of Soviet political power."<sup>5</sup>

A cardinal principle of Leninist doctrine, as we noted earlier, is the assumption regarding the "predatory essence of imperialism." Thus, recounted Marshal Grechko recently, Lenin instructed that "the first commandment of our policy and the first lesson. . . which all workers and peasants must learn is to be on their guard and to remember that we are surrounded by people, classes and governments which openly express the

greatest hatred of us."<sup>6</sup> This view remains the current orthodoxy. In an essentially moderate report to the 24th Party Congress in 1971 in which he launched the Soviet Union's "peace program," General Secretary Brezhnev felt compelled, when referring to "the foreign policy of imperialism," to note "the immutability of its reactionary and aggressive nature." And two quite sophisticated Soviet analysts feel obliged to quote Brezhnev.<sup>7</sup>

The centrality of this dogma in contemporary Soviet political doctrine has a profound effect on the activities of the USA Institute. Institute Director Georgi Arbatov, himself a ranking Party official (he is currently a member of one of the CPSU's central bodies, the Central Auditing Commission) of course, fully identifies himself with this Leninist belief. So, furthermore, must his colleagues. Given their sensitive position--to travel abroad and to read "bourgeois" political materials, Party clearance is required--Soviet Americanists must be especially careful to remain certified as ideologically reliable. Furthermore, they are constantly subject, as are all others who take up the pen in the USSR, to criticism and attack by militant elements in the Party (or by political enemies) for any hint of ideological "softness."

How, then, can the leadership of the United States, the "prime strike force" of predatory imperialism, be viewed in anything less than hostile terms? How can relaxation and reconciliation with an inherently aggressive enemy be rationalized? Arbatov offers the following explanation:



If many of the imperialist powers are becoming acceptable partners. . . , this does not at all indicate that the class nature of their policies has changed--this has not happened and could not have happened. But the world in which the imperialists have to live and act has changed. It is to these changes, to the objective reality of the present situation, that they have to adapt. . . .<sup>8</sup> (*Italics added.*)

Bound by obligations of doctrine and Party authority to an image of an "immutably hostile" United States, the "realistic" behavior of its leadership must be understood as a product of necessity rather than virtue. The possibility of good will on the part of the United States simply cannot be admitted.

Thus, even though they are recognized as less antagonistic toward the Soviet Union than most of their predecessors, the moderation of the current Washington leadership is a function of the changes in the "correlation of forces." Nothing less is possible. As Arbatov points out, a truly "class approach," i.e., one consistent with Party principles,

demands a clear understanding of the fact that no matter how far the process of the adaptation of imperialism to the situation goes, this does not change the nature of imperialism or the oppressive essence of this system. This distinguishes the Marxist-Leninist approach from the reformist and revisionist approach, which essentially preaches the accommodation of the workers' movement to present-day imperialism and a reconciliation with it.<sup>9</sup>

To suggest that the "class nature" of U.S. foreign policy had changed, that a close relationship between the two countries is now--or ever could be--possible, is to open oneself up to charges of "reformism and revisionism," i.e., ideological heresy. Thus, détente cannot be taken to mean or even to allow for the possibility of a genuine reconciliation between

the two systems. As a guardian of Party orthodoxy said not long ago, "Communists would cease to be communists if they did this."<sup>10</sup>

In fact, détente is seen to be a continuation of the "class struggle." Insofar as negotiations with the United States, enlarged trade relations, summit agreements and the like reinforce the moderate elements in the United States and isolate the enemies of the Soviet Union, this policy can be viewed as part of the struggle for socialism.

Basing their argument on the predominance of "objective factors" also helps justify the policy of détente against potential domestic critics. By stressing its "solid objective foundation" in the "correlation of forces," normalization of Soviet-American relations can be considered "lasting and viable," rather than merely an "episode."<sup>11</sup> Even assuming good intentions on the part of individual American political figures, the brevity and uncertainty of their tenure in office and their less-than perfect control of the American political system makes reliance on such "subjective factors" a poor foundation on which to rest Soviet policy. This argument also challenges the apprehension of some that détente derives from Soviet weakness.

The perceptions of the United States to be found in the pages of SShA must be understood in this context. Whether from ideological conviction or political necessity, Soviet analysts are obliged to keep within the confines of the "class approach," i.e., to the view that détente is a product not of the well-meaning desires of the American "ruling elite" but of objective necessity. Whatever the specific issue--

the limitation of strategic weapons, trade relations with the USSR, budgetary priorities--the policy of the United States government is never attributed to decent or generous instincts but, always to narrowly defined class interests which, invariably (though not always) are seen to be at odds with the true national interests of the American people.

Given the intellectual-political constraints imposed by this "class approach," the Amerikanisty have been quite imaginative. Theirs is not, despite the accusations of some, a simplistic conceptual scheme in which "politics is a mere function of economics, the political leaders do the bidding of the monopolies and foreign policy is bound to be imperialistic."<sup>12</sup> While lip service is frequently given to such simplified dogmas, often this is mere ritual deference. Furthermore, as Soviet analysts themselves know all too well, in the sphere of doctrine much depends on interpretation. His Soviet training serves Orlov well when he observes that the United States Constitution "often allows arbitrary interpretations." As a result, he writes, it has been "converted into a weapon in the struggle between individual groups which adapt it to their own political interests."<sup>13</sup>

Though confining, ideology has not proven to be all-inhibiting. As we have noted throughout this report, the analyses of Soviet Americanists have been strikingly differentiated. The contributors to SShA vary, considerably, in both knowledge and judgement. Nonetheless, the over-all pattern reveals much more differentiation than one unfamiliar with Soviet intellectual traditions might discern. The vulgar Marxism of the Stalin era with its crude economic determinism, has given way to more



sophisticated assessments in which governmental policies are seen to be the product of a medley of influences--political, bureaucratic, historical, even psychological--as well as the once-dominant "class interests" of the "ruling circles."

This sensitivity to historical and psychological factors seems especially prominent among those analysts dealing with Soviet-American strategic relations. Trofimenko, as noted earlier, views deterrence as a psychological problem, taking place in peoples' minds (quoting Secretary Kissinger),<sup>14</sup> sees the key problems in current Soviet-American relations to be a function of the "suspicion, guardedness, extreme caution, distrust of the other side's sincerity" and other such psychological propensities engendered by a prolonged period of mutual confrontation.<sup>15</sup> In Trofimenko's judgement, detente involves, in considerable part, a "process of psychological reorientation."<sup>16</sup>

Moreover, although the United States is identified as a capitalist society, it is no longer regarded as having the same fixed qualities or to pursue certain pre-determined policies which doctrine attributed to "state-monopoly capitalism." As we have discussed in some detail, individual political leaders may have a very considerable policy role, sometimes pursuing programs in the face of bitter opposition on the part of the "ruling class." Indeed, the "ruling class" itself is now seen to be divided with a relatively small--though still powerful--component which still retains a stake in an aggressive foreign policy. The bulk of the "ruling class" is believed to have an increasing interest in a

relaxed international climate. Moreover, the organizational interests of officials in the executive branch of government are seen to have been a significant influence on state policy. The Congress, public opinion (the anti-war movement, the Jewish vote, anti-militarism), special interest groups ("think tanks", "counterrevolutionary" emigrés, Sovietologists) all have a political role. The political orientation of the American political leadership is no longer imbued with "class hatred" and, in critical areas, share parallel interests with the Soviet Union. Finally, the USSR can even do business with an inveterate anti-communist such as Richard Nixon.

There are even occasional hints that, although the United States is still seen to be the main culprit responsible for international tension, its attitudes are in some measure understandable. Trofimenko notes that "colossal distrust built up on both sides during the cold war." Furthermore, he takes the position that even when both the Soviet Union and the United States are equally committed to searching for agreement on a particular issue, "misunderstandings arise through different interpretations of the agreed provisions as a result of the differences in the interests and philosophies of the sides."<sup>17</sup> Oleshuk carries this one step farther and suggests that the Soviet Union may bear some of the responsibility for past tensions. "The period of the 'cold war'," he writes, "abounded in examples of how certain forces carried on ideological subversion which led to alienation or even hostility between nations." For those Americans who associate the continuing ideological competition

between the USSR and the United States with such subversion, he confesses, "naturally object to it with the best of motives."<sup>18</sup> The "certain circles" which prompted such suspicions among Americans could only be the Soviet secret police.

Arbatov goes further still. In his major work, The Ideological Struggle and Contemporary International Relations (1969), Arbatov condemns the baneful influence of Soviet writers, claiming to be Marxist, who "rejected modern genetics, the theory of relativity, cybernetics and some other major discoveries" and who produced "vulgaristic works" in the social sciences. The authors of these works, who "masked their own dogmatism, laziness of thought or simply lack of knowledge with lofty ideological considerations, with 'concern' for the purity of Marxist-Leninist theory," he suggests, seriously damaged the reputation of Soviet science and nourished anti-communist sentiments in the West. The "upswing of creative Marxism," the "extensive efforts carried out in the recent period to overcome stagnation, dogmatism and subjectivism," all helped to bring about "a marked change in world public opinion, in its attitude toward communism."<sup>19</sup> In Arbatov's view, then, anti-communism in the West was, in some measure, a response to Soviet intellectual obscurantism: A unique confession, to say the least.

Much indeed is new in Soviet perceptions of the United States (and, to some extent, even of themselves). Interests, attitudes, expectations, influences--the underlying "motive forces" of American foreign policy--are more differentiated than originally assumed. This generation



of Soviet Americanists, as Leites suggests, is "seeing us more as we really are, at the expense of previous beliefs."<sup>20</sup>

Does the existence of these more knowledgeable sources of opinion have any policy implications for the United States? Much depends, of course, on one's assessment regarding the resonance of such views in the Politburo. Judging by the external evidence--Arbatov's eminence in the Party, his election in 1974 to the Supreme Soviet and in 1975 to full membership in the Academy of Sciences, his active role (along with Trofimenko, Zhurkin and Shershnev) in publicizing current policies in the Soviet media--one can assume that the Director does have political influence at the highest levels of Soviet decision-making. How much and with whom depends on the timing and specifics of the issues as they arise as well as internal Party-political considerations.

The point to be noted, however, is that this is one voice, among many others to be sure, but one voice which the makers of Soviet policy do hear. What this suggests is that, whatever the original motivation behind the moderate foreign policy line of the past half decade or so, the policy of détente has fed back on the USSR itself, nurturing a reasonably moderate trend within the Soviet political elite. There are, if you will, two distinct tendencies in Soviet leadership circles: one aggressive, militaristic, suspicious of the United States, hostile to détente; the other, sober, moderate, concerned less about the danger of war with the United States than the benefits of mutual collaboration in specific areas.

While the political dynamics of the two governments are vastly different and the very character of the Soviet system is biased in the direction of the more militant elements, the existence of the moderate voices should always be kept in mind. A conscious effort should be made to act in such a way as not to undermine whatever authority they may have acquired.

What is being suggested, therefore, is--taking a feather from Arbatov's cap--attempting to see the détente relationship dynamically, i.e., as a political force in and of itself which can be used to bolster the influence of the more moderate tendencies in the Soviet leadership, to increase the authority of the more "realistic," less militant elements and, at the same time, to weaken the position of the more conservative, ideologically orthodox groups.

The policy orientation of the moderate group toward the United States is, of course, basically different from that of their traditionalist colleagues. On the one hand, they view US foreign policy today as less-belligerent, less anti-Soviet, less prone to taking unnecessary military risks, and generally less-threatening than at any time in the past. These elements do not see this country as threatening basic Soviet security interests. At the same time, they do not regard us as weak, passive or isolationist. The vast military resources of the United States are known and respected as are our economic capabilities, especially in the area of "scientific-technical revolution." While America's

expansionist proclivities (as seen by Moscow) have waned, our international interests and commitments remain considerable and our willingness to use force where necessary to protect them is recognized. There seems little evidence of a loss of will on the part of high-level American officials or, for that matter, that domestic concerns are paralyzing their ability to act. The image, then, is of a still powerful but more restrained, more circumspect, less menacing United States, a nation with which one can do business but one not to be regarded lightly.

To the degree that this assessment is accurate and this perception is judged to be generally desirable, the United States should--as a matter of deliberate policy--seek to act in such a way as to reinforce the position of those who share it. At the same time, we should consciously strive to avoid giving credence to the arguments of those opposed.

We should, to take a specific example, make due allowance for Soviet sensitivities regarding the issue of equality of status. From the tone and intensity of their arguments, Soviet sources to this day remain extraordinarily touchy about being dealt with as an inferior power. Their complaints about being regarded as illegitimate, about the desire of the West to "restore capitalism" in their country, about the Western policy of seeking to harm their interests, about being treated as a pariah, as being economically second-rate and militarily incompetent, all of this was taken to imply second-class status.

Given their acute sensitivity on this issue, a conscious effort should be made--to the degree this is not inconsistent with overall



American interests--to avoid policies which indicate that the Soviet Union is being dealt with by the United States on anything less than a fully equal basis. It remains important to behave in such a way that avoids giving unnecessary umbrage. Talk of capitalist "class hatred" and imperialism's "utopian strategy of social revenge" still echo in the Soviet corridors of power. We should not contribute to their credibility.

Another step in this direction, one geared in particular to ensure the continuation of a moderate orientation in the Soviet leadership after the departure of Brezhnev, would be to seek to reinforce the sentiment that the Soviet Union will benefit from a continuation of détente. In this regard, special attention should be focused on what, increasingly has been called questions of a "pan-human" or "global" scale. Inozemtsev, in particular, has been stressing the existence of common problems confronting all nations of whatever social system, problems deriving, as he describes it "from contradictions in the development of the human race as a whole." Among these, he focuses on two: the prevention of a new world war, which is "the prime task of all mankind, on it depends 'the preservation of human society'," and environmental questions--depletion of resources, pollution of the environment, population growth--"problems of the greatest import from the point of view of future prospects."<sup>21</sup>

Concentrating on such "spheres of common interest"--concern regarding which is clearly growing--will tend to demonstrate that the cold war policy of seeking to harm the other side has indeed been jettisoned.

(The Apollo-Soyuz mission has precisely this effect.) And, to the extent that problems of ensuring adequate energy supplies or controlling water pollution are, like strategic weapons limitation questions, of both a technical and political nature, the sophistication and political sensitivities which have emerged in the Soviet arms control community may also develop elsewhere during the long-term discussions and negotiations on these vexing and difficult issues.

The Soviet view, as espoused by moderate elements, has been that "the emergence of progressively new problems on a global scale" require "joint efforts by all states," that "peaceful competition not only does not rule out but on the contrary presupposes the widescale development of mutually advantageous cooperation among states."<sup>22</sup> The focus here is on problems of a "pan human" scale in which all sides have interests--interests defined by membership in the human race rather than class. This approach--common concern, similarity of interest rather than class conflict and struggle--should be endorsed.

Thus, much as Soviet Americanists view détente as a dynamic process by which "realistic" elements can be bolstered, so might we seek to approach our foreign policy. The United States should strive to use détente to further diminish the Soviet fear of American hostility and to neutralize Politburo leadership opinion which favors a continued policy of antagonism. Then, hopefully, a more moderate, orientation will eventually prevail.

## FOOTNOTES

INTRODUCTION

1. Frederick A. Barghoorn, The Soviet Image of the United States (New York: Haucourt, Brace and Co., 1950), p. 277.

2. See especially Robert C. Tucker, "The Dialectics of Coexistence," The Soviet Political Mind (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), pp. 201-222. William Zimmerman, Soviet Perspectives on International Relations, 1956-1967, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969; and Franklyn J. C. Griffiths, "Image, Politics and Learning in Soviet Behavior Towards The United States," Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Columbia University, 1972.

3. Hannes Adomeit, "Soviet Risk-Taking and Crisis Behavior: From Confrontation to Coexistence," Adelphi Papers No. 101 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Autumn, 1973), p. 19.

4. See, for example, Marshall Shulman, "SALT and the Soviet Union," in SALT, The Moscow Agreements and Beyond, Mason Willrich and John B. Rhinelanders, eds. (New York: The Free Press, 1974), pp. 101-121.

5. George Urban, "A Conversation with Robert F. Byrnes, Cultural Exchange and its Prospects--II," Survey, XX, No. 4(93), Autumn 1974, p. 61.

6. Uri Ra'anan, The Changing American-Soviet Strategic Balance: Some Political Implications. Memorandum Prepared at the Request of the Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations, Committee on Government Operation, United States Senate, 92d Congress, 2d Session (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972), pp. 11-12.

7. Ibid.

8. Under the editorship of Valentin M. Berezhevskiy, the current circulation of SShA is 35,000, having begun in 1970 with 22,000. While it is closely connected with the USA Institute, Berezhevskiy told me that he seeks to keep it somewhat independent. Thus, not only is it housed separately but about half the members of its Editorial Board are non-Institute Amerikanists from either other research establishments, such as the Institute for World Economy and International Relations, or from the International Department of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party. Among the latter, V. V. Zagladin, Deputy Chief of the International Department served on SShA's Editorial Board until August



1973. The current ranking Party official on the journal is N. V. Mostovets, identified by Berezhkov as chief of the International Department's North American section. Thus, while not simply the house organ of the USA Institute--it is described on its masthead as a "Scholarly and Public Affairs Journal"--SShA is a carefully monitored and officially sanctioned source of information and analysis on current developments in the United States.

9. The main sources reviewed have been the writings of Institute Director Georgi Arbatov, Vitaly V. Zhurkin, Deputy Director, Genrykh A. Trofimenko, Chief of the Institute's Department on U.S. Foreign Policy, Yuri A. Shvedkov, Chief of Sector on General U.S. Foreign Policy and Soviet-American Relations, Igor A. Geyevski, Chief of Sector on U.S. Mass Social Movements, Anatoly A. Gromyko, former Chief of Sector on U.S. Foreign Policy Doctrine, as well as articles by numerous other analysts. Many of the members of this group have spent considerable time in the United States. I have, on several occasions, interviewed most of the above mentioned authors, most recently on a research trip to Moscow in May 1974.

10. Izvestiya, October 30, 1973, p. 4.

#### PART I.

1. Paul Hollander, Soviet and American Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 25.

2. It also reflects their abiding concern regarding the chronic economic backwardness of their own country. Despite fifty years of diligent efforts, Soviet industry and agriculture--much like those in a developing country--still requires outside economic assistance. They must view American aid, as Nathan Leites suggests, with a deep sense of "shame" and "subdued despair." "The New Economic Togetherness: American and Soviet Reactions," Studies in Comparative Communism, VII, No. 3 (Autumn, 1974), pp. 257, 263.

3. Quoted in Soviet Policy-Making, Peter H. Juviler and Henry W. Morton, eds. (Frederick A. Praeger, Publisher, 1967), p. 17.

4. For a discussion of the deep psychological resentments attached to Moscow's "catching up with America" slogan, see Morton Schwartz, The Foreign Policy of the USSR: Domestic Factors (Encino, Calif: Dickenson Publishing Co., 1975), pp. 84-89.

5. Quoted in Current Soviet Policies--II. The Documentary Record of the 20th Communist Party Congress and its Aftermath, Leo Gruliov, ed. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1957), pp. 30-31.

6. Evgeny Chossudovsky, "Genoa Revisited: Russia and Coexistence," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 50, No. 3 (April 1972), p. 574.

7. N. N. Inozentsev, "The U.S.A. Today and Soviet American Studies," SShA, No. 1 (January, 1970), pp. 6-7.

8. Ibid., p. 8.

9. Val. Zorin, "American Domestic Problems of the 1970's," SShA, No. 8 (August, 1971), p. 13.

10. "The Economic Situation in the United States, (Scientific Conference)," ibid., No. 9 (September 1974) pp. 126-127.

11. G. A. Arbatov, "U.S. Foreign Policy and the Scientific-Technical Revolution," ibid., No. 10 (October, 1973), p. 6.

12. Ibid., pp. 3-4.

13. "U.S. Foreign Policy and the Scientific-Technical Revolution--II," ibid., No. 11 (November, 1973), p. 6. He notes: ". . . the country possessing scientific and technical superiority could scarcely count on successfully utilizing it in order to place others in a position of firm and long-term dependence. . . remember the history of radar, aircraft engines, nuclear power and missiles [7] The fact that Gagarin was first in space but Armstrong first on the moon still galls.

14. Ibid., p. 7. The tone of Arbatov's language--either compete with the United States, or walk in its shadow or lag behind--is similar to that used by Stalin when he warned, in 1934, of Russia's need to catch up with the advanced industrial nations. "Either we do it," he said, "or we shall be crushed." J. Stalin, Problems of Leninism (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1954), p. 592.

15. Arbatov, ibid., p. 6.

16. V. M. Kudrov, "The Main Capitalist Countries: A Comparative Economic Analysis," ibid., No. 6 (June, 1972), pp. 36-40; see also V. I. Gromeka, "The USA and Western Europe: The 'Technological Gap'," ibid., No. 7 (July, 1970), pp. 38-41.

17. B. Rachkov, "The Monopolies and the 'Raw Materials Crisis,'" Ekonomicheskaya gazeta, No. 4, January 20, 1975, p. 22; FBIS, February 4, 1975, p. A7.

18. Nikolai Inozemtsev, "On the Nature of Contradictions in Our Era," Problemy mira i sotsializma, No. 9, September 1973; FBIS, October 5, 1973, p. A8.

19. Yu. I. Bobrakov, "State-Monopoly Regulation of the Economy," SShA, No. 10 (October, 1971), p. 52.

20. Ibid.

21. V. M. Shamberg, "On Certain Distinctive Features in the Development of the American Economy," ibid., No. 5 (May, 1971). p. 35.

22. Ibid., p. 38, 35. Shamberg was himself something of an enthusiast regarding the accomplishments of "state-monopoly regulation" in the mid-1960's. See his "American Notes," Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya (World Economy and International Relations) (cited hereafter as MEMD), No. 9, 1966, pp. 121-124.

23. "The Economic Situation in the United States. . . ," op. cit., p. 127.

24. Bobrakov, op. cit., p. 58.

25. "The Economic Situation in the United States. . . ," loc. cit. Anikin even suggests that certain branches of the economy--namely the railroads--might "revert to the state."

26. Giuseppe Boffa, "How It Is Possible To Cooperate," interview with Georgiy Arbatov, L'Unita, May 10, 1974, p. 3; FBIS, May 29, 1974, p. B3.

27. N. N. Inozemtsev, "Peculiarities of Contemporary Imperialism," MEMD, May 1970, pp. 7-8; quoted in W. W. Kulski, The Soviet Union in World Affairs, A Documented Analysis, 1964-1972 (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1973), p. 2 and his "On Contemporary Imperialism," Pravda, July 18, 1969, pp. 3-4, in the Current Digest of the Soviet Press (hereafter CDSP), XXI, No. 29 (August 13, 1969), p. 20.

28. I. A. Geyevsky, "Many-Faced America," SShA, No. 12 (December, 1974), p. 54.

29. Anatoly A. Gromyko, Diplomatiya sovremennogo imperializma (Moscow: Izd. "Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya," 1969), p. 396.

30. See, for example, article on "Militarism" in the Bol'shaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya (Moscow, 1954), 2d ed., Vol. 27, p. 481.



31. G. Trofimenko, Review of B. D. Pyadyshev's "The U.S. Military-Industrial Complex," SShA, No. 12 (December, 1974), p. 84.

32. G. N. Tsagolov, "The Military-Industrial Complex: Some General Aspects," ibid., No. 11 (November, 1970), p. 24.

33. Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1961?), p. 331.

34. Tsagolov, op. cit., pp. 27-28.

35. Anatoly A. Gromyko, 1036 dnei Prezidenta Kennedi (Moscow: Izd. Politicheskoi Literatury, 1968), pp. 87-88.

36. Gromyko, Diplomatiya. . . , op. cit., pp. 395-396.

37. G. A. Arbatov, "Soviet-American Relations in the 1970's," SShA, No. 5 (May, 1974), p. 30.

38. \_\_\_\_\_, "U.S. Foreign Policy. . . ." (October, 1973), op. cit., p. 9.

39. \_\_\_\_\_, "On Soviet-American Relations," Kommunist, No. 3 (February, 1973), pp. 109-110.

40. \_\_\_\_\_, "A Step in the Interests of Peace," SShA, No. 11 (November, 1971), p. 57.

41. \_\_\_\_\_, "The Nixon Administration at the Halfway Mark," ibid., No. 8 (August, 1970), p. 10.

42. G. A. Trofimenko, "Militarism and the Domestic Political Struggle," ibid., No. 1 (January, 1972), p. 71.

43. I. A. Geyevsky, "Exacerbation of Social Problems and the Nixon Government," ibid., No. 10 (October, 1971), p. 5.

44. Yu. A. Shvedkov, "The 'Nixon Doctrine' and the Domestic Political Situation in the USA," in "Doktrina Niksona," Yu. P. Davydov, V. V. Zhurkin and V. S. Rudnev, eds. (Moscow: Izd. "Nauka," 1972), p. 32.

45. Georgi Arbatov, "Strength-Policy Stalemates," World Marxist Review, XVII, No. 2 (February, 1974), p. 19.

46. \_\_\_\_\_, "The Nixon Administration at the Halfway Mark," op. cit., p. 11.

47. G. I. Svyatov, G. S. Sergeyev, "Priorities and Alternatives in the U.S. Federal Budget," SShA, No. 10 (October, 1974), p. 74.

48. A. G. Mileikovsky, "A Valuable Study of American Monopoly Capitalism," (Review of I. I. Beglov's SShA: Sobstvennost' i Vlast') ibid., No. 3 (March, 1972), p. 94.

49. G. A. Arbatov, "The Nixon Administration at the Halfway Mark," op. cit., p. 11.

50. See, for example, V. Nazarevsky, "U.S. Aggressor's Troubles at Home," International Affairs, No. 8, 1966, pp. 46-48.

51. G. A. Arbatov, "The Nixon Administration at the Halfway Mark," op. cit., p. 11.

52. See, for example, N. D. Turkatenko, "U.S. Corporations in the Context of Detente," ibid., No. 6 (June, 1974), p. 36, where it is suggested that "the factor of military might. . . is moving into the background. . .," as a means to protect the interests of the multinational corporations. "Full emphasis is now being given to the 'primacy of economics'. . . ."

53. Ye. G. Kruglov, "American Monopolies and the War in Vietnam," ibid., No. 10 (October, 1970), pp. 69-70.

54. G. A. Arbatov, "Soviet-American Relations in the 1970's," op. cit., p. 33.

55. Zorin, op. cit., p. 5. A veteran journalist, then a leading member of the Institute staff, Zorin had visited the United States in the early 1960's. When I met him in Moscow in 1967, he was proudly wearing a PT-109 tie clip given to him by Robert Kennedy. Though now active as a TV commentator and no longer on the Institute staff, Zorin remains a member of SShA's editorial board.

56. Yu. F. Oleshchuk, Review of Moral and Military Aspects of the War in Southeast Asia, hearings before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, May, 1970, SShA, No. 12 (December, 1970), p. 67.

57. G. Arbatov, <sup>"American</sup> "Imperialism and New World Realities," Pravda, May 4, 1971, pp. 4-5; Current Digest of the Soviet Press (CDSP), XXIII, No. 18 (June 1, 1971), pp. 1-2.

58. Geyevsky, op. cit., p. 6.

59. Zorin, op. cit., p. 10.

60. G. A. Arbatov and V. V. Zhurkin, "The Approach to Negotiation," Doktrina Niksona, op. cit., p. 44.
61. Geyevsky, op. cit., p. 6.
62. Ibid., pp. 7-8.
63. G. Arbatov, "On Soviet-American Relations," Kommunist, No. 3 (February, 1973), p. 107.
64. Ibid.
65. Ibid., pp. 107-108.
66. V. V. Zhurkin, "The Policy of Imperialism--The Basic Source of International Conflicts and Crises," Mezhdunarodnye Konflikty, V. V. Zhurkin and E. M. Primakov, eds. (Moscow: Izd. Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya, 1972), pp. 24-25.
67. V. M. Berezhkov, "The Only Alternative," SShA, No. 9 (September, 1974), p. 3.
68. I. A. Geyevsky, "The Black Struggle: Certain Theoretical Problems," ibid., No. 4 (April, 1971), p. 25.
69. Shvedkov, op. cit., p. 33.
70. See A. G. Mileikovsky, "Crisis Processes in the 'Consumer Society'," Parts I and II, SShA, Nos. 4-5, (April-May, 1974).
71. "Scholarly Conference at the USA Institute," ibid., No. 12 (December, 1972), p. 33.
72. Boffa, op. cit., p. B1.
73. Zorin, op. cit., p. 9.
74. Krasnaya zvezda, January 25, 1975, p. 3; FBIS, January 31, 1975, p. R3.

## PART II.

1. Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism, op. cit., p. 327.
2. Ibid., p. 326.



3. Lenin on the United States, (New York: International Publishers, 1970), p. 401.

4. See Griffiths, op. cit., passim.

5. Gromyko, 1036 dni. . . , op. cit., p. 93.

6. \_\_\_\_\_, Diplomatiya. . . , op. cit., pp. 234-243.

7. A. A. Bessmenykh, "The Diplomatic Apparatus," in SShA: Vneshnepoliticheskii mekhanizm, Yu. A. Shvedkov, ed. (Moscow: Izd. Nauka, 1972), p. 104.

8. Yu. A. Shvedkov, "The Main Centers of Administration," ibid., p. 78.

9. Turkatenko, op. cit., p. 30.

10. S. M. Menshikov, Ekonomicheskaya politika Pravitel'stva Kennedy, 1961-1963 (Moscow: Izd. "Mysl," 1964), pp. 114-115.

11. A. Yu. Borisov, Voprosy istorii, 1969, No. 9, p. 184.

12. N. N. Yakovlev, Prestupivshiye gran' Moscow: Izd. Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya, 1970), p. 6.

13. Washington Post, October 27, 1973.

14. G. A. Arbatov, Ideologicheskaya bor'ba v sovremennykh mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniyakh (Moscow: Politizdat, 1970), p. 259.

15. Inozemtsev, "The U.S.A. Today. . . ," op. cit., p. 12.

16. "Text of Gromyko speech at UN General Assembly," Pravda, September 26, 1973, p. 4; FBIS, September 27, 1973, p. A5.

17. Yu. A. Shvedkov, "Strategy, Management and the Foreign Policy Process," SShA: Vneshnepoliticheskii mekhanizm, op. cit., pp. 22-23, 37.

18. Gromyko, 1036 dni. . . , op. cit., p. 158.

19. Ibid., p. 224.

20. Shvedkov, "Strategy, Management. . . ," op. cit., p. 23.

21. Gromyko, Diplomatiya. . . , op. cit., pp. 229-230.

22. V. V. Zhurkin, "The United States and International Political Crises," SShA, No. 12 (December, 1970), p. 22.

23. Gromyko, Diplomatiya. . . , op. cit., p. 231.

24. \_\_\_\_\_, 1036 dnei. . . , op. cit., p. 82.

25. \_\_\_\_\_, Diplomatiya. . . , op. cit., p. 230.

26. \_\_\_\_\_, "Changing Moods," SShA, No. 4 (April, 1973), p. 74.

27. D. Tomashevsky, "Towards a Radical Restructuring of International Relations, MEMO, No. 1, 1974; FBIS, February 3, 1975, p. All.

28. "Summit Meetings," editorial, SShA, No. 6 (June, 1974), p. 3.

29. Shvedkov, "The Main Centers. . . ," op. cit., p. 46.

30. See Yakovlev's Prestupivshiye gran' (They Exceed the Bounds) op. cit.

31. V. A. Shvetsov, "The Role of Congress," SShA: Vneshnepoliticheskiy mekhanizm, op. cit., p. 259.

32. A. O. Portnyagan, "Criticism of Pentagon Plans in the Area of the Indian Ocean," SShA, No. 3 (March, 1975), pp. 75-76.

33. V. S. Anichkina, "Struggle in Congress on Soviet-American Relations," ibid., No. 6 (June, 1974), pp. 78-79.

34. Shvetsov, op. cit., p. 278.

35. Ibid., p. 269.

36. D. N. Konovalov and V. A. Savel'yev, "Action to Limit Presidential War Powers," SShA, No. 2 (February, 1974), p. 97.

37. Anichkina, op. cit., p. 80.

38. Shvetsov, op. cit., p. 278, and Konovalov and Savel'yev, op. cit., p. 94.

39. Ye I. Popova, "The Senate and Strategic Arms Limitation," SShA, No. 4 (April, 1974), p. 23.

40. Konovalov and Savel'yev, op. cit., p. 94.

41. P. M. Malakhin, "Most-Favored Nation Treatment in U.S. Foreign Trade Policy," SShA, No. 10 (October, 1974), p. 112.
42. Anichkina, op. cit., pp. 79-80.
- 42A. Popova, op. cit., pp. 13-24.
43. Ibid., p. 22.
44. Shvetsov, op. cit., p. 276.
45. Ibid., p. 278.
46. Kononov and Savel'yev, op. cit., pp. 94-95.
47. G. A. Trofimenko, "The Soviet-U.S. SALT Agreements," SShA, No. 9 (September, 1972), p. 11 and M. A. Mil'shteyn, "Progress Along the Main Salient," ibid., No. 2 (February, 1975), p. 7.
48. SShA, No. 10 (October, 1974), p. 77.
49. Shvetsov, op. cit., p. 278.
50. See Portnyagan, op. cit., passim, Popova, op. cit., passim, and V. A. Linnik and V. A. Saval'yev, "Departure of William Fulbright," SShA, No. 2 (February, 1975), pp. 122-126, (which should be compared with Robert Kaiser's "Soviets: Zionists Beat Fulbright," Washington Post, June 8, 1974).
51. Shvedkov, "Strategy, Management. . .," op. cit., p. 35.
52. S. B. Chetverikov, "'Organizational Problems' of Foreign Policy" SShA, No. 8 (August, 1974), pp. 32-33.
53. Ibid., p. 29.
54. Ibid.
55. Gromyko, "1036 dnei. . .," op. cit., p. 142.
56. Ibid., p. 89.
57. Ibid., pp. 264-265.
58. Arbatov, "Soviet-American Relations. . .," op. cit., p. 4.
59. Chetverikov, op. cit., pp. 31-32.



60. Shvedkov, "Strategy, Management. . . ," op. cit., pp. 20-21.
61. Chetverikov, op. cit., p. 31.
62. Shvedkov, "Strategy, Management. . . ," op. cit., pp. 23-24.
63. Chetverikov, op. cit., p. 34.
64. Ibid., p. 31. For a sympathetic account of the "bitter intrabureaucratic struggle provoked by the reform--in which all agencies concerned with foreign policy sought "to defend their own purely departmental interests and prerogatives," see Yu. A. Shvedkov and P. T. Lesnoy, "Washington's Administrative Concerns," SShA, No. 11 (November, 1970), p. 36.
65. Chetverikov, op. cit., p. 31.
66. Yu. I. Bobrakov and V. T. Novikov, "The Economic Levers," SShA: Vneshnepoliticheskii mekhanizm, op. cit., p. 189.
67. Shvedkov, "The Main Centers. . . ," op. cit., p. 81.
68. Bobrakov and Novikov, op. cit., p. 209.
69. Bessmenykh, op. cit., pp. 115-118. See also N. A. Olenov, "The Intelligence Community," SShA: Vneshnepoliticheskii mekhanizm, op. cit., p. 183.
70. Bessmenykh, op. cit., pp. 105-106, 93-94.
71. Arbatov, "The Nixon Administration at the Halfway Mark," op. cit., p. 12.
72. \_\_\_\_\_, "Outlook for Soviet-American Detente," SShA, No. 2 (February, 1972), p. 30. While Acheson refers to an argument in the "State Department itself. . . between the Planning Staff /with whom he sided/ and Soviet experts" (Present at the Creation (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1969), pp. 375-376), Arbatov writes that "the policy planners and then Secretary of State Acheson opposed the academic Soviet-ologists /vystupili protiv uchenykh-sovetologov/." Is Arbatov simply a hasty reader or does he assume that there is no meaningful difference between the two?
73. Bessmenykh, op. cit., pp. 98, 89.
74. Ibid., p. 102.
75. Chetverikov, op. cit., p. 34.

76. Shvedkov, "Strategy, Management. . . ," op. cit., p. 34.
77. V. M. Kulagin, "The Military Complex," SShA: Vneshnepoliticheski mekhanizm, op. cit., pp. 133-134. See also V. Osipov, "A Complex of Opponents of Detente," Izvestia, February 15, 1975, p. 4; FBIS, February 24, 1975, p. A9.
78. Kulagin, op. cit., p. 135.
79. Chetverikov, op. cit., p. 33.
80. Ibid.
81. Kulagin, op. cit., p. 139.
82. Ibid., p. 154.
83. Ibid., p. 144.
84. Tsagolov, op. cit., p. 26.
85. N. G. Zyabliuk, "Lobbyism in the USA's Political Mechanism," SShA, No. 12 (December, 1974), p. 114.
86. Yu. F. Oleshuk, "On the Theory of 'Limited Detente'," SShA, No. 4 (April 1975), p. 9.
87. Arbatov, "Outlook for Soviet-American Detente," op. cit., p. 26.
88. Kulagin, op. cit., pp. 135-136.
89. Ibid., p. 148.
90. Trofimenko, "The Soviet-U.S. SALT Agreements," op. cit., pp. 8-9.
91. M. A. Mil'shteyn and L. S. Semeyko, "The Problem of the Inadmissability of a Nuclear Conflict," SShA, No. 11 (November, 1974), p. 11.
92. Chetverikov, op. cit., p. 33.
93. Ibid., p. 32.
94. Tsagolov, op. cit., p. 26.
95. D. N. Konovalov, "The Trident Program," SShA, No. 11 (November, 1974), p. 69.

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5. Arbatov, Ideologicheskaya bor'ba. . . , op. cit., pp. 250, 251. He condemns unnamed "left-sectarian elements" who regard "imperialism as some deliberately abstract, almost mystical force" and "ignores all its inner shadings and contradictions." (p. 248) These distinctions must be borne in mind, he writes, "so that we do not. . . artificially increase the number of our enemies. . . ." (p. 132).

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13. Editorial, "The Year 1975," SShA, No. 1 (January, 1975), p. 4.

14. Arbatov, "New Frontiers. . . ," op. cit., p. 4. In 1937, Stalin rejected as "rotten" and "dangerous" the theory that with every success in the construction of socialism in the USSR, the "class enemy becomes more and more tractable." On the contrary, he told the Party Central Committee, "the farther we advance, the greater will be the fury of the remnants of the exploiting classes, the sooner will they resort to sharper forms of struggle." (Mastering Bolshevism.) This argument served, domestically, as a justification for the blood purge of that year. In foreign policy, it was the rationale for unceasing vigilance and the maximization of power against the historically doomed but ever-more dangerous imperialists.

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